P 4267

The Nazis Go Underground

BY Curt Riess

TOTAL ESPIONAGE

Underground Europe

HIGH STAKES

THE SELF-BETRAYED

THE INVASION OF GERMANY

THE NAZIS GO UNDERGROUND

Curt Riess THE NAZIS GO UNDERGROUND



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To Walter Winchell Courageous Fighter Against the Nazi Underworld

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Introduction

AT THE end of August 1943 Dr. Alexander Loudon, Netherlands Ambassador to Washington, made a most interesting forecast about the outcome and aftermath of the war. He predicted that, with defeat, the German General Staff, the Nazi leaders, and in particular the Gestapo, would go underground to prepare for the next war. As for this war, he said, the Nazis knew that they had already lost it, and were willing and eager to get it over with.

The Ambassador was the first person to suggest such a development. But in the months since he uttered his somewhat startling prophecy similar hints have appeared with increasing frequency in English, Swiss, and Swedish newspapers. Toward the end of October 1943, for instance, the Swedish daily, Nydag, reported that a vast organization all over Germany was preparing to go underground when Germany is defeated; that the "General Staff" of this "illegal Nazi party" had been established in Munich; that secret radio stations, a clandestine press, and secret arsenals of arms, ammunition, explosives, and sabotage material were being prepared; that wholesale sabotage was to start in Germany in case of an Allied occupation after defeat; that SS men were being selected and trained as guerrillas.

Much of this and similar information could be traced to the Grand Hotel in Stockholm, the most prolific rumor factory of World War II, or to equally "reliable" sources in Portugal and Switzerland. In a few cases it was established, however, beyond doubt that the sources were inside Germany and that they were extremely sound. It cannot be doubted that for some time the Nazis have indeed been going underground.

Whom among the German people do we mean when we use the term "the Nazis"? Certainly we must consider that the overwhelming majority of the Germans is to be included in this category. But

even if we figured on only 20 or 30 per cent of the entire German population being real Nazis, it stands to reason that ten to twenty million men and women cannot easily go underground. Not even the apparatus of the Nazi party, let alone the enormous apparatus of the Nazi state, could successfully make such an attempt. Therefore, the coming Nazi underground can scarcely involve more than a minute percentage of the entire Nazi gang. The Nazi government can never go underground. But cadres can. The party will be stamped out. But the movement will survive—underground.

It can be done; and though it sounds incredible it is the logical and reasonable thing for the Nazis to do. For, once the military collapse of Germany is an accomplished fact, they cannot hope to survive in any other way. The Allies have sworn to destroy the Nazis. Even their own allies inside Germany, the generals and industrialists who created them, and who have gone such a long way with them, mainly for reasons of political and economic expediency, will try to dissociate themselves from the Nazis—on the surface, at least. The German people as a whole, who flocked so eagerly to the swastika flag because it seemed to be the least risky and most promising step at the time, will try to denounce them for precisely the same reason. Surrounded by enemies or potential enemies on all sides, the Nazis—or the Nazi cadres—have only one way open. They must hide; they must play dead; they must wait.

The Nazis themselves have known this for a long time, and have long made preparations for exactly such an eventuality. In fact, by the time this book has reached its public their preparations will have progressed to the stage of readiness. The war may go on for some time, but as far as the future of the Nazi idea is concerned, the war can be considered only as a delaying action which will not only gain time for the preparation of the coming underground, but also for the preparation of World War III.

In a way this is one and the same thing, since the ultimate goal of the Nazis who continue after the defeat will be another war. World War III is by no means a product of the overheated imagination of diehards among the Nazis. Even the most realistic among the German generals have begun to think and talk seriously about it. General Otto von Stuelpnagel has already prepared a memorandum on the next war which the Algerian weekly Combat (November 28, 1943) printed. Field Marshals von Mannstein and

von Rundstedt have made speeches saying they considered the present struggle only a prelude to World War III and urging that as much as possible should be destroyed now so that the occupied countries cannot be rebuilt by the time Germany is ready to strike again.

This book attempts to describe the plans and preparations the Nazis are making to go underground—in anticipation of World War III. These plans are not quite so melodramatic and thrilling as the reports quoted from the Swedish newspaper. Still, they are unusual and breath-taking and perhaps even more impressive because behind them is felt the ice-cold determination of the Nazi organizers. This iron will of theirs may not manifest itself in sabotage and guerrilla warfare; it may not manifest itself at all—on the surface. But that only means it is the more dangerous.

This book deals with facts, not dramatic and operatic speculations. It tells what has taken place; not what might have taken place. It reveals and surveys what will take place if nothing unforeseen occurs to disturb the careful plans of the Nazis.

Germany at war is by no means cut off from the rest of the world to the degree most of us believe. There have been steady leaks, and there will continue to be leaks. There are trains connecting Germany with Switzerland, planes connecting Germany with Sweden and Turkey. Not everybody on these trains and planes can be searched by the Gestapo all the time.

It even happens occasionally that letters addressed to foreign countries leave the Third Reich without being censored. This is due partly to the fact that most Nazi censors are badly overworked and have given up reading every line. But it is also due to the fact that certain censors do not want to read some messages, and even took steps to prevent their colleagues from reading them. In short, many of these censors have been extremely helpful in smuggling intelligence out of Germany. Since the war censorship had been run by the army, but toward the end of 1942 the Gestapo moved in and took over—there had been too many leaks in information. Numerous arrests were made; but the very fact that the organization was in process of change created a vacuum, so to speak, and for almost three weeks letters left and entered Germany without being censored. Since the Gestapo has taken charge of censorship it has become far more difficult to smuggle material out. And yet

it has not been entirely impossible to do so; intelligence officers and agents of countries fighting Hitler are still active among the Gestapo.

It is no exaggeration to state that at this moment more than fifty different intelligence services have agents inside Germany. Among them are, of course, those who work for the Allied and neutral countries; but there are others who work for the underground movements of occupied countries, and still others who work for different political parties in different countries, for church groups, for certain industrialists, and so on. The material contained in this book has, to a great extent, come from such sources.

The coming Nazi underground is by no means a movement—or threat—restricted to Germany proper. It will spread all over Europe; all over the world. It could not, indeed, hope for any prolonged existence if it were not able to count on assistance in our hemisphere. Its organization in Argentina is all set up and waiting impatiently for the "go-ahead" signal. Almost the same may be said of the numerous "collaborators" in the United States. It has, therefore, become imperative to consider the possibilities and potentialities of the coming Nazi underground movement in our country.

This book has a purpose beyond that of compiling sensational evidence. Its main purpose is to warn. If nothing else the last fifteen years have proved that it is an ungrateful business to warn the public against the Fascist danger. The world did not want to be warned against the Nazis. First there was a general conspiracy not to speak about the Nazis at all, and frightened people—first in Germany, later in the entire world—believed that if Hitler wasn't mentioned he somehow would become non-existent. Then, when it no longer was possible to bury him in silence, he and his movement were ridiculed by saying it seemed evident that the Nazis couldn't get anywhere and that they didn't intend to put into practice all the things they threatened. When this illusion, too, could no longer be maintained, the world decided to appease Hitler. After all, people argued, there must be a limit to the demands of the man.

But there wasn't. Whatever the Nazis were offered, they asked more. They demanded more because their real goal was what had been the goal of their predecessors and the predecessors of their predecessors—in fact, of most men who ever controlled Germany—to dominate and rule the world.

In vain was all this said and written by those of us who saw the ever-increasing danger. In vain were hundreds of books and articles published warning the world against coming events. The world preferred to play deaf and dumb.

The civilized world today has not yet overcome its desire to be deaf and dumb. While everybody who feels himself part of this civilized world knows that the Fascists must be defeated in this war, few realize that Fascism or Nazism will by no means be defeated even after the war is won. There is still a struggle ahead. The more we know this, the more clearly we understand it, the better our chance in the final battle against the enemies of freedom.

CURT RIESS

New York



The Party Must Go On

THE NAZIS went underground on May 16, 1943.

Before that day there had been many weeks of preliminary and preparatory work—work done mainly inside the so-called Gestapo building in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse, Berlin, where Himmler had his headquarters on the second floor. But on May 16 the real work began. On that day those who were in charge of it moved to a spacious house, almost a little château, at 11 Koenigsallee in Berlin-Grunewald. The whole estate, which had once belonged to a Jewish banker and had been taken over by the Nazis before the outbreak of the war, comprised more than a square mile. The rebuilt house contained large rooms on the first floor and a number of small offices on the second floor. The left wing of the main building was occupied by General Werner Heissmeyer of the SS and his staff, the right wing by General Fritz Kaltenbrunner of the SS. In the large, well-kept garden that surrounded the house some of the old trees had been cut off to make room for small office bungalows. The archives were stored in a bombproof cellar.

I quote from a report: "It was the Intelligence Department of the Gestapo which moved to 11 Koenigsallee on May 15 and 16. From May 16 on the Intelligence Department of the Gestapo was split into two parts. About half of the officials went on as usual in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse. The rest worked in Koenigsallee under Heissmeyer and Kaltenbrunner."

Strange orders began to issue from 11 Koenigsallee during the following weeks, most of them unintelligible to those who received them. It was, for instance, decreed that certain units within a certain government department should be dissolved and that other new units should be formed in other departments. Minor officials were suddenly transferred into departments for which they had never worked. From September 1943 on these strange orders increased. Some important departments were suddenly dissolved or

completely reorganized or merged with other departments. All these orders were signed by Heinrich Himmler, who had by then become General Plenipotentiary of the Reich.

At 11 Koenigsallee everyone worked feverishly. They had better means for preparing to go underground than any other potential underground movement in the entire previous history of the world. They had all the machinery of the well-organized Nazi state. And they had a great deal of time to prepare everything. They worked very hard, but they did nothing hastily, left nothing to chance. Everything was thought through logically and organized to the last detail. Himmler planned with the utmost coolness. He chose for the work only the best-qualified experts—the best qualified, that is, in matters of underground work.

What, exactly, does it mean to go underground?

It means that a person or a number of persons, a unit, a force, an idea, a movement that had been visible before becomes invisible. It is no longer represented to the outside world. It has become anonymous. Its existence is known only by the effects of its actions.

To go underground is for a single person, and even more so for a large number of persons, first of all a question of organization. The Nazis had always been very fond of and very good at organization. Long before Hitler took power the party was organized down to the last detail. In fact, the party apparatus contained a whole state machinery within itself. Like all other parties, it had experts for foreign policy, agriculture, commerce, et cetera. But, unlike other parties, the Nazi party had built up around these experts elaborate organizations which functioned exactly like government departments around a Minister. The parallelism became evident the moment the Nazis took over the government of Germany.

Hitler was the leader of the party. In 1933 he became the Chancellor of the Reich, that is, leader of the government. The men who had acted as his personal secretaries took charge of the chancellery. The party man who was the expert on agriculture in the party, Walther Darré, became the Minister of Agriculture and his whole office moved into his ministry. The Propaganda Chief of the party, Joseph Goebbels, became Propaganda Minister. The party expert on colonial questions was General Epp. And as soon as Hitler de-

cided that he wanted to have a Minister of Colonies, the general got the job. The police of the party was the SS (Elite Guard). The secret police of the party was the SS Sicherheitsamt (Security Department). Less than one year after Hitler had become Chancellor the chief of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, had become chief of the police, and the chief of the Security Department of the SS had become chief of the Gestapo (Secret State Police).

All this could be done without a hitch because the different departments in the party had been organized parallel to the particular departments in the government (except in those cases in which such departments did not exist in the government and had to be created afterward, as in the case of the Propaganda Ministry). In brief: the apparatus of the party was simply transferred over to the apparatus of the state.

Now, when the party wished to go underground and still retain its organization, all it had to do was simply to act in reverse order: that is, to transfer—or, more accurately perhaps, retransfer—the apparatus of the state into the party apparatus—a not-too-difficult enterprise, since both apparatuses were still organized along parallel lines.

The underground organization of the Nazis, then, will be formed by groups, units, departments, organizations parallel to those existing in today's state government. That does not mean that all the men at present working in the state apparatus will be shuttled over into the parallel underground party apparatus. While some of the men from the state apparatus have been transferred into the parallel party apparatus since the summer of 1943, in many instances the very opposite transfer has been made, in order to place some "dependable" men inconspicuously in the state apparatus in such a way that they may later be able to collaborate closely with the parallel department in the underground. This, no doubt, will make the work of the underground much easier.

On the morning of November 9, 1942, an important conference had taken place in the private office of Heinrich Himmler in the Brown House in Munich. Herr Himmler had given specific orders that he did not want to be disturbed and that nobody was to be admitted. Not even his most trusted lieutenants were present. He was all alone with Martin Bormann who, in 1941, had succeeded

Rudolf Hess as deputy leader of the National Socialist German Workers' party.

There were a number of festivities going on in Munich at the time, as was always the case on November 9. In 1942 it was nineteen years since Hitler had made his famous Beer Hall Putsch, his first attempt to assume power in Germany. It had been, to be sure, an ill-fated attempt; and it seemed shortly afterward as though the world would never hear of Adolf Hitler again—if, indeed, it had heard of him up to then. But little more than nine years later the same Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.

A symbolic date, this November 9. For this time, in 1942, things again looked very black for the Nazi party, perhaps even more hopeless than they had nineteen years ago. Two days before the Americans had landed in North Africa, and though Hitler had declared that Africa did not matter, nobody felt there was any reason to cheer about it.

As in 1923, the victory no longer seemed an assured thing. Now again it was the question of survival that assumed utmost importance.

Later Himmler was quoted as summing up his talk with Bormann to his most trusted lieutenants in these words: "It is possible that Germany will be defeated on the military front. It is even possible that she may have to capitulate. But never must the National Socialist German Workers' party capitulate. That is what we have to work for from now on."

In spite of the fact that Bormann belongs to the handful of the most important men of the Third Reich he is practically unknown to the great majority of the German people, to say nothing of the outside world. The few pictures show him to be a stocky, bulky man, with brownish hair and without distinguishing features of any kind, one who would blend into almost any background without being noticed twice. A member of the movement since before the 1923 putsch, he had achieved so little prominence during the fighting years of the party that in 1935 he was not even mentioned in the Führer-Lexikon, the Who's Who of the party. Later, particularly after he had taken Hess's place, he had made himself known—and by no means agreeably so. In charge of the party chancellery, he tried to grab for himself whatever he could, wherever he could: power, money, riches, and, above all, information, and soon became

one of the strongest forces inside the party. He also became one of its best-informed members. After Rudolf Hess went to England and didn't return, the men who had worked with him for so many years, the countless little officials of the mammoth organization controlling the life of the party, began to wonder. Goebbels could -perhaps-explain away the Hess flight to the mass of the German people. He could not convince the men who had worked with the former deputy leader that he had suddenly gone crazy. They had found Hess an extremely intelligent and dependable man. Now they were supposed to believe that he had become mentally unbalanced and had gone on a suicidal trip. They guessed the secret of this trip; they took it for granted that Hess had gone to England to talk peace. And that meant that the war was not going according to plan. Bormann learned about the misgivings of the party key men right away. To what extent he took them seriously, no one will probably ever know. But so much can be said: he must have known more about the doubts that existed inside the party than most of the other party big shots.

It is said in party circles that nothing ever escapes Bormann. He is much less colorful, and certainly less talented, than Hess. He has never produced as many ideas as did his predecessor, but he was and is a thorough man. Nothing ever escapes Bormann. In a way he is even better informed than Himmler. While the secret police have, in the main, been interested only in what people do or intend to do, Bormann even knows what they are likely to think under given circumstances. He may not have known on November 9, 1942, that the war was being lost. But he knew that the key men of the party all over Germany harbored doubts and that these doubts were growing hourly.

It was only fitting that the initial conversation covering this subject should have taken place between Himmler and Bormann, for these two men represented the party better than any other two men that one might find within its ranks. Himmler symbolized the power of the party, Bormann the rank and file. Himmler represented the brains, Bormann the life blood of the party. Himmler knew what was necessary, Bormann knew what was possible.

During the weeks following his conference with Bormann, Heinrich Himmler called many other meetings in which, besides Bor-

mann, such Nazi leaders as Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, Fritz Kaltenbrunner, SS general and head of the Gestapo, and Konstantin Hierl, Reichsarbeitsfuehrer (Reich Workers' Leader) took part. During these weeks Germany's strategic situation, too, was rapidly changing for the worse on every front. The Americans were advancing steadily in Africa; Rommel was being chased by General Montgomery. It seemed only a question of time now, and very little time at that, until everything would be over with the Afrika Korps. On the Russian front the Battle of Stalingrad was in its last stages. Those in the know had no illusions as to how it would end. Dr. Goebbels spoke quite freely about it to a few handpicked newspaper owners whom he entertained in his private villa in Wannsee, near Berlin. "Only a miracle can save us," he declared.

Even after this miracle had happened—even when the Russian front had been somewhat stabilized, as the Führer proclaimed in his speech of March 21, 1943—the party leaders who listened to his words knew that it would never be quite stabilized again, that no other front could be stabilized again for an indefinite time. They knew that the war was lost. In fact, all the plans they were developing even then were based on this certainty, and on the assumption that Germany, or most of it at least, would be occupied for many years after the war by English, American, and Russian troops mixed with units of the French, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Norwegian armies. There would also be a civilian occupation. Every branch of the administration of Germany would be supervised or controlled by Allied officials. This much the Nazis were convinced of by March 1943. They were determined to survive. And so they started to plan for the future. These plans were based on the most pessimistic of speculations. The Nazis did not intend to have their new plan fail through the advent of some unforeseen turn for the worst. Instead, they planned for the worst. If the worst did not happen, so much the better for the plan and for themselves.

While German propaganda boasted that the Russian front was being stabilized, the party leaders were busily stabilizing another front.

This new front was underground.

This new front would be a fighting front too. There would be shooting and killing. There would be acts of sabotage: trains would be derailed, buildings blown up, vital food supplies interfered with,

epidemics started. There would be, above all, many kinds of resistance against whoever would then be in charge running the country. Running Germany—because the front would be Germany.

The preparatory work, then, had to be centralized. But there was some question as to where this centralization should be done. Should it be entrusted to one of Bormann's organizations, the *Verbindungsstab* (Liaison Staff) of the Führer, for instance, the machinery for which had been built up by Hess and in which key men of all party and state organizations were represented? Some of the Nazis were of the opinion that this might be an excellent idea. However, by the end of April or at the latest by the beginning of May 1943, the Gestapo, that is one of Himmler's organizations, was definitely put in charge of the entire preparatory work for the Nazi underground after the war.

There were several reasons for this move. Perhaps one of the main reasons was that Himmler, by dint of constantly simplifying his organization and increasing its efficiency, had brought it to such a state of perfection that by now the Gestapo had become by far the best-organized machine within the Third Reich—a fact which would facilitate the work considerably—while Bormann had hardly changed the much less streamlined organizations which Hess had left him. It was probably the hope that Himmler's great talent in organizing would work miracles which finally got him the job. But perhaps it was also the fact that Himmler wanted it; and the Police Minister could be strangely persistent when he wanted something for himself.

The world knows a great deal about Heinrich Himmler. And still it knows very little. He has chiefly been known all over the world and particularly inside Germany and the occupied countries as the cruel police chief of the Third Reich. So much so that Dr. Goebbels decided by the end of 1943 to distribute four million picture post cards showing a smiling Himmler talking to children, in order to prove that he is a human being even as you and I.

But there are many sides to Himmler of which very few people have ever heard. Scarcely more than a few dozen men, for instance, have ever known anything about Himmler the scholar. The evidence of his particular study was probably destroyed on November 23, 1943, when British bombs laid in ruins the building in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse. Himmler's rooms contained a small but extremely specialized private library, consisting entirely of books dealing with the subject of underground movements. There were volumes on the intrigues of the Bourbons since 1789, on the Bonaparte movement after 1815, on what happened in Prussia between 1806 and 1812. There were Kotzebue's works on the history of German orders, the writings of Lenin and Trotsky on the organization of underground movements, and those of Djershinsky—the first efficient police organizer of the Bolshevists—as well as books on the Ku Klux Klan, the Irish revolutionary movements, the German Free Corps, and *Feme* organizations of the early 1920s, et cetera.

That was what Heinrich Himmler has been interested in for a long time: underground movements of revolutionary character, underground movements of forces and personalities who had been deprived of power and wanted to stage a comeback. All these books must undoubtedly have influenced Himmler. And thus they will influence the future strategy of the Nazi underground. Germans are fond of thinking and acting in historical parallels.

The history of modern underground movements began about one hundred and fifty years ago. The man who wrote about the first movement and the secret organizations involved in it was the German Count Adolf Franz Friedrich von Knigge. He called his book, innocently enough, Über den Umgang mit Menschen (On Dealing with People). The title seemed to promise a book of etiquette, something like the one Emily Post wrote many years later. Sure enough, after a few years the publisher changed the book into one of exactly that type, although it was on a somewhat more profound and philosophical basis than its many successors were. The original book, however, was no mere work on social etiquette. It contained the laws and rules of a secret society. In short, its subject was how to deal with people in order to promote a revolution, how to form the tactics and the strategy for revolts. The original edition, of 1788, can still be found in a few libraries.

The secret society about which Knigge wrote was the organization of the *Illuminaten* whose raison d'être was to fight against the monarchic principle for the rights of the third estate and for the idea of international brotherhood. Von Knigge was more or less

the propaganda minister for this secret order, whose membership list embraced many prominent people, including even a few progressive dukes and ministers of monarchic governments in Germany. Toward the beginning of the nineteenth century German governments, and particularly the Catholic Church, started to take decisive actions against the order. As a result it became extremely dangerous to be an Illuminat. In spite of persecutions which after Napoleon's defeat were conducted mainly by Minister Metternich of Austria, then the leader of the reaction in Europe, the secret societies increased in size rather than otherwise. The most important of the newcomers to the movement was the group of the Carbonari which was founded in Italy in order to fight the tyrannical regime of the Italian princes in Naples, Florence, and other cities, as well as the Austrian Emperor, Metternich's boss, who protected these princes. The Carbonari were probably the inventors of the main unit of our modern underground movements: the cell. Their organization was divided into a number of baraccas (huts) none of which was supposed to have more than twenty members or "good cousins," as they called themselves.

The Carbonari attempted several times to upset the various monarchic regimes in Italy, becoming so dangerously active that finally belonging to their organization was declared to be high treason. Among the Carbonari was a certain Louis Napoleon, who was later to become Emperor of France and who at one time was almost arrested by the Austrians in a coup which, however, proved unsuccessful. The leadership of the organization was finally transferred from Italy to Paris, from which place the fight against reaction in other countries was to continue.

Later the Carbonari split up into many groups, the most prominent members having decided to concentrate on Italy, where they finally succeeded in bringing about a change. By that time a number of secret societies and underground movements had also developed in Russia. Strangely enough, the early members of these societies were army officers. The first important group was called the Organization of the Decembrists, the name deriving from the month of December 1825, in which they attempted an open revolt against the Czar. They were in close collaboration with a patriotic society in Warsaw whose aim it was to make Poland independent—an attempt which was also frustrated by the Czarist troops.

In spite of the defeat of the Decembrists and their countless successors Russia was from that time on the classic proving ground for all subsequent underground societies and movements in Europe. Prominent among them were the Nihilists and the Social Revolutionaries, who succeeded in assassinating one Czar and several princes; in spite of opposition of unbelievable cruelty from the secret police. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the Social Democratic party was founded and for many years existed mainly underground. The revolt of 1905 and the revolution of 1917 were the final outcome of these early Socialist attempts to do away with a stupid, cruel, corrupt, and altogether antiquated system of government.

Between 1806 and 1812 Germany, or rather Prussia, had been the scene of still another underground movement. Napoleon had defeated the Prussians and had instituted a rigid control over what was left of the Prussian Army. It was then that the Prussian War Minister, Scharnhorst, with his helpers Clausewitz and Gneisenau, decided to reorganize the army, although not openly, of course, since Napoleon would have put a stop to that. It was the first army underground movement ever to be attempted in modern times, and it became the pattern for the German underground movement after 1918.

Scharnhorst decided that in order to build up the new army it would be necessary to re-educate the Germans. And he began by seeing to it that the army, that is to say, he, as its representative, was put in charge of the plan of education in Prussian schools. This plan consisted mainly in promoting national feeling in the children and in instructing them as fully as possible in matters which would help to make them good soldiers later on. He also caused complete lists to be drawn up of all those who were able to serve in an army. These lists were compiled in a very simple manner: Every priest or minister was required to deliver a list of every pupil receiving religious instruction as soon as he became fourteen years old. This idea had been developed by the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe, a sovereign governing a tiny German state. Scharnhorst adopted the scheme, which became the basis of the system of universal service. Thus it was that between 1806 and 1812, under Napoleon's very nose, there was laid the foundation of a new Prussian army which was to be in large part responsible for his defeat at

Leipzig in 1814, and which also helped to deal him the final crushing blow at Waterloo.

Strangely enough, among the underground movements for which the Nazis, or at least a few of them, have always had a particular interest was the Communist underground of the early twentieth century and the Trotsky underground in the later nineteen twenties and early thirties. On one occasion, during the late twenties, Hitler himself asked a few of his lieutenants what they thought of Leon Trotsky. Since Trotsky was a Communist and a Jew on top of that, these lieutenants pretended to feel disgust and horror at the mere mention of his name. The Führer, however, did not agree with them. "You should read his books," he barked. "We can learn a lot from him."

At least one of the Nazis besides Hitler did read Trotsky's books and became very familiar with his ideas and methods of organization. That man, of course, was Himmler. He also knew many things about Trotsky's methods, because Rudolf Hess and several other men of the Hess organization were at different times in close touch with the Russian Communist leader. The development of the Trotsky movement may have given Himmler more than one idea for the underground movement he is now working out. Trotsky was deprived of any direct power after his exclusion from the Russian Government. But even then he still retained considerable indirect power, because he did not lose contact with his adherents. many of whom kept their key positions within the apparatus of the state. If, as frequently happened, one of these men was found out to be a conspirator against the Soviet Russian Government, all he had to do was to say that he had been wrong, to repent, and in most cases he would be reinstalled and could continue exercising his subversive influence. It was thus that Trotsky, or, rather, Trotsky's movement, continued to hold a great number of positions within the very regime it wanted to do away with: within the party, within the army, within the secret police, and, above all, within the diplomatic service. It was at least theoretically possible that the day would come when all these men would take over their departments in which they were working. And thus, indeed, an underground movement could have taken over the whole government and the running of the country without any great difficulty. And they would have succeeded if it had not been for the fact that the men the Trotsky underground had to fight—Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich—were men who themselves had formerly been members of an underground and thus soon became suspicious of what was being plotted against them. The final failure of the Trotskyists did not prove, however, that the principle of their organization had been wrong. On the contrary, the very fact of its near success must have proved to Himmler, at least, that an underground would have ever so much more chance of ultimate success if it could put some of its men within the government or within governmental departments of the regime it desired to do away with.

But Himmler had not merely his books to draw ideas from. He also had his own experiences in the underground.

In the first place, the Nazis themselves had once gone underground. That was in 1923, after the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. Even Hitler had to disappear for some time after that incident. Before his subsequent arrest he was able to get in touch with other members of the movement, who immediately started to take measures to prevent the dispersion of the members of the then-outlawed Nazi party. The party did not have to stav underground for long that time. This does not mean that it could not have done so. It just happened that it was not necessary. The republic allowed its mortal foe to continue the fight against it openly. There was another time, only a short while before Hitler came to power, when it looked as though the Nazis would have to go underground again. In 1931 and 1932 it was touch and go as to whether the Republican government would outlaw the party. Hitler at that time wanted to transfer the central organization of the party to the Free City of Danzig, where he would have been out of the reach of the German police. Himmler and Konstantin Hierl were feverishly organizing cells which could continue their work inside Germany. It may be interesting to note that the man who helped them in this work was the former Communist Richard Muchow, who had entered the Nazi party only in 1930.

The over-all organization of which the cells were part was the Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation (National Socialist Organization of Shops). Whenever these cells became too big, that is, as soon as they had more than ten members, a subdivision

was made. The larger part of the cells continued to be openly pro-Nazi and to indulge in all kinds of propagandistic activities, while a few men withdrew themselves until the time when the Nazi party would be suspended, and the members who were officially known would not be able to continue their work.

But the danger passed, and the Nazis, instead of going underground, took over the state. And the only practical experience Himmler had was the supervision of the Nazi underground in Austria till Hitler took over that country in March 1938 too.

However, Himmler was to have other experiences with underground movements during the following years, though he was not to enjoy them. He made the acquaintance of the anti-Nazi underground movements in every single country into which the Nazis marched: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Holland, Belgium, Norway, France, all over the Balkans, and Soviet Russia. In spite of his Gestapo, in spite of an almost perfect organization, in spite of an army of Quislings and Nazi sympathizers, in spite of the unbelievably cruel means he used to combat these patriots, Himmler finally learned the truth of the famous words of Machiavelli: "The prince must be on his guard, for he can never so rob a man that there remains to him no knife by which he can avenge himself." Being Himmler, it can be taken for granted that he also picked up a few new tricks from the anti-Nazi underground movements he was combating which he will use in due time in his own underground machine.

In August 1943 Himmler became General Plenipotentiary of the Reich and consequently outranked all the other cabinet ministers. The parallel between the government and the coming underground was thus established at the top. The General Plenipotentiary of the Third Reich now became the General Plenipotentiary of the underground—or vice versa.

The work which had already been started could now go on at an accelerated speed.

Who were the men in charge of the work of preparing for the new underground movement? The logical partner for Himmler, chief administrator of all state organizations, was Bormann, the chief administrator of all Nazi organizations. The third man to be assigned to the task was Konstantin Hierl, Minister without Port-

folio, who has proved himself one of the best organizers in the Third Reich. His title was Reichsarbeitsfuehrer (Reich Workers' Leader) and he had under his command ten thousand administrative workers and a reservoir of many millions of young men and women. For some time—at least till March 1943—Bormann had suggested Robert Ley, Minister of Labor and leader of the Arbeitsfront (Workers' Front), but Himmler, or rather Himmler's men, had objected to Ley, on the grounds that the Arbeitsfront was too uncertain and undependable an organization for underground purposes, since most of the German workers, although they had joined either the party or the Arbeitsfront, were still considered rather leftist by the Gestapo.

Behind Himmler, Bormann, and Hierl a whole General Staff was organized to do the preliminary work, among them the SS Generals Werner Heissmeyer and Fritz Kaltenbrunner. Mention was also made of the possible role of the Minister of Armaments, Munitions, and Production, Professor Albert Speer.

All these men were working with only one idea in mind: the party must go on, no matter what happened. Gauleiter Wagner had expressed this idea on January 29, 1943, to a small gathering of party leaders in the Brown House in Munich, when he declared: "If we win the war, it is the party that wins. If we lose this war, it is the army that loses." All of which was said with much more punch in a slogan which Goebbels was to utter ten months later, toward the end of 1943: "No matter what happens to Germany, the party must go on."

No matter what happens to Germany... That has been the leitmotiv of every meeting of the Nazi leaders since that first one between Himmler and Bormann in November 1942, meetings of which no mention has ever been made on the official radio or in any newspaper, but which have taken place with strange regularity in Berlin, Munich, Weimar, Badenweiler, and in any number of small, almost unknown towns.

No matter what happens to Germany . . . No, these Nazis who were so concerned that the party and the Nazi ideology should continue were not exactly idealists. They had always been more concerned with their own interests than with ideals. To them the party and its principles existed, not for the benefit of the people as a whole, but for the satisfaction of their own personal and pri-

vate desires. And what did they want for themselves? Power. Some of them, like Goering, were fond of showy uniforms, shining medals, big spectacles. They wanted power to satisfy their vanity; they wanted to play with their power, to let everybody know that they possessed it. Others, like Goebbels, wanted power in order to be able to dominate people, to make them say and think what they wanted them to say and think, no matter what the people really thought and liked to say. Others, like Heydrich and Streicher, wanted power to satisfy an innate sadistic streak. Still others—perhaps most of them—craved power because of the security that they believed only power could confer.

It is only logical that these men desired to keep their power, once they had achieved it. But how could they keep it? The promise that the Nazi idyll would last a thousand years, that their children and grandchildren would take over from them, no longer seemed likely to be fulfilled by the end of 1942. It looked indeed very much as if the opposite would happen. If Germany did not win the war, would not the Allies make good their promise and rid the world of the Nazis, or, as they were termed, the war criminals? And even if they were not destroyed by the Allies, were these Nazis not threatened with annihilation at the hands of their own allies, the generals and industrialists who were eager to create alibis for themselves, even before this final defeat? But the Nazis did not want to be annihilated or liquidated. They did not want to disappear. They wanted very much to go on, to go on . . .

They wanted to cling to the power they still possessed. But this power was shrinking in their own hands. The war was still being fought on foreign soil; yet with every new day the power the Germans wielded over the people of the occupied countries proved to be more and more of an illusion. Their prestige in the neutral countries was rapidly sinking.

They knew that something had to be done if they were not to lose this all-important power forever. Something had to be done, and now, before it was too late, before the war was finished.

Six months before he became Chancellor, Hitler had refused to enter a coalition government and make compromises. At that time he had created a slogan: "All power to the party!" Now, in 1943, this slogan was revived. But this time it had a different meaning.

2

Those Who Paid Hitler

THE FOLLOWING IS from a letter written in Lisbon:

In the middle of May 1943 the leaders of German industry, Krupp von Bohlen-Halbach and Baron Georg von Schnitzler, called an important meeting. It took place at Château Huegel, where the Krupps reside.

Château Huegel lies in the near vicinity of Essen. It is a large house with high-ceilinged, cold rooms, almost always deserted. A number of important meetings have taken place here in the past. It was here that the Kaiser consulted with leaders of the German industry during the last war; here Herr von Krupp received Friedrich Ebert, the Socialist President of the German Republic. It was here that Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, presented the Young Plan to German industry in the spring of 1929, and here that he decided to torpedo this very plan which he himself had negotiated, because the industrial leaders didn't approve of it. It was from here, too, that Hitler set out to speak to the Krupp workers in 1936.

The letter continued:

Present at the meeting in May 1943 was fat Otto Pietzsch, the owner of the biggest machine factory in Germany. He looked disgusted, and talked disgustedly about the war. [AUTHOR'S NOTE: By that time Tunis and Bizerte had been taken by the Allies, and Africa had been rid of the Germans.]

Herr von Schroeder tried to calm Pietzsch down, but Pietzsch became very angry. Herr Hallersleben, president of the Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken, also did not seem to be in the best of humor. He muttered something to the effect that he could not be made responsible for not delivering on time, since the English bombs had destroyed part of his factory, and complained because he had not been advised to

build his plants underground while there was still time. Sitting next to Schroeder was Dr. Otto Fischer, chief of the Reichskreditanstalt. At the other end of the table were Herr Krupp von Bohlen-Halbach and Herr von Schnitzler, chairman of the board of directors of the I. G. Farben. It seems that these two had already conferred before the others joined them, and had agreed on a division of roles. Krupp said something to the effect that there would be a great many changes, and that all of them would have to work together closely so that any "unpleasant complications" would be avoided. As to the changes necessary, he himself would see to it personally that they were carried out inside Germany with the least possible disturbance to business, while Baron von Schnitzler would try to use his many contacts abroad in order to assure some sort of collaboration with former friends in other countries.

The letter does not state it specifically, but there seems to be no doubt that these words referred to the situation which would arise after the war. It continued:

All future changes discussed at the meeting centered around the idea of divorcing German industry as far as possible from Nazism as such. Krupp and Schnitzler declared that it would be much easier for them to work after the war if the world were certain that German industry was not owned and run by the Nazis. He said that Goering as well as other influential party men saw eye to eye with him on this, and would consent to any arrangement that did not involve the prestige of the party.

Since this meeting a number of such "arrangements" have become known to the outside world. It has, for instance, been made public that such firms as Krupp, the Hamburg-America Line, and the Norddeutscher Lloyd, which were for many years under state control, have now by special law been returned to their original owners. Incidentally, these men did not lose any money as a result of the original transaction. On the contrary, they made enormous sums out of it.

At about the same time—the end of 1943—a decree was issued which stated that all Nazi party officials must cease to have any connection with private business concerns of any kind. Neutral observers thought that this decree was aimed at counteracting the growing resentment among the Germans against those Nazi officials who were growing rich and fat from their business connections. But the real reason was the pious hope that if the industries

were in the hands of industrialists instead of Nazi leaders, they might escape expropriation later.

The question arises: why did the German industrialists, seeing that the war was being lost, not make an honest effort to divorce themselves from the Nazis? Why did they only fake such an attempt? Why did they not desert them, instead of conspiring with them?

There are many reasons for this.

One of the most important of these reasons is that, contrary to what has been said on this subject in other countries, the industrialists have done very well under Hitler. He has liberated them from the "threat" of workers' unions. Under him they have made unbelievably huge sums of money, particularly through the rearmament which had started without delay. And they have never had to pay taxes at all comparable to those paid by big business in this country or in England—a fact which is too little known outside of Hitler Germany, though German big businessmen have always cited it in answer to the question why they helped Hitler into power.

But all these are only symptoms. More important than these symptoms is the fact that the Nazis as a dynamic movement had assured German big businessmen of basic conditions far more favorable than those they enjoyed under the republic or even under the Kaiser. Could they wish for anything better than a world constantly on the brink of new wars?

There was, however, an even more basic reason for the German industrialists to dread the passing of Nazism and to collaborate in every way possible to facilitate its comeback, a reason which perhaps can be understood only if one understands precisely what a German industrialist is, what his innermost thoughts are, what he lives for—in short, what makes him tick.

Fifty years ago a society was founded in Germany which said in the announcement of its organization: "We shall be a conquering people who take their portion of the world themselves and do not seek to receive it through the grace and benevolence of another people." This society called itself the Pan-German League. Among the original founders and behind them were some of the leading German industrialists.

Businessmen, then. But was not the language of the proclamation a strange language in the mouths of businessmen? Certainly the basic idea of the Pan-German League and its goal—world domination by Germany—had no direct connection with the business of these men. But indirectly it had connection enough.

Of course these men wanted to do business. But more important to them was that this business should be a preparation for or a proof of Germany's domination of the world. That is what they believed in and that is what they worked for. Deutschland über alles! They were patriots, if you want to call them so, albeit patriots of a strange and fanatical type, who believed decidedly in Germany's right to become the leading country in the world, but who equally decidedly did not believe in the right of any non-German people to exist. Deutschland über alles! The trade-mark "Made in Germany" became in their eyes a proof of superior quality. Nay, more, it became in their ears a call to gather their troops for the final attack upon the world. Everybody all over the entire globe should use things "made in Germany." Everything Germany could make was better than anything anybody else could produce. German engineers were the best. German goods were the best. German ideas were the best. German inventors were the best -in fact, everything ever invented had been invented before by Germans, though, to be sure, the world did not always acknowledge or even realize this fact.

German industrialists did business and wanted to do business. But they went about it in the way generals go about winning a war. They used many tricks, as all businessmen do; but this was for them only a question of tactics. Behind and above all these tactics was a definite, never-changing common strategy, the goal of which was to conquer the whole world. First with their goods. Later . . .

German industrialists have been just as imperialistic as German generals—perhaps even more so. And they have always been in very close contact with these generals, in many cases marrying into their families. The industrialists supported the Kaiser whenever he acted aggressively, and opposed him strongly when they thought he was too much of an appeaser. (In fact, the Pan-German League was founded mainly to counteract Kaiser Wilhelm's occasional pacifist moods.) They were behind General Ludendorff when he declared total war on the whole civilized world. They were behind

the German General Staff clique when the latter started to build up the army immediately after the armistice of 1918. They were in all the Nationalistic conspiracies against the democratic republic and the Versailles Treaty, helping not only to finance illegal movements but even to hide away members of these movements who were sought for by the police of the republic.

The words they wrote fifty years ago still hold true. The spirit has not changed. They are still willing to take over the world or "their portion of the world," no matter what. We saw a sample of how this works when German industrialists moved into Poland, France, Belgium, and the Balkans in the van of the German Army. In a short time they will have moved out of these countries again, and given up "their portion of the world," but they hope to come back. And is there any way for them to come back if the Nazis don't come back?

Of course there have been a number of misunderstandings between German big business and the Nazi party, mainly caused by a few ungrateful Nazis who tried to muscle in on the economic royalists. But those are minor matters. From a long-range point of view the industrialists are in the same boat with the Nazis. They can't afford the luxury of throwing the Fascists out. They must sink or swim together; because, if the Nazis don't come back, the industrialists' dreams of world domination will be ended once and for all. And, incidentally, business will never be so good as it used to be under Hitler.

What, then, can the German industrialists do to help the Nazis get back into power? They can go underground along with the Nazis. Of course it is quite a different proposition for industry to go underground than for a party to do so. Perhaps it would be more exact to say that German industry from now on will have to lead a double life. As far as the outside is concerned the industrialists will attend to their business and nothing else. But unofficially they will go on collaborating with the outlawed Nazis. They will be very useful to the Nazi underground. They will find jobs for the many Nazis who must stay in Germany in order to attend to their subversive activities. They will find key positions for the key party men. They will finance the movement wherever and whenever it is necessary. In short, they will do for the Nazis exactly what they did for the Nationalistic movements in the early twenties.

All this may seem strange to a non-German observer. But German industrialists are strange men, because they are obsessed men.

A few days after the meeting at Krupp's residence Herr von Schnitzler appeared in Madrid, having made the trip from Berlin in his own plane. He declared that he had escaped from Germany just ahead of the Gestapo, who were trying to arrest him. The statement was original, to say the least. For a man trying to escape from the Gestapo, Spain scarcely seemed a logical asylum. Switzerland or Sweden would have been much healthier places to repair to. And anyway, why should Herr von Schnitzler have had to fear the Gestapo, since his son-in-law, Herbert Scholz, was one of its leading officials?

No, there is no reason to believe a word of what Baron Schnitzler said in those first interviews. And the world did not believe it. It was the case of Fritz Thyssen all over again.

According to the most recent reports the Hotel Adlon on Berlin's Unter den Linden has been hit by an Allied bomb. But at least in 1943 and during the first months of 1944 this famous luxurious hotel palace was still doing business. And among its permanent guests were Herr and Frau Fritz Thyssen. Yes, the same Fritz Thyssen who had made the front pages of every newspaper all over the world during the first days of World War II.

It was on September 2, 1939, that two cars passed the Austro-Italian frontier near Villach and sped away in the direction of Switzerland. They carried Fritz Thyssen, the mighty German industrialist, and his family. Two days later Thyssen made a statement in Switzerland in which he said that he had broken with the Nazis. This announcement created no small sensation throughout the world, since Thyssen had been among the first big businessmen of Germany to help finance the Führer. He said that he had decided to leave Germany for many reasons, one of which was that he regarded it as a crime to start this war, which he was sure Germany would never win. But more than that, it seemed that Herr Thyssen had at last become quite disgusted with the Third Reich in general, having learned only at this comparatively late date about the many crimes committed by the Nazi leaders.

Thyssen did not stay long in Switzerland but moved on to Paris,

in spite of the fact that technically, at least, he was an enemy alien in France. But his many friends among the French industrialists took care of that. Later he moved on, to settle finally in a beautiful house on the French Riviera.

By that time the Nazis had taken action against him. He was excluded from the party and deprived of his German citizenship. And, most important of all, his entire holdings inside Germany were confiscated. They must have amounted to several hundred million marks.

Thyssen used his stay at the Riviera to dictate his memoirs. What he had to say amounted to one tremendous indictment of the Führer. "Hitler deceived me as he has deceived the German people as a whole and all men of good will," he wrote. And: "My conscience is clear. I know that I have committed no crime. My sole mistake is that I have believed in you, our Leader, Adolf Hitler, and in the movement initiated by you." Or: "Your new policy is suicide . . . your new policy, Herr Hitler, is pushing Germany into the abyss and the German people into ruin."

Herr Thyssen had hardly finished his memoirs when the Germans invaded France. The German industrialist was in a perfect strategic position to make a getaway. It was months before the Gestapo had time to repair to the Riviera to round up the most prominent anti-Nazis. By that time Thyssen could certainly have gone back to Switzerland, or via Portugal to the United States, or, even better, to South America, where he controlled many important industrial interests. Since so many penniless refugees were able to make their getaway, certainly this millionaire, who had so many excellent connections all over the world, could have succeeded with the greatest of ease.

But he never budged from his Riviera villa. Toward the end of 1941 he was brought back to Germany. No informed person had the slightest doubt that the Nazis would do away with the man who had so grossly offended their Führer. It was only then that Thyssen's American publisher decided to print the manuscript he had written in his retreat on the Riviera. It appeared under the title, I Paid Hitler.

A short time later it was established beyond doubt by neutral correspondents that Thyssen had neither been killed nor sent to a concentration camp. He was, as a matter of fact, staying in Ger-

many's most fashionable hotel, the Adlon. And in spite of the fact that his fortune had been confiscated he seemed to be in no need. He was in steady contact with his old friend, Freiherr von Schroeder, the very same man whom the Nazis had entrusted with administering the large Thyssen holdings after their confiscation.

The flight of Fritz Thyssen was not a genuine one. And why should Thyssen have fled Germany? True enough, one of his nephews, an Austrian monarchist, had died in a concentration camp under suspicious circumstances. But surely Herr Thyssen must have known in 1939 that there were concentration camps in Germany, and that people who were brought there sometimes died rather suddenly. He had never protested against this state of affairs, never protested against the assassination of thousands of Catholics and Jews.

And how about Thyssen's statement that he had been surprised at Hitler's decision to wage war? Is it possible that this industrialist who had held a key position within the whole German rearmament business had not known that the Nazis wanted to start a war? He said that he was shocked when Hitler concluded his pact with Stalin. Is it believable that a man who belonged to the innermost circle of the Nazis did not know that Hitler made this pact only to gain time, and that he never had any intention of leaving Soviet Russia alone?

No, Herr Thyssen's statement did not hold water. Why, then, did the Nazis want him to leave Germany? There was an excellent reason for this.

At the start of the war nobody in Germany knew, or could know, exactly how it would develop. There was at least a theoretical chance of Germany's losing. The French Army still had the reputation of being invincible. Let us suppose that Hitler's attempt to invade France had failed, that for some reason or other the Nazi war machine had broken down in 1940. (A great many experts did believe that this would happen, even up to May 1940.) In such an event Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier, who would have had to make peace with Germany, certainly would not have been willing to negotiate with Hitler or with the Nazis, that much the Nazis knew. But they would undoubtedly have negotiated with German industrialists of the conservative kind. Fritz Thyssen would have been an ideal person not only to talk peace to, but to

take over the German government—for the time being. Neither Chamberlain nor Daladier would have wanted to see a revolution break out inside Germany. And with a man like Thyssen in control that danger could have been averted.

Let us see who Herr Thyssen's neighbors were during his stay on the Riviera. His villa was flanked by the house occupied by Sir Nevile Henderson, former British Ambassador to Berlin, a Tory of the purest water, and an appeaser if there ever was one. On the other side of him lived Pierre Étienne Flandin, the well-known reactionary French politician, the man who represented the interests of French industrialists of the Thyssen type. So the German "refugee" was really admirably placed in case things should go wrong with the war.

There is, incidentally, an earlier parallel in the history of the Thyssen family to what Fritz Thyssen tried in 1939. Shortly after America entered the war in 1917 a memorandum was circulated among a number of American big businessmen which dealt in a critical manner with the Pan-German plans of the Kaiser. Its author was said to be August Thyssen, the father of Fritz. Later, in the early twenties, old Thyssen denied that he had written the exposé. He took his time, though, before he issued this disclaimer. And by the time he did so, things had gone back to normal in Germany, as far as the big industries were concerned. Industry was once more in the saddle. But it is possible that if things had developed differently, if big business had not come back into its own, August Thyssen might not have denied authorship of the memorandum. For if there had been any serious likelihood of the German Revolution becoming a real revolution, the Allies, who did not want such things to happen in Germany, might have begun searching for a strong man who was not too closely identified with the old Pan-Germanistic regime; and then the author of the memorandum might have come in handy.

Perhaps it was such reflections that incited Fritz Thyssen to act as he did in 1939.

In any case, his flight was phony, and his "break" with the Nazis was arranged in careful agreement with these same Nazis. And if the Nazis had disappeared in 1940, Thyssen would have been invaluable to them as their successor or, shall we say, as a regent who would care for the business of state until the time of their comeback.

Then came the swift collapse of France, and England seemed to be so completely incapable of organizing any resistance that the Nazis thought there was no longer any need for them to make preparations for going underground. And so they called Thyssen back home.

Two years after the fall of France, Heinrich Himmler probably realized that it had been a mistake to recall Thyssen. But it was not too late then to try something else along the same line. And von Schnitzler's trip to Madrid was precisely such an attempt.

Georg von Schnitzler was (and presumably still is) a pleasant-looking man, rather tall, high-domed, swarthy, with a long, somewhat embarrassing nose. His was a rather unimpressive personality: you were hardly aware of him when he was in a room; he could blend into almost any background.

Schnitzler had always been rather popular, both nationally and internationally. After the Nazis came to power it was frequently pointed out that the men in the I. G. Farben were not half so bad as the rest of the German industrialists, and decidedly not Nazis. Had Herr von Schnitzler not tried to keep his Jewish employees? And when he could do so no longer had he not attempted to place them in I. G. Farben branches abroad?

That was true. But it was also true that these Jews had made fortunes for I. G. Farben and that it was good business to retain their services and also made for international good will, which any German firm during the thirties could well use. It may be that Schnitzler himself never became a member of the party; and it is quite certain that his predecessor, Dr. Karl Duisberg, definitely disliked the Nazis; but the president of the company, Dr. Matthias Schmitz, had financed Hitler and had been a member of the party for a long time, a fact which, incidentally, his American and English business friends knew very well.

So much for Schnitzler's background. As for his trip to Madrid in the spring of 1943, it had no connection at all with his being hunted by the Gestapo. But it did have everything to do with the postwar plans of German industry. Schnitzler followed very closely the line German industrialists had used after the defeat in 1918.

Then they had been afraid that the Allies might take away their enterprises. In order to counteract such a move they therefore

proposed to their friends in France, Belgium, and England that the latter should come in with them as equal partners; in other words, they proposed to give away up to 50 per cent of their holdings if the other 50 per cent would stay in their hands.

The deal did not come off in 1918, mainly because the German industrialists recovered from their panic almost immediately after the armistice. But as Herr von Schnitzler knew, this time international control of German industry would not be so lenient as it was after World War I, and therefore measures had to be taken immediately. His plan was again the proposal of a partnership of the 1918 type, the only condition he made being that Allied bombings of Germany should either stop or at least leave industrial plants alone. And that request seemed logical enough. For how could Allied industrialists partake in the benefits deriving from German business enterprises if there were no enterprises left after the war?

Georg von Schnitzler did not stay very long in Madrid. Three weeks after his "flight" he was back in Berlin again. Somehow he must have made his peace with the Gestapo. More important, his mission was completed.

But before he went back to Germany he made an appearance in Lisbon too. He met a few friends there and familiarized them with certain "changes of organization" which, he said, German industrialists were then contemplating. The details he gave showed how industry intended to carry through its plan of a faked divorce from Nazism. To this end, von Schnitzler explained, German industry would fall back on its old, pre-Hitler organization. The most important of the organizations, in fact, the center around which all future activities would be organized, would be the Deutsche Weltwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft (German World Economic Society).

This society had been formed in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I, with the idea of establishing a contact between leaders of German industry and industrial leaders abroad. It was born too late to be of any particular help during World War I. German industrialists remained isolated then, except for a few friends in neutral countries. And after the war, during the years of the Weimar Republic, it was hardly heard from. But this state of affairs changed completely after Hitler came to power. It was

chiefly General Karl Haushofer, a member of the society since 1930, who devised an active and provocative policy for the society, and mapped out ways and means of using it for propaganda and industrial espionage. It turned out to be relatively easy to do this, because the Deutsche Weltwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft nominated the German representatives in the International Chamber of Commerce, which in turn provided intimate contacts with industrialists of other countries.

Certain industrialists who were members of the society, among them Friedrich Krupp von Bohlen-Halbach, Otto Pietzsch, and Dr. Otto Fischer chief of the Reichskreditgesellschaft, had been very busy ever since the summer of 1943 trying to figure out what the Deutsche Weltwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft could do to reorganize business affairs and disconnect them from the Nazis. This, according to Herr von Schnitzler, would be accomplished by an outward divorce from the Nazi party and by replacing all the Nazi machines of industry by those machines and organizations which had existed before Hitler came to power. All of which, it was thought, should certainly prove to benevolent bystanders that everything was again as it used to be before Hitler.

The main industrial organizations of the pre-Hitler period were the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie (National Federation of German Industry) and the Vereinigte Arbeitgeberverbände (United Federations of Employers), which were merged under Hitler. Other pre-Hitler groups which are to be revived are the Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft (Society of Economic Policy), the Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Gesellschaft (Society of Economic Science), the Technographische Gesellschaft (Technographical Society), the Chemische Gesellschaft (Chemical Society), the Bunsen Gesellschaft (Bunsen Society), et cetera.

All these organizations and many more have already been revived, and additional groups will be established before the war is over. On the face of it all of them exist for the sole purpose of scientific research; but the industrialists assume, and with good reason, that many of these scientific research bureaus will be badly needed by the Allies in order that a Germany geared to war production may quickly be shifted into a Germany functioning under peaceful conditions. No matter what the final peace terms may be, experts will be needed for the resettlement of the slave labor now

accumulated in Germany, and also perhaps for the hiring of German workers to be sent abroad. Before any kind of reparation can be decided upon extensive research projects will have to be carried on, in order to decide what there is still left to pay from, et cetera, et cetera. It is the cherished hope of the industrialists that the scientific organizations mentioned above will be used for just these purposes; and, needless to say, we will undoubtedly find installed in them a large number of persons who have been transferred from industries and banks, persons who in the interest of big business must be kept in key positions, no matter what comes.

All this is a perfect setup for keeping German industry in a commanding position—a setup which in turn would be helpful if some little business of sabotaging Allied plans was considered necessary.

The intricate business of international cartels being what it is, it is next to impossible to find out with absolute certainty exactly how much the non-German business associates of German industrialists know about these plans and to what degree they are willing to co-operate in them. Certain only are these facts:

- r. German industrialists have been working constantly on plans which permit them to go underground in the way described above (that is, to put up a false front behind which nothing will change), the entire project having been conceived in closest collaboration with leading Nazi personalities, and for their benefit.
- 2. Herr von Schnitzler and, as we shall see later, other representatives of German industries as well have at least attempted to make contacts with their former business associates abroad in order to propose a close collaboration and even a partnership for the postwar period.

To what degree this proposed collaboration is already an accomplished fact while the war is still being fought is anybody's guess. But would it matter whether this collaboration started yesterday or will start the day after the armistice, so far as giving aid and comfort to the Nazis is concerned?

In January 1944, the American Government filed anti-trust charges against a huge British-American chemical cartel. It was officially stated at that time that "the world is not a private hunting preserve which can be divided at will between those monopolists

who think they have gained squatters' rights." Behind this general warning was the very specific warning not to conclude any new cartel treaties with Germany, that is, with I. G. Farben.

After all, Lord McGowan, who is a member of the British House of Lords and the leading man of the Imperial Chemical Industries, the giant British cartel, had never left any doubt that he and his American partners would seek and find a new working arrangement after the war with their former German partner, I. G. Farben. Which means that Lord McGowan and his friends seem to be convinced that there will be an I. G. Farben to deal with, and don't feel too badly about it, either. And since I. G. Farben is a close ally of the Nazis, it will mean that the Nazis can depend on help from at least one Allied country, even though this help may be given in all innocence.

It would be quite unfair to suspect honest businessmen of aiding the enemy during wartime. Nothing is further from the author's mind. But peacetime—that is something else again. And we must not forget that Lord McGowan attended Hitler's Nuremberg Party Congress in 1936. We must not forget, either, that this same Lord McGowan was one of the contributors to the cause of the "pacifist" Rev. Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, who declared, also in 1936: "I thank God for a man like Adolf Hitler."

The men who met at Château Huegel in May 1943 were immensely rich and extremely powerful. They had helped Hitler before he came to power and they have helped him ever since, directly and through their numerous international connections. But their help was insignificant compared with what another man has done for Hitler. This man was not an industrialist but a banker. While comfortably well off, he could not compare in personal wealth with the industrialists. But his personal influence and his international connections were even more powerful and, to Hitler, far more helpful than theirs.

This man was Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, who, incidentally, is a good friend of Georg von Schnitzler and of most of the other industrialists.

For at least the last year or so Dr. Schacht has been living in a suburb of Zurich in a beautiful house overlooking the famous lake. When asked about his stay in Switzerland, Schacht said his doctors

had told him that it was necessary for his health. No stories of a last-minute escape from the Gestapo for Dr. Schacht! He is too clever to resort to such an obviously faked excuse.

The story of his failing health did the trick much better, for of course it was at once rumored that Dr. Schacht had broken with the Nazis and that he had to go to Switzerland for reasons of health. And the time-honored tune was sung again, that Schacht had in reality never been a full-fledged Nazi, but a true German patriot; and there was certainly nothing wrong in that. As a patriot he had wanted to prevent Hitler from destroying Germany completely, and had therefore decided to play along with him, no matter how unhappy he felt about it and no matter how great the personal sacrifice. Had he not proved his true feelings constantly by opposing the persecution of Jews and Catholics? Had he not fiercely protested Hitler's war plans?

So much for the rumors, the stories, the inside information spread by the international "wise guys." But there is good reason to believe that Schacht himself did everything to help such rumors circulate. It made things easier for him.

Is Schacht, then, a Nazi? If the word has any meaning at all, he is one, indeed, and has been for a long, long time. Years before Hitler came to power he used his international reputation as a sound banker and his excellent connections in the city of London and in Wall Street to undermine the credit of the fading republic and to build up Hitler's prestige. Long before Hitler took over, Schacht joined the party and obtained Hitler's promise to make him president of the Reichsbank, which Hitler proceeded to do without delay in March 1933. During the following years Schacht by his shrewd financial policy made German rearmament possible. He not only refused to pay back the foreign debts, but even froze the interest. And by numerous fraudulent tricks he succeeded in obtaining even more credit for Germany, until Hitler was ready to strike.

It matters little that Herr Schacht quarreled many times with the Nazis and that on occasion he resigned one or two of his jobs. He never quarreled about matters of principle. And, his apologists to the contrary, he never officially opposed the persecution of the Jews. That he voiced some opposition unofficially—what does that mean? It probably means only that he hoped thus to establish

more international confidence in him. Indeed, all through the thirties not only Schacht but so many of the industrial collaborators of the Nazis assured, in private of course, that they were opposed to anti-Semitism, that it seems as though these gentlemen had obtained special permission from Hitler to depart from the party line, at least so far as that issue was concerned. If the world believed them, so much the better for Hitler. In any case, Hialmar Schacht was not too outraged at the cruelties the Führer committed, first against the Jews, and later against whole nations. For he remains to this very day Hitler's personal adviser in matters of finance. In December 1942 Schacht was appointed by Hitler head of a "Peace Negotiation Office." He immediately established himself with a small staff of collaborators on Unter den Linden and embarked upon an analysis of the possible and probable consequences of this war for Germany. There were five possibilities that he considered: German victory, negotiated peace, separate peace (either with Britain and America or with Russia), collapse of Germany's allies, and unconditional surrender. The famous financier himself decided that Germany's only chance of survival lay in a negotiated peace.

In March 1943 a Lisbon newspaper printed a report that Schacht had been ousted from the party and was no longer an adviser to Hitler. In the fall of 1943 more items of that kind appeared. By then Schacht had, as a matter of fact, settled in Switzerland.

At that time, too, the first rumors about the so-called "Schacht Plan" began to leak out from Switzerland and Lisbon. It was more or less identical with the plan Herr von Schnitzler had proposed a few months before in Madrid and Lisbon: it foresaw the future collaboration of German and Allied big business. It also foresaw an important role for German banks as clearinghouses for this type of collaboration. Its main distinguishing feature, however, was that Herr Schacht was going to direct the whole scheme. It was even said that under certain conditions he might be willing to be second man in the new government if a colorful personality could be found to front for him.

Since Schacht was in on the plan of the industrialists to avert defeat, and since in so many respects he wanted exactly the same things these men wanted, it is a good guess that he also had the same long-range ideas as they did about the comeback of the

Nazis. And why not? The type of financier he represents is just as much in need of a dynamic political movement as the German industrialists are. If there ever was a dynamic financier, Schacht was it. After all, why otherwise would he have gone over to Hitler at a time when he had a perfectly safe position with the Weimar Republic?

Schacht was quite optimistic when he explained his plan. "They will need economists who understand how to run the finances of a country more than ever after this war. Otherwise, there will be general confusion and Communism," he told everybody in Zurich who wanted to listen. "And is there a better man around for such a job than I?"

There probably isn't. And there also probably is no financier who will stay in closer contact with the coming Nazi underground or who will be more eager to serve it than Schacht.

Shortly after Schacht had made his plan known some interesting news came from London. The United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Criminals had decided that Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht was not to be considered a war criminal. The man who had made Hitler's war possible, the man who through years of international scheming, through years of borrowing and bartering had enabled the Nazis to import the necessary raw materials to manufacture arms, the man who knew better than anybody else how many cannons and how many tanks each of his deals meant for Germany, the man who foresaw more clearly than anybody else against whom these guns would be used, which country the tanks would invade—this man was not a war criminal!

And he does not even have the excuse, if there be such a thing as an excuse for one who plans murders, that he believed in those crazy theories of world domination by the Master Race which the Nazis preached. Dr. Schacht never believed in anything except himself and in his right to do what he pleased. And it happened to please him to scheme and negotiate and trade and borrow so that German soldiers could once more threaten civilization.

Of course, if Schacht were declared a war criminal he could not possibly be of use to the underground as a contact man. This would be unfortunate for the Nazis. But it would be equally unfortunate for those who are interested in the survival of the Nazis in any way—particularly for the German industrialists and their

friends abroad. For Dr. Schacht could be very useful to them, because of his excellent connections. Many of these connections were never broken off, even after the war began. And Dr. Schacht had his ways of continuing them if he so wished. He did not need to employ any melodramatic devices; he did not have to resort to coded letters to arrange secret meetings. He could meet his friends on the other side quite openly, during the meetings of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.

This bank was founded in 1930 as part of the Young Plan by the United States, England, Germany, France, and practically every other country of Europe, including Lithuania and Albania, to serve as a means of regulating the loan service connected with this agreement. The bank immediately declared itself extraterritorial. "The governments concerned . . . have declared the B.I.S. to be immune from any disabilities and from any restricted measures such as censorship, seizure, or confiscation in time of peace or war..." Any member of the bank could attend its meetings, that is travel to and from Basel, without restriction in times of war or peace. Thus Allied nationals could go to Basel even if they had to travel through Nazi-occupied territory. And in Basel itself during the numerous meetings American, English, French, and German financiers had to meet and talk to each other, as they have done through the years, and as they are continuing to do at the present time. War or no war, business is business.

So Dr. Schacht, if he wished, had every opportunity to talk directly or indirectly with banking representatives of the Allies. The most outstanding of them is a man who has been Schacht's closest friend for his entire lifetime—Montagu Norman, former governor of the Bank of England, whom Schacht until only very recently must have met frequently in Basel.

Mr. Montagu Norman, up to his retirement in April 1944 the greatest single power in British Finance, has long been in favor of a Nazi regime, as far as Germany was concerned, of course. Undoubtedly he was motivated only by the reflection that a pro-Nazi course in Germany would be best for the British Empire. As history proves, this was not a very intelligent view to take; but there is nothing to prove that it might not have been his honest conviction.

In any case, Montagu Norman has been aiding Hjalmar Schacht,

and thus, of course, Hitler, for many years. In 1932 there was a meeting between him and Sir Henry Deterding in the United States, at which the two discussed subsidies for the Führer and possible ways of aiding him if he came to power. Early in 1934 Norman met with more than a dozen outstanding financiers and industrialists of England in his private office in the Bank of England. Norman made a speech to the group in which he referred to the Nazis as a "great stabilizing force" which would come in handy against Soviet Russia. Again Norman was in favor of financing Hitler.

The same year, 1934, saw a number of conferences with Hjalmar Schacht in Badenweiler, a small German spa. At that time the British Government did not quite see eye to eye with the governor of the Bank of England. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, in particular, was less than lukewarm to the Hitler cause. During the years 1935 to 1937, however, more and more members of the government went over to Montagu Norman—first Defense Minister Inskip, then Sir John Simon, and finally Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer. This move on Chamberlain's part proved to be a decisive factor in shaping his political career. A few months later he became Baldwin's successor.

In December 1938—after Czechoslovakia had been sold out at Munich—Herr Schacht visited England. He was a guest at Montagu Norman's house. No statement was issued concerning the purpose of this visit—it was declared to be "purely personal." One month later this purely personal visit was returned by Norman when, on his way to Basel, he stopped over in Berlin to see Dr. Schacht. Again nothing definite leaked out about their conversations. It was rumored, however, that the two men were trying to form some common policy of expanding markets for Germany and of settling Germany's foreign debts. There were also rumors about British export credits for Germany to the tune of \$375,000,000, or thereabouts.

Hitler himself, however, saw to the "extension of markets" for Germany when, a few weeks later, he marched into Prague, contrary to his promises at Munich. And shortly before the outbreak of World War II Montagu Norman did his friend Schacht another and presumably last service when he handed over to him the Czech gold deposited in the Bank of England.

Montagu Norman is by far the best friend Hjalmar Schacht has among international bankers. There is, however, no country in which Schacht cannot depend on the help of powerful men in the banking business. And this includes the United States too. Wall Street has always thought highly of Dr. Schacht, and from a professional angle there was every reason to do so.

How useful such connections were, and those of the German industrialists, and what excellent results they could furnish even in the middle of the war, became evident, though not to the world at large, during the Allied invasion of Africa. Africa, and particularly Italy, was to prove, too, that still another group of men had an excellent chance to play a decisive part in the underground to come. It was the German generals who had realized even before the Nazis and the industrialists did that the war could never be won by Germany and were busily preparing their own survival.

3

Generals Never Give Up

GENERALS usually know when a war is lost. The German generals had never been absolutely convinced that they could win World War II. They had only hoped to win it mainly because Hitler had promised them that the enemy armies would suffer a moral collapse and that they themselves would not have to fight a two-front war. The Western campaigns had taken precisely the course Hitler had predicted. But Russia was another story. The German generals found out pretty early that it would not be a blitzkrieg. And that, the General Staff was convinced, meant they could not win the war. The generals knew it long before Heinrich Himmler and Martin Bormann, or even the industrialists, did.

Field Marshal Werner von Brauchitsch, the High Commander of the German Army, knew it on October 15, 1941.

At that time the German front had many salients and pockets

which were constantly in danger of being cut off by flank attacks. The German Army, therefore, had to choose between continuing to attack or retreating and spending the winter behind fortifications.

Von Brauchitsch was not a general of great vision. But he was a man who could judge a military situation when he saw one. And he could retain his judgment even in the face of the impressive advances the German Army had made in Russia during the first four months. He had a good memory. He remembered the spectacular advances of General von Kluck's First Army in August 1914. The young Brauchitsch had been a liaison officer in that army. He remembered in what an unbelievably short time the Germans had rushed to the Marne and the Ourcq. And then came the defeat at the Marne, and the war was lost, although it took four more years to establish this accomplished fact.

Brauchitsch could not be deceived by impressive partial successes. He knew that the timetable had not been kept, that the Russian Army had by no means been crushed, that it had by no means been prevented from deploying. All of which meant that the war would not be over before the Russian winter would set in. And Brauchitsch knew that the German Army was not equipped to spend a Russian winter fighting.

Therefore, Brauchitsch was in favor of a retreat.

On October 15 he had called a meeting of his outstanding generals to talk things over. However, the meeting did not develop according to his expectations. Hitler dropped in unexpectedly.

The generals all agreed with von Brauchitsch. They were unanimous in their belief that the offensive should be discontinued in the face of the ever-increasing strength of the Russian Army and the approaching winter. Field Marshal von Bock even proposed a withdrawal of some two hundred miles. Hitler objected violently. He had no intention of going back, he had every intention of going on with the war and of attacking a handful of other countries in the near future. He did not want to lose his newly acquired prestige as a military genius. A heated discussion ensued, and harsh words were exchanged between some of the generals, particularly Herr von Bock, and Hitler's private advisers whom he had brought along. But nothing definite was decided upon.

Six weeks later Brauchitsch knew that he had been right. The

Russian Army had begun its first counteroffensive. The winter in Russia was now a dead certainty. On top of it all, on December 7 Japan had declared war on the United States, and it was only a question of days, perhaps hours, till Germany and America would be at war too.

Such was the situation when Brauchitsch met his generals once more on December 9, 1941. That date may become historic, for it was on this day that the generals admitted quite openly to each other that the war could no longer be won. Or, as one of them put it, "The Third Reich has lost the war." And the others said it in other words—all of them—von Bock, von Rundstedt, von Leeb, von Kleist, von Mannstein, and the chief of staff, General Halder. It was then that Brauchitsch decided to resign as commander in chief, and that the others decided to decline to take over his job, and with it the responsibility for the war, if the Führer should offer it to them.

All of which meant that the generals, although well aware that the war was lost for Germany, had every intention of surviving it themselves.

The generals intended to save themselves till after the war. Because thus, and only thus, could they hope to save the army, or, what was the same thing, to maintain conditions favorable to a rebuilding of the army. It was on this December 9, 1941, that they decided on the course they should take. They knew that there was ample time to accomplish their plan before the final defeat. But they did not intend to be surprised as they had been surprised in 1918.

What could they do? What kind of preparations could they make? They could demonstrate to Germany and to the world at large that they had had nothing to do with the planning of this war; that they could not be blamed for anything, except for having done their duty as soldiers; they were worlds apart from that man Hitler, who was the only person to be blamed. How could they make this clear beyond any chance of misunderstanding? By allowing the Führer to assume the entire responsibility. By making him take over, officially, the job of High Commander.

Thus it was with some interest that the generals awaited Field Marshal von Reichenau's reaction to such a plan. Reichenau had excellent connections with the heads of the party—indeed, his

connections were too intimate for the taste of some of the generals. They wondered if Reichenau would not object to the idea of getting the army away from the Nazi party. But to their pleasant surprise he proved to be completely of their opinion. He, too, felt that Hitler had made a decisive mistake, and that it was up to him and the party members and not to the generals to pay for this mistake.

Things developed rather rapidly after that. Von Brauchitsch resigned officially on December 12, and Hitler soon found out that none of the other generals was willing to take over the job. But he and Himmler still counted on Reichenau. On December 23 the latter conferred with Himmler at Poltava in the Ukraine, at which time Himmler made certain demands concerning the inclusion of SS officers on all staffs, as well as the merging of the Army Intelligence Service with the Security Service of the SS. Reichenau, if he agreed to these demands, was to become High Commander.

This was Himmler's counterattack. Thus he hoped to strike a deadly blow against the generals and their plan. If his demands had been accepted, if the army had been infiltrated by SS men, it would soon have become an instrument controlled more by Himmler than by the generals. If Reichenau had accepted the High Command, the plan of the generals to divorce themselves from the Nazi cause could never have been carried through.

On January 11 Reichenau informed Himmler that he would not take over the command, and that, furthermore, the army would under no condition accept the demands of the SS. Nobody could do such a thing to Himmler. He was not one to stand by and watch others make plans of which he did not approve. Five days later three officers of the SS, Fritz Leine, Paul Radunski, and Max Pelke, visited Reichenau's headquarters. They left half an hour later, declaring that Herr von Reichenau had suddenly suffered a stroke and died.

The generals were not discouraged. In any case, they had no choice. They had to act if they wanted to keep out of the disaster which they saw approaching. They were not interested in what became of Hitler after the defeat, so long as they themselves survived. They had acted once before in precisely the same way when

they had abandoned their Kaiser in 1918, in defiance of their oath of loyalty, so that they themselves and the army could survive. They were willing and eager to do it again.

In November 1918 it had looked much darker for them than it did in 1942. Then they had to cope not only with a defeat, they had to cope with a revolution to boot.

On November 9, 1918, the day of the German Revolution, the gentlemen in the general headquarters on the front were in a highly nervous state. They waited. There was a direct telephone line connecting the General Staff with the chancellery in Berlin. They waited. They wondered. Would the man who was now the head of the provisory government of the republic, the former Socialist deputy Friedrich Ebert, answer the telephone if they called him? In short, would he collaborate with the General Staff? Or would he dismiss the men who represented everything the Socialists had been fighting against and who, on top of it all, had lost the war?

The chief of the General Staff, Wilhelm Groener, tried the line and President Ebert answered. Friedrich Ebert was willing to collaborate with the generals. The Socialist wanted the officers to continue in service, to protect law and order in Germany. Against whom? Naturally, against the people who had actually believed that a real revolution was on and that those who had been directly or indirectly responsible for the war were to be driven from power.

After the first conversation Ebert called back very soon. The man who answered his call was Major Kurt von Schleicher. How relieved he must have felt when the bell rang! How relieved General von Hindenburg and his comrades must have felt. So there wasn't going to be any revolution. The Social Democrats really didn't want a change so much, after all. Did they?

Major Kurt von Schleicher did not lose much time with such considerations. On the same day, on November 9, 1918, which has become the historic date of the German Revolution, he began to lay his plans to fight the republic which he supposedly protected. On this very day he began to lay his plans to counteract the conditions of the armistice and whatever conditions the peace treaty might impose upon Germany. On this very day he started the underground movement of the Imperial German Army.

It was all very secret. It had to be, because it was a conspiracy

not only against the former enemies but a conspiracy against the very republic which the officers had sworn to defend and which, incidentally, paid the salaries of those officers; a conspiracy in which the Army Ministry of the republic collaborated gleefully for many years to come. A few disturbing facts leaked out here and there. A few courageous journalists wrote of what was going on behind the scenes. A few convinced republicans were murdered, while others were accused of high treason and put into prison. The government, in spite of the fact that it knew better, declared again and again that there was not one iota of truth in the current rumors about the existence of a number of secret armies, a socalled Schwarze Reichswehr (Black Army) in Germany. Such talk, they said, was all propaganda paid for by France and possibly by Poland. But in spite of these pretenses and excuses there were such secret armies. As for the official army, the one permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, it never had quite come down to the number of men it was supposed to contain. Schleicher had seen to that. And he had also seen to it that this small army of the new republic was extremely unrepublican. He had taken care that this army should contain only nationalist and supernationalist elements who were waiting impatiently for the day when they could turn against the republic, against its democratic representatives, and, of course, later against the whole world, to take revenge for the war lost in 1918.

Little troops and units began to spring up here and there which had no connection with the regular army, although the arms they possessed could only have been obtained from the army proper. These troops, so Schleicher explained, should not be disarmed, because they protected the country against the communist danger which, he asserted, though without presenting the slightest evidence in proof of his assertion, was growing steadily from day to day.

But it was not the communist danger, it was those troops which grew from day to day. During the year 1922 many of them sprang up near the eastern frontier. Their main task was to gather the war material which, according to the Treaty of Versailles, should have been destroyed or surrendered, to get it in good shape, and to hide it. Some of these groups had fancy names; most of them were later to be known as the "Free Corps"; all of them

formed what was to become famous as Schwarze Reichswehr. Thus the following picture presented itself: visible to the world at large there was the relatively small German Reichswehr. Invisible, that is, underground, there was the Schwarze Reichswehr. Both these armies were led and controlled by the same officers. The ultimate control of both was exercised by the Army Ministry of the German Republic.

In fact, the illegal Schwarze Reichswehr was just as thoroughly organized as the regular army. In 1922 so-called Erfassungsabteilungen (Collecting Departments) were created within the Black Reichswehr. The officers of each military district were thus able to assemble personal files on all men of military age-precisely what had been forbidden by the Versailles Treaty. And from these files they were able to build up a certain reserve of the regular Reichswehr, a thing which was also forbidden by the Treaty. Within the Department of Operations of Military District IA a new department called IAP was created, under the somewhat innocent name of Truppenverstaerkung (Troop Reinforcement). The real task of this department was to run the Black Reichswehr and to form the liaison between it and the regular Reichswehr. The leading men in this Truppenverstaerkung were von Bock and von Rundstedt, who were later to become the leading generals in World War II.

The Schwarze Reichswehr comprised the scum of Germany: youthful delinquents, would-be assassins, perverts, hysterical "patriots." The gentlemen in the Republican Army Ministry later had to admit this; and they also had to admit that, as things stood then, the spirit of the Black Reichswehr very often carried over into the regular Reichswehr. This, they acknowledged, was indeed regrettable, but under the circumstances—meaning the "communistic threat" and perhaps also the fact that the French and the Polish armies were so much stronger—they insisted that nothing could be done about it.

Perhaps nothing could be done; but, if so, it was mainly because these supernationalistic elements represented precisely the type of men the army needed for the underground preparations for another war.

How right the generals were to put up with them the world was to see fifteen years later.

In 1918 the generals had been surprised by the military events as well as by the so-called German Revolution. They had to act quickly, they had to improvise. Fortunately for them, Kurt von Schleicher, who was the brains behind the Black Reichswehr, was a genius at improvising. All the same, this time the generals had no intention of being caught napping again.

After Brauchitsch's resignation in December 1941 many things had happened. Hitler had removed von Bock, von Leeb, von Rundstedt, and von Kleist from their posts after they had expressed their unwillingness to take over the responsibility, and had made himself acting commander in chief, just as the generals had hoped he would. But, of course, this was no solution of the generals' own problems.

Some of them, including von Rundstedt and von Bock, met again on March 10, 1942, in the Army Ministry in Berlin. They decided to create certain cadres or organizations most necessary in rebuilding the army in the future. This preparatory work was to be done through Department AIV (a branch of the Auslandsabteilung of the War Ministry) and the Demobilization Department of the General Staff. The work in Department AIV was entrusted to Major General Werner Graberg, while that in the Demobilization Department was handed over to Colonel Richard Delius. In addition to these two men they called upon General Georg Thomas, one of Goering's most intimate collaborators, who had a post in the Ministry of Economics. Thomas, of whom it had been said repeatedly that he had resigned, was considered one of the most brilliant minds dealing with economic problems in Germany.

None of these men could be considered a real successor to Kurt von Schleicher. Perhaps the generals had thought of Field Marshal Reichenau for this position. But Reichenau had died of apoplexy. Who, then, was going to be the man in whose hands all the threads would converge, the real power of the new army-underground movement to be, the unofficial leader of the enterprise about to be started? During the March meeting in Berlin Field Marshal von Rundstedt suggested that it might work out best if, for the moment, they should designate a man whom for military reasons the Nazis could not dispense with as they had dispensed with Reichenau. He then brought forward the name of General

Erich von Mannstein. This general was little known outside of army circles. He had been chief of Rundstedt's staff during the Polish campaign and in France he had commanded the corps which made the break-through at the Somme. In the initial stages of the Russian war he had been in command of the Ukrainian Army after General von Schober had been killed by guerrillas. He had proved himself an excellent soldier, and nothing but a soldier. Precisely the type of man the generals were looking for.

Mannstein was then in his fifties. He was of only medium height, reaching hardly to the shoulders of most of the other generals. His face was dominated by a strong, energetic nose. The eyes were almost hidden behind heavy lids. His light blond hair had become gray and thin. Mannstein had never been a talker. Now, since both his sons had died on the Russian front, he had become almost completely silent. Perhaps the most interesting feature about him was his long, fine hands, the hands of a musician, which became strangely alive when they moved about on a General Staff map. It is said that Hitler found it impossible to establish a personal contact with this general. When he visited him at his headquarters, Mannstein would sit down at the piano and for hours play Bach fugues. Hitler, who is a great lover of the more spectacular music of Wagner, is said to have been slightly uneasy on these occasions.

The tenth son of the impoverished Prussian artillery General von Levinsky would hardly have dreamed in his youth that sometime he might be thought of by the General Staff clique as a possible head man in the Fourth Reich. Of course he was to become an officer, that much he knew always. But when his father died suddenly on his East Elbian estate during harvesttime, it was doubtful if he could even afford a cadet school. Then fate intervened in the person of a wealthy neighbor, who took the boy into his home, gave him a splendid education, and finally adopted him. The neighbor's name was Baron Georg von Mannstein.

The adopted son of Mannstein could easily afford the somewhat exclusive cadet school of Lichterfelde. He was a good pupil, but far from spectacular. He could not compare with his comrade Fedor von Bock, who was a few years older and who proved to be one of the most brilliant pupils Lichterfelde had ever seen. No, Mannstein was not brilliant. But he was dependable. After he had gone through Lichterfelde he became lieutenant in the Guard

Grenadier Regiment of Potsdam, one of the most expensive and most snobbish regiments in Europe then. His foster father sent him generous amounts of money, but he hardly touched them. He was not interested in social activities. He was interested only in becoming a good soldier. During World War I he was wounded twice. After the armistice he was sent to the Allgemeines Truppenamt (German Troop Department), actually nothing but a camouflage for the General Staff that had been outlawed by Versailles. Later on he undertook many trips to Russia for the purpose of studying the unorthodox organization of the Red Army.

Rundstedt's tip proved to be excellent. During the summer of 1042 Mannstein became almost famous. He was responsible for the victory of Sevastopol. And, happily for him, he was not mixed up in the catastrophe of Stalingrad—a catastrophe which threatened to develop into a collapse of the entire German front in Russia. In February 1943 Hitler was no longer able to stem the disaster. And lo and behold! The generals one and all suggested to him that Mannstein should be called in to save the situation, or at least as much of it as could be saved. The moment he took command it became evident that the German Army was once more under competent leadership. The front was at least temporarily re-established. Counteroffensives were undertaken. On March 12. 1943, Mannstein recaptured Kharkov. The disaster which had been so imminent was avoided for the time being. Now an organized retreat was possible, precisely the type of retreat the German generals had been demanding in vain for so many months. German military experts spoke about Mannstein's performance, not without justification, as "the miracle of the Donets."

There was still another reason why the generals thought Mannstein was the right man to deal with a somewhat misty future. He was almost the only one of them who had succeeded in keeping out of the innumerable quarrels between the party and the army. He had never been party to the countless intrigues. He had also been lucky enough to avoid military discussions with the Führer himself, and had thus been able to do his work without being hampered. And he was the man to continue to do his work if given half a chance. The generals knew Mannstein was no sentimental fool. Hitler was for him the head of the state, no more, no less. He served him as the generals had served the Kaiser, Ebert, and

Hindenburg. He had no desire to go down with the Führer. He was—dependable.

And best of all for their purpose, he was indispensable to Hitler and to the Nazis. For he had become popular. The man in the street knew that it was Mannstein who had saved him from the Russians. It was an open secret that Hitler had not dared to interfere with Mannstein's plans. He had kept the situation in hand for many decisive weeks without the Führer and without the party intervening. Was it not logical that he would be capable of doing it again?

It seems quite obvious that the Führer himself sensed the implications of Mannstein's victory, or, to be more precise, of Mannstein's successful retreat. After a silence of many months Hitler spoke again for the first time, on March 21, 1943, on the occasion of the *Heldengedenkfeier* (Heroes' Memorial Day) at the Zeughaus Museum, which only a few months later was to be completely destroyed by British bombs.

Those who heard him speak on that day reported that he was a changed man. Even his voice seemed to be different. Reporters referred to it as "shell-shocked." It was as though Hitler were searching for words, as though he was not quite sure when to raise his voice and when to let it drop.

Was Hitler really changed? And if so, what had changed him? Did he, too, know that the war was lost? How much of the truth had the men around him dared divulge to him?

By early 1943 Hitler had become perhaps the most isolated man inside the Third Reich. Every report was rewritten before it was given to him. He no longer saw the newspapers, though, to be sure, they contained little enough genuine information. He saw only clippings. The reason for all these precautionary measures was that nobody around Hitler fancied the hysterical outbreaks to which he was so addicted, and nobody wanted him to have any more brainstorms or intuitions of the kind which had already cost the army so dearly in Russia.

But it was then and still is an open question whether Hitler shared the pessimism of Himmler and Bormann, or whether he would have done so even if they had told him the truth. It is probable that he would not have believed that the war was lost, because he did not want to believe it. Hitler had been in tight spots before. Many times, before he came to power, it had looked as though the party was definitely finished. But Hitler never lost his nerve in such moments, because he believed so firmly in what he calls his "stars." And it may very well be that he will go on believing in his stars for a long time to come.

How much did Hitler know of Himmler's plan? Probably nothing. He would have seen in such a plan an admission of defeat, and that would have been sufficient to make him tear it up. How much did he know of the plan of his military leaders? He might have suspected something. He knew his history. He certainly had not forgotten how the generals had betrayed the Kaiser in 1918.

Himmler had sent a first warning to the generals when he liquidated von Reichenau. Had they understood it? Certainly. But how were they going to stop Himmler from repeating this warning, and, in general, from interfering with their plans?

A showdown had to come. It did come, but not until September 1943.

The German generals wanted to make the world believe that they were not Nazis. Most of all, they wanted the Allies to take such a view. They could hope to rebuild their army at some future date, long after the end of World War II, if some of them were able to convince the Allies that they could be trusted.

Is there a chance for the generals to fool the Allies so grossly? It does not seem so hopeless as one might believe. History proves that the generals had actually a chance. Did the Allies do anything in 1918 and the following years to stop the rebuilding of the German Army, which had already proved such a threat to them during more than four years of bloody warfare? Undoubtedly they could have done something about it. There were Allied control commissions all over Germany. Certain parts of the country, particularly the Rhineland, were occupied. To be sure, there was no AMG then, but the English and American officers had the right to interfere to a certain extent in the administration of the occupied territories. These officers had only one desire: They wanted law and order where they were stationed. And law and order, according to them, was something which evidently could not be guaranteed by representatives of the newly born republic, but only by representatives of the old regime—by the very men against whom the Allies

had fought for more than four years. The explanation of that anomalous situation was, of course, expediency. The men of the old regime were experienced in their jobs, and knew well how to keep the country in order; the republicans, on the other hand, were still greenhorns at governing, and could create only disorder and unrest.

The revolution had brought to life so-called soldiers' soviets. The Allied command in the Rhineland suspended both them and the workers' soviets during the very first days of the occupation, and declined to have any dealings with representatives of leftist parties, or to discuss with them any problems, such as that of feeding the population, though these leftists happened to be of the same parties that ran the Berlin government. On the contrary, the Allies demanded that only men should be sent to them who had held their jobs before the revolution.

That this strange state of affairs actually existed is proved by many documents. There is, for instance, the report of Colonel I. L. Hunt, in charge of all civil affairs of the Third American Army in the Rhineland. Hunt wrote:

Most of the ex-Imperial officers throughout Germany remained at their posts. In occupied territory their retention of office was made a condition of the armistice. . . . The political institutions with which the American Army came into contact during the occupation were, without exception, those of the old regime.

According to Colonel Hunt it all worked out fine:

The requirement of the armistice that the civil government in the occupied zone should continue to be conducted by the old German officials assured a continuance in office of experienced and competent men... No case of an official declining to continue his duties was brought to the attention of the Third Army Headquarters... The autocratic nature of the Prussian civil service peculiarly fits in to adapt itself to the wishes of an occupying military force.

And:

In the first days of the occupation, the ideas of the great middle class were being revolutionized under the pressure of internal disorder and the opinion of the outside world. This was unfortunate, since it was to this body of public opinion that Germany would have to turn if

she were to erect a stable democratic government. Hence in many cases our arrival was welcomed by the ex-Imperial officials, who regarded our coming as being of great assistance in enforcing their authority, which had been weakened by the revolution. . . . Paragraph 5 of the armistice (stipulation that occupied territories should continue to be administered by their local authorities) was so interpreted by both Germany and the Allies that "local authorities" meant officials of the old regime. As a result, the armies of occupation had a thoroughly capable group of officials to carry out their orders and wishes.

Thus the Allies, instead of helping the Germans to break the yoke of the German military clique and of the equally reactionary and nationalistic civil officials of Imperial Germany, did everything to keep these men in control. And why should not the same thing that happened then happen again after this war? When the generals first met toward the end of 1941 they must indeed have felt that there was no reason why it should not happen again. They had only to convince the Allies that again they and only they could guarantee law and order. Therefore, all that the German generals needed to do to save themselves from the catastrophe and to get another chance for another underground army movement with the goal of still another world war was to see to it that no real revolution occurred once the defeat became a certainty; to insure that calm and order would prevail.

The generals had no illusions. They figured that after this defeat not only part but the whole of Germany would be occupied, and that on top of this the winners would exercise a certain influence on whoever would form the German government. If the Russians were in charge of the occupation the government would, of course, be a leftist one; if the Anglo-American influence were predominant it would be a more conservative regime. However, the main thing, the generals felt, was to create some kind of working arrangement with the occupying troops themselves, the AMG. If that could be done it would not be too difficult to obtain certain concessions, or at least to keep certain men in some of the key positions.

No, the generals had no illusions. They knew that they could not organize groups of resistance and Free Corps as openly as they had done after the last war. The Allies would not permit themselves to be duped twice in the same way. The generals believed—and in particular von Bock and von Rundstedt went on record as

saying—that this time there would have to be a long intermission during which they could do nothing but keep quiet. They said that this period might last from two to five years, and that any attempt to form a militant underground group within that period would be suppressed with much bloodshed. Also every attempt would be suppressed in which any personality known as a former Nazi had his hand. The generals realized that it might be better for them to have no dealings with anybody who was compromised by a too-violent Nazi past.

Therefore, the generals decided, the Nazis had to disappear from sight. And the sooner the better. Only thus would the generals have a chance—and a good one—to co-operate with the future AMG. Only thus could they hope to convince the officers of the occupying enemy armies that they, and only they, could do the job of keeping law and order, and that they could be trusted.

The events during the occupation of Africa and, even more, the developments which followed the Allied invasion of Italy were to prove their point.

4

The Nazis Look at Africa and Italy

THE GERMANS WERE BEATEN in Africa. They had had to relinquish Sicily. And the very fact of our invasion of the Italian mainland exploded the carefully built up myth of the impregnable Festung Europa. Still, from a long-range point of view—and such a view is the only one that interests us here—Africa was a victory for the German industrialists, and thus, indirectly, for the Nazis. And Italy transformed itself into a victory for the German generals far beyond any tactical or strategic issues of this war. And thus again it brought advantage to the Nazis, or to the Nazi underground to come.

In order to understand this and, in particular, the conclusions

the Nazis must have drawn from their examination of the invasion of Africa and the occupation of Italy it may be a good idea to reexamine the facts ourselves.

Extensive preparations were made for our landing in Africa, some of them of a rather romantic nature. Robert Murphy of the State Department was very busy during the weeks preceding the landing. He made his headquarters in the house of a Jewish physician, Dr. Henri Aboulker, in Algiers, where he met a great number of the doctor's friends, most of them confirmed de Gaullists, most of them Iews. One of them owned the beach villa to which General Mark Clark came in a submarine to confer about details of the invasion. These men were to organize a few hundred of their friends. furnish them with arms which the United States Government had sent for the purpose of seizing such strategic points as the telegraph office, the police department, the power plants, and to arrest any of the leading French officers who they thought might be likely to offer any resistance. Among these was Admiral Darlan. While the plan did not succeed entirely, since the Americans landed many hours later than they were scheduled to, the enormous confusion caused by the presence of the five hundred and forty armed men in the city of Algiers, and their arrest of so many important officers, caused enough distraction to facilitate the American landing considerably.

Then, immediately after the landing, a lot of things began to look quite different in Algiers as well as elsewhere. The de Gaullists had risked their lives to help the Americans; but it was Admiral Darlan, who had fought General de Gaulle and his followers so mercilessly, who was put in power by us. The Jews had done their utmost to make our invasion possible; but when anti-Semitic French officers who had not aided us demanded that the Jewish interpreters who had facilitated our landing operations be ousted, the interpreters were promptly chased out of the ports. Frenchmen who had shown enthusiasm when the Americans landed were put into prison. Many citizens who had fought for the Americans lost their jobs, while French officers who had fought against them were promoted. Two police officers who had actively assisted the Allies during the landing were arrested because they had not told their superior officers of the imminent invasion. The superior officers

stayed in their jobs, although they had been violently anti-American and continued to be so.

Now Mr. Murphy no longer could find time for seeing the old doctor or any of the men he had conferred with so frequently before. In the meantime Admiral Darlan was assassinated. Officers and officials who had been imprisoned by the army of five hundred and forty men during the night of the landings, and who had begged on their knees for their lives, saw their chance for revenge now. Finally every one of the group who had helped the Americans, including old Dr. Aboulker, was arrested by the French secret police. It was said that they were plotting to assassinate General Giraud.

During the following weeks members of French Fascist organizations who had hidden out when the Americans came in reappeared on the streets and in the cafés and made no secret of the fact that they were still on the side of Marshal Pétain and against the Americans. The Service d'Ordre de la Legion, the French counterpart of the SS, was even accepted with open arms by our Army Intelligence. Their intelligence service turned over the names of many "suspicious" persons, whom the Americans proceeded to arrest. Most of these were actually de Gaullists or Jews, none of whom belonged to Fascist organizations.

In the meantime Mr. Murphy had arranged for M. Marcel Peyrouton, one of the most faithful of the French collaborationists, to go to Algiers. It seemed, in short, that everyone who had helped us to land was being punished, while everyone who had worked against us was being encouraged.

When we landed in Africa, General Giraud was there ready to assume the command of the French troops. Soon it became known that the general was not the choice of the Frenchmen who were eager to liberate themselves. He had never shown any partiality for democracy; he had always been a reactionary and a loyalist. On top of this he was—even for a long time after the invasion—a man who believed in Marshal Pétain and who wanted to serve the old marshal.

At first it seemed as though General Giraud had been selected by the governments in Washington and London as "the liberator." However, the real instigators of this choice were French industrialists, the brothers de Wendel, Peyrimoff de Fontennelles, Pierre Étienne Flandin, Pierre Pucheu, and others, not to speak of the dozens of generals and hundreds of minor officers who arrived in Africa at the time General Giraud did.

When we landed in Africa we found there quite a sizable group of Frenchmen who usually did not reside in that part of the world. We also found many billions of francs in African banks which had not been there a short time before. There had been a leak somewhere, and a few French industrialists—or were they German?—had not been slow to profit from it.

The story goes back to November 1941 when a Franco-German trust was formed to control African raw-material bases. This trust was capitalized at eight million francs. Fifty-one per cent of its shares were taken over by I. G. Farben, the rest by leading French chemical concerns. Both the German Government and Vichy approved. The Nazi press proclaimed that a new economic era had begun with the creation of this new enterprise.

Soon afterwards another Franco-German trust, the French Trans-African Company, was formed, the shareholders being two leading French banks, which in turn were owned by the Deutsche Bank in Berlin as well as by a number of German industrial firms. Thus ever since the end of 1941 French North Africa was industrially as well as financially under the complete control of Germany.

Then, sometime during 1942, an important Frenchman found out about the invasion plans. He spoke of it to one of the top men in the Comité de Forges (an association of leading mining industries), a certain Pierre Pucheu, who was also a director of the Banque Worms in Paris, which had participated in the French Trans-African Company and of which the Deutsche Bank held the majority of shares. Banque Worms also represented the interests of the Schroeder Bank at Cologne (the same Schroeder who had started financing Hitler with money from the German heavy industries in 1928). Pucheu talked about the impending invasion to a number of bankers, among them Bréart de Boisanger, who had close contacts with I. G. Farben and other German industrial enterprises. Boisanger was also a Vichy representative on the board of directors of the Bank of International Settlements in Basel, where he was in constant touch with Hjalmar Schacht.

Thus, via Pucheu and Boisanger, a great many people learned

of the invasion who were not supposed to know about it, among them Schacht, Herr von Schroeder, and, of course, Baron von Schnitzler. And only a few days after the news leaked out the two German-French trusts in North Africa began to transfer all available money from their banks in Paris to branches of the Banque de Paris and the Union Parisienne in Algiers and Morocco. At the same time other French enterprises poured money into North Africa. One who transferred large sums was François de Wendel, regent of the Banque de France and head of the Wendel steel corporation, and also, it should be noted, a close friend of Fritz Thyssen.

By October 1942, only a few weeks before the invasion, about nine billion francs had been transferred from France proper to North Africa. Among those who arrived along with the money was the rightist politician Pierre Étienne Flandin, who in 1940 had been living next to Fritz Thyssen at the Riviera, and who was now on the board of directors of both Franco-German North African trusts. Later, Pierre Pucheu arrived too. They went to North Africa to assure Robert Murphy that they would collaborate with the occupation authorities in every way possible. Whether or not this offer was made with certain reservations, whether or not a compromise had been reached, shortly after North Africa was in our hands the American administration offered to exchange those billions of francs at seventy-five francs to the dollar—an extremely favorable rate, since at that time the franc had fallen to one hundred and fifty francs and more to the dollar. Still, Pucheu and Flandin and a dozen or two other French industrialists and bankers who had arrived with them didn't think that was enough, and they finally persuaded Mr. Murphy to fix the official rate at fifty francs to the dollar.

Thus, the French industrialists and bankers had succeeded in transferring many millions of dollars to a place of safety. Or had they? Perhaps it was not they who owned this money. As a matter of fact, it wasn't. It was the Germans who held a majority of the shares of these Franco-German trusts and therefore it was they who owned the money, or most of it, and had thus succeeded in getting it safely out of war-torn Europe and exchanged into good American dollars. Hence the excellent deal engineered by Pucheu and Flandin brought them a few additional millions.

Nor is this all. The French industrialists residing today in Africa, these fronts for the German industrialists and bankers, are not at all satisfied with merely having saved their money. They are worried because things have not gone exactly as they had hoped. Their main source of grievance is de Gaulle, who does not feel himself bound by arrangements concluded before he reached Africa. It is for this reason that these French industrialists, led by François and Guy de Wendel, have, since the arrest of Pucheu and Flandin, tried hard to become more Free French than the Free French, making several attempts to approach groups of the opposition inside France, and offering them money for the purpose of building up an army which they then would control and which they could use in many ways. Perhaps to outmaneuver the Free French. . . .

Much has changed since de Gaulle and his Free French began to act. A great number of French Fascists who seemed to triumph after we had completed our landings are now in prison. Many of those men who were then sent to prison as reward for their collaboration with the Americans and English today occupy important positions. Flandin and Peyrouton are under arrest, and Pucheu has been executed. It does not look as though the Free French are going to respect the German money which is safeguarded in Africa in the accounts of those two French-German trusts!

But it took a long time for de Gaulle to get to Africa and establish himself there. And before that happened the intelligence service of the coming Nazi underground undoubtedly had plenty of opportunity to assemble a large number of interesting and vital facts. Encouraging ones too. After all, what could be more heartening to a Nazi underground than to see our army intelligence collaborating with the intelligence department of a Fascist organization? Though it must have been unfortunate in their eyes that de Gaulle finally intervened, they still had time to place some of their more important agents securely in places where they may not be found out for many years to come.

And what had been done in Africa could be repeated elsewhere. It has been repeated, as a matter of fact, in Italy.

On July 25, 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III announced that Mussolini had resigned. On the same evening the United States Office of War Information broadcast that this resignation had not changed much in Italy since the "moronic little King" was still in power. It may have been bad judgment not to use Mussolini's downfall more effectively for propaganda purposes, but what the Office of War Information said could not be contested, in spite of all the criticism it evoked, including certain remarks made by President Roosevelt himself.

The moronic little King had been an accessory to the crime of Fascism for more than twenty years. He had seen what Mussolini did, and he had approved of it. He had tolerated the persecution of Italian workers and liberals and the political assassination of socialists. He had said "Yes" to the unprovoked attack on Abyssinia and the rape of Albania. He had collaborated with Hitler and had entertained no qualms about the persecution of the Jews. He had thrust the knife into the back of France and had participated in the crime against Greece. He had sent his troops into Spain and into Russia, his planes against England. He was among those most responsible for the Italian atrocities in Yugoslavia and Greece. And now, suddenly, he was no longer Fascist? True, he no longer wanted any part of Mussolini, but the reason for that change of heart was that Mussolini had lost the war. Victor Emmanuel had cut himself off from Mussolini in order to save himself and his throne.

As for the man whom he had appointed Prime Minister, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, possibly he never had been a true friend of Fascism; but he had collaborated with Fascism, just as the German generals had collaborated with Nazism without being Nazis themselves. Was he to be forgiven for this collaboration? Was he to be forgiven for the unspeakable war crimes which were committed by him and under him against Abyssinia?

On September 10, 1943, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, von Kleist, von Mannstein, von Brauchitsch who was acting as an adviser to Mannstein, and von Kluge met with Heinrich Himmler and Martin Bormann on the estate of Prince Pueckler near Kottbus, fifty miles from Berlin.

Things were decidedly taking a turn for the worse. On September 3 General Eisenhower had made his secret treaty with Marshal Badoglio about Italy's dropping out of the war. The German Ambassador in Rome had vainly attempted to get a definite promise

from the marshal to continue fighting at the side of Germany. On September 8 the Italian armistice was made official.

The King and his marshal were to deliver the fleet and the entire army, Rome and the whole of middle Italy. Furthermore, they promised that the north of Italy would be so severely shaken by upheavals and revolts against the Germans that in no time at all the entire country would be in Allied hands. That is what was agreed before the armistice was concluded on September 3, 1943. Then nothing except the fleet was delivered. Badoglio could not hold Rome; the army never came over to the Allies; and the revolts in north Italy never assumed sufficient dimensions to endanger the Germans. The new Italian government could not even keep Mussolini in prison. Hitler saw to that. And on December 27 General Eisenhower had to admit: "The surrender did not give us all we had hoped for."

The German generals did not yet know all of this when they met with Himmler and Bormann at Prince Pueckler's estate on September 10, 1943. Some of the details of the Allied-Italian bargain became known only much later. But the generals knew enough to prove to them that their position was by no means desperate. The little King and Badoglio had collaborated for years and years with Fascism and still they were not considered Fascists by the Allies. Why, then, should the generals be considered Nazis? The main thing was to put some distance between themselves and Hitler. When the day of the final defeat came, the situation must be clear beyond doubt. Nobody, least of all the Allies who had pledged the liquidation of Hitler and his gang, must have any reason to believe that the generals were Nazis. After all, they were not. They had merely collaborated with the Nazis. . . .

On the other hand, the generals needed the Nazis for later. Or at least they needed some kind of popular movement in order to create their army underground. They knew that alone they could never hope to control the masses to the extent that was necessary if they were to stage a successful comeback. They well knew that the people had no love for the army, and would refuse to follow it blindly. That is why they had had to enter into the mésalliance with the Nazis in the late twenties. That is why they would have to enter some similar mésalliance again in the near future.

On their side, the Nazis, particularly Heinrich Himmler, dis-

trusted the generals profoundly. But he could not liquidate all of them as he had liquidated von Reichenau. After all, the Nazis did need the generals. They wanted time, which means that they wanted the war to be prolonged as much as possible. And that could not be done without the generals.

During the meeting of September 10 Bormann put his cards on the table. A report from Zurich tells of the episode as follows:

The generals were informed of the intentions of the Nazis. It was their first inkling of what Himmler and company intended to do after the defeat. They learned with deep misgivings of these projects. They grasped what the Nazis were driving at: to create a maximum amount of disorder and uncertainty in Germany; to wage continuous underground warfare against the occupying troops and powers as well as against the German people.

This was the precise opposite of what the generals desired in order to work out their long-range plan of an army underground which was to start many years after the armistice.

Field Marshals von Kluge and von Mannstein put their foot down in no uncertain way. Von Kluge in particular declared that the Nazi plans and projects could not be considered seriously. That would never do. The army would not stand for it.

What could the army do about it? It was to be seen during the following weeks that the army could do something very decisive about it, because during these following weeks strange reports found their way out of Germany. They appeared in Czechoslovakian underground newspapers and in Swiss periodicals. They even found their way via Stockholm papers to the London dailies. These reports said that Heinrich Himmler "had been instructed to establish cadres immediately for the underground cells of an illegal Nazi party to exist fully ramified and equipped. . . ." It was also said that "plans had been completed for violence and terror ... to start as soon as the war was over." In particular it was rumored that "two to three secret divisions of SS men had been established and were being trained in guerrilla tactics. . . . Factories, power plants, waterworks would be destroyed . . . communications would be smashed, food depots be blown up." Other accounts spoke of "secret radio stations, a clandestine press, and secret arsenals of

arms and ammunitions. New Free Corps were quoted with names such as "Goetz von Berlichingen" and "Georg von Frundsberg."

At least in one case it has been established that it was Field Marshal von Kluge himself who arranged for this intelligence to leak out. There was method in this madness. The generals simply wanted to put a stop to the Nazi plans which, if they were ever executed, would have immediately canceled out their own hopes and plans.

And the generals succeeded in putting a stop to the Nazi plans—temporarily, at least. "The upshot of the meeting of September 10 and several conversations which continued during the following weeks between Heinrich Himmler and Field Marshals von Mannstein and von Kluge was that the Nazis made up their minds to lie low—at least for the time being."

Why did Heinrich Himmler give in? There are several possible explanations. He may have recognized that he was unable to carry through the somewhat melodramatic underground plans without the help and against the opposition of the generals. He may have become convinced that their long-range plan had more chance of success. A third explanation, however, seems the most plausible one. Himmler had never seriously thought of putting into practice the blueprint for an underground movement which would be based on a terroristic concept. At least it was not his idea to base the entire movement on its ability to blow up bridges and railway stations and do a lot of sniping. Such features might have a good effect on the Germans and might even be useful, on occasions. But the real Himmler plan was less melodramatic and more practical. Why. then, did Himmler have to be "convinced" by the generals? The answer is simple. He allowed himself to be persuaded in order to get them to collaborate with him. By threatening first to follow a plan which, if executed, would have ruined their plans, and then by apparently slowly giving in he reached not a compromise but precisely what he needed: to have them on his side.

If there was any need to prove that the plan of the generals was realistic, the events in Italy following the unconditional surrender of Marshal Badoglio furnished such a proof.

Italy was, then, in a way the dress rehearsal for the German generals. What happened there was a valid demonstration that the

AMG was, indeed, behaving exactly as the generals had foreseen it would.

To be sure, the Allies did not collaborate with the Fascist leaders or with very prominent persons too deeply stained with a Fascist past. They even arrested some of them. But they did collaborate with the great majority of the Fascist officials, from the mayors of an occupied town down to the last clerk. And, of course, they also collaborated with military men who had been Fascists as long as Fascism was doing well. In fact, they did not even seem to have any objection to Marshal Badoglio, although for twenty years that gentleman had been one of the chief military exponents of Fascism. They evidently believed him when he said it was all a mistake and that he was no longer interested in politics. But was it really so? Had Marshal Badoglio become converted to democratic ideals? Did he, after he went over to the Allies, honestly try to break with his Fascist past?

He did not. He never made any statement in favor of democratic ideas. He never spoke about the necessity for a new order. He never renounced his past. On the contrary, he made nostalgic remarks, to American journalists of all people, about the Abyssinian war. Those were the days! It never occurred to the marshal that those were the days when Fascism had begun its series of attacks on other countries. No, Marshal Badoglio had not changed. Even after his surrender to the Allies he declared proudly, again in an interview with Americans, that he was the third oldest marshal alive, the older ones being the German Marshal von Mackensen and the French Marshal Pétain. It never occurred to him that under the changed conditions it was at least somewhat tactless to bring up these names as objects of veneration. It never occurred to him, because as far as he was concerned nothing had changed much.

One of the first things Badoglio had to attend to was the selection of a chief of staff. He chose for this position General Mario Roatta. Roatta thus became the man in charge of the reorganization of the army in southern Italy. He set out on this business in the early part of September 1943. By the middle of November it was established during a debate in the House of Commons that this was the same General Roatta who had been responsible for extreme atrocities in Yugoslavia. It was he who had ordered the torturing and killing of

countless patriotic Serbs; he who had given orders to shoot every Serb in uniform who had no identification card with him; he who had arranged for the beating up of the patriots in Montenegro and the crucifying of those in Herzegovina. None of the leading American or British military men had opposed his appointment. It was only after violent protests by our Yugoslav Allies that Roatta was forced to resign on November 13. Six weeks, in which this confirmed Fascist could begin rebuilding a new organization within the Italian Army; six weeks in which he could place any number of "dependable" men in key positions; six weeks in which he could dispose of genuine anti-Fascists who would later prove "inconvenient"; six weeks during which the foundation for a really democratic army could have been laid. And then he was out.

Once again Badoglio had to look for a chief of staff. And again he had a splendid idea. What he needed, so he declared, was a popular man, a war hero. Such a man would pull together the somewhat bewildered Italian troops. And he pointed his finger unwaveringly in the direction of Marshal Giovanni Messe, who had been taken prisoner by the Allies during the African campaign. Marshal Messe was, of course, immediately liberated and returned to Italy.

How the German generals must have grinned when they learned of this new appointment! Perhaps Marshal Messe was not a Fascist. But he was a symbol of Italian aggression. He had achieved popularity as "Victor of Tunis," and retained it in spite of having lost Tunis and much more territory afterward. But he was an old and tried reactionary military man, a man who represented exactly the same school of thought as that to which the German generals belonged. For him such things as democracy and liberty and justice were simply words. And from the moment he took over as chief of the General Staff he did everything he could to hamper the actions of the genuine Italian democrats and anti-Fascists, and to reinstate or keep in power the out-and-out Fascists, or the men who could be depended upon to steer Italy toward a future reactionary and anti-democratic course.

How the German generals must have laughed! History was repeating itself. A beaten general was called back into power, though the course of the country was supposed to have been changed completely. It was the story of Hindenburg all over again—only that Hindenburg had had to wait six years before he was brought back to power in Germany, while Messe had had to wait only a few months.

The cases of Roatta and Messe have proved to the German military clique that it can depend on the occupying forces for support, if and when the occupation of Germany becomes an established fact. The generals don't have to get upset so long as they can guarantee to the AMG or whoever will be in charge that there will be no disorder, no acts of revolt, let alone a revolution. Since the American and English military men have trusted so completely the Italian generals who fought against them even up to the day before they surrendered, and who had, after all, come over to them by an act of treason pure and simple, why will they not trust the Germans the same way?

Heretofore Roatta and Messe had been no more than two names to the German military clique. Now they became a confirmation to the generals that they were on the right track. There now seemed to be no reason why their plans for a German future should not work out.

Field Marshal von Mannstein, then, was to be the German Badoglio or Roatta or Messe. And why not? He had been less involved with the Nazi party than the three above-mentioned signori had been with Fascism. And last but not least he had proved himself to be an excellent military man, while the military qualities of his Italian confreres were of a somewhat doubtful nature. They had promised a lot to the Allies and had delivered nothing. Mannstein could deliver—at least as long as he chose to do so. Or as long as the Nazis chose to let him make decisions.

There is no certainty whatever that the newly formed alliance of September 10, 1943, will last. One day Himmler may decide that the generals are betraying the party, after all. And then Mannstein may receive an unexpected and unexplained visit from a few SS officers and die suddenly of "apoplexy."

Whether or not the generals have entirely given up their idea of divorcing themselves from Hitler, nobody can say for certain. Only four weeks after the meeting with Himmler and Bormann a number of German generals spoke up precisely to this effect. But these men were not informed of the latest developments. They had been

Russian prisoners of war since Stalingrad. Still, what they said was so remarkably in tune with what the other generals had said and thought, in strictest privacy, of course, that no room is left for any doubts as to just how deeply the idea of betraying Hitler has infiltrated into the mind of the average high officer.

The speeches and statements referred to were made on the occasion of the foundation of the *Bund Deutscher Offiziere* (Association of Commissioned German Officers) in Soviet Russia on October 11 and 12, 1943.

The invitation for the formation of the Association was more than clear. It said among other things:

Every thinking German officer knows that Germany has lost the war. . . The men in the government know it, too, those who have brought about this whole miserable situation. Hitler and his regime are fully responsible before history for the wrong decisions that will lead Germany into the abyss if the people and the army do not force a reverse course. . . . Hitler as a statesman has brought together the most powerful states of the world into an overwhelming coalition against Germany. Hitler as a general has led the German Wehrmacht into the gravest defeats. . . .

General of the Artillery Walter von Seydlitz, who presided at the first meeting, said:

The goal is to end the war soon and to prepare the peace. The removal of the Hitler regime is the preliminary condition. It renders possible the creation of a peaceful government based upon the confidence of the people and to avoid more useless bloodshed by a truce, and it makes possible, as proof of our peaceful intentions, to lead back the Wehrmacht to the frontiers and to preserve it for the people. An honorable peace can be in store only for a people whose Wehrmacht is not disintegrated. It is the urgent need of the hour to conclude a truce to anticipate the disintegration of the Wehrmacht.

Colonel von Hooven, who made the main report, declared among other things:

It is not we who have become disloyal. It is Adolf Hitler who has miserably misused the confidence which the German people put in him. By heedlessly provoking this war, by challenging the whole Western world to conflict with Germany, by daring to fight Russia against the advice of all the experts, he alone has the responsibility

for the bombing of German cities, the death of women and children....

Major General Lattman shouted:

Never did we take an oath to make Hitler or even ourselves masters of Europe. We only pledged ourselves to be loyal if we had to fight for Germany. But he to whom we pledged loyalty made our oath a lie. . . . Understand the necessity of the hour. Create a basis for an armistice and peace. Lead the army back to the frontier. Prevent the dissolution and disbanding of the army and of the Reich. Save the Wehrmacht as an instrument of peace for the new Germany.

Such was the general tenor of the speeches. No, the German officers no longer had anything to do with Hitler. It was he who was responsible for all the misery of the world including the misery of the officers themselves. Never mind what happened to him. But the army had to be saved. The army which had so faithfully followed the Führer, which had permitted him to create havoc and throw a whole world in despair must be left alone.

The officers imprisoned in Soviet Russia spoke their minds with remarkable frankness. Of course they could say anything as long as Stalin didn't mind (which apparently he didn't). They didn't have to take into consideration how Himmler felt about it. He couldn't reach them.

It was not only the German generals who had reason to be content with what was happening in Italy. The German industrialists, too, must have approved heartily of the way in which things were shaping up south of the Po. Their friends, the masters of Italian industry, were doing quite nicely, thank you. In fact, as far as they were concerned, it was Algiers all over again. To name just one: Alberto Pirelli, one of Mussolini's early backers, and an official in the Fascist government, was left completely unmolested. The Allies didn't seem to care that he had been one of the main organizers of the Fascist Confederation of Industrialists and a member of the Grand Fascist Council.

Pirelli is one of the leading industrialists of the world. He has numerous plants in Italy for the manufacture of all kinds of rubber products, wire, and cables. He also possesses sources for the material which goes into these products. His company has subsidiaries in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, England, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, and the Dutch East Indies. Up to 1939 all these properties were owned by a Belgian holding company which Pirelli organized to evade high taxes in Italy. Then, evidently afraid of the approaching war, he shifted his properties to the care of a Swiss holding company. When England and the United States compiled their black lists he was able to keep his subsidiaries in Latin America off these lists. This was easy enough. The Swiss holding company merely had to deposit bonds with the Bank of England as security for the promise not to do business with the enemy. The amount deposited in bonds was about \$50,000-a tiny fraction of the business which Pirelli did every year with the enemy. In April 1943, when the President of Brazil wanted to take Pirelli's possessions over as enemy properties, the British Embassy in Rio de Janeiro protested that the Pirelli Company was neutral property. It may be added that Pirelli's companies are closely interwoven with the I. G. Farben. Yes, it was Algiers all over again.

Africa was the first step, but anybody can make mistakes in the beginning. By the time we went into Italy, we should have learned from those initial mistakes. Africa was, politically, a vacuum. Our leaders might have believed, and perhaps did, that they would find there Fascist and semi-Fascist forces to the exclusion of any others. But Italy was no vacuum. It was known to us long before we moved in that Fascism was on the decline, that the vast majority of the Italian people were outraged at the Fascist leaders and were willing to fight for their liberation.

Why didn't we use these outraged masses? Why did we not invade Italy, or, better still, Sicily with an Italian legion? Why, after the invasion of Sicily, did we not form legions of anti-Fascists? Were we afraid to collaborate with the people of Italy, whom we had encouraged in countless propaganda broadcasts to risk their all for liberty? Were we afraid of the revolutionary flame we had been so busy kindling?

Evidently we were. In vain did Count Sforza, after his arrival in Italy, demand that the King and Badoglio be ousted. In vain did he cry, on October 22, "The evil comes from the circles of the King where everything is tried, even in the trickiest ways, to set a stage

for a general acquittal of Fascists. They know too well that an honest, sincere elimination of disloyal Fascists will sooner or later reach certain exalted ranks." In vain did six anti-Fascist parties, liberals as well as Socialists and Communists, demand that the King abdicate. It did not matter that Badoglio and his men had no intention of abandoning the Fascist spirit after they had, in name only, dropped Fascism. Lord Rennell of Rodd, the head of the Allied control machinery, a prominent financier and former friend of Schacht and of Pirelli and other Fascist industrialists, did everything he could to see to it that the regime was kept in power.

Anti-Fascists who had formed armed units to combat Fascism were forced by Badoglio to wear the King's insignia. In disgust they tore off their uniforms and went home. Workers in north Italy who had organized numerous uprisings and who had taken to guerrilla fighting decided that it was no use. Prominent liberals in Bari were arrested because they demanded the abdication of the King. Mass meetings in the University of Naples which were called for the same purpose were dissolved. Liberal papers were suppressed. Count Sforza received a severe warning for holding a meeting for which he had neglected to obtain a permit.

In short, we did everything possible to keep in power those who had fought us. Count Sforza said about the generals who did the dirty work there, "They despise the Allies in their hearts, but probably will be given congressional medals." The knowledge of what was going on in Italy must have pleased the leaders of the Nazi underground enormously. Here was the perfect setup in which to plant their men.

They planted them. Perhaps they did not need to plant any around the King or Badoglio because there were enough Fascists or former Fascists close to them to assure any degree of collaboration with the Nazi underground in the years to come. Theoretically, that idea contradicted the original Nazi plan of not working in close contact with known Fascists. But, then, that plan had been conceived only in order to protect the movement. Wherever, as in Italy, the Fascists themselves were protected, there was no possible risk in collaborating with them. These Fascists centered mainly around the headquarters of General Antonio Basso near Naples. Basso had ordered flags raised all over Naples to celebrate the King's birthday and had criticized the dean of the University,

Adolfo Omodeo, for a speech in which he honored General Clark without mentioning the King. The dean replied that he was not sure whether an American general would like being mentioned in the same breath with the Emperor of Ethiopia and the King of Albania.

In April 1944 the picture changed somewhat. Following suggestions by the Russians, the Italian government was placed on a broader basis, embracing all Italian parties. It is probable that since then some of the Fascist collaborators have been driven out of their key positions. However, they have had ample time to lay the groundwork for what is to come.

This was one side of the picture. The other side was that numerous men and women traveled from the north of Italy to the south and found shelter in towns and villages there. Among them were agents loyal to Mussolini who told the southern population that conditions were much better in the northern part of the country, that Mussolini had instituted revolutionary methods, that big estates were being divided up among the people, wages had increased, and that the food supply was superior to that in the south. In a few cases these propagandists were caught by the intelligence services of the Allies.

It was soon found out that it was not Mussolini who had sent those agents, but the Germans. This is understandable enough, for the coming Nazi underground Italy is important in two respects. In the first place, it is an ideal proving ground for finding out just how much the Nazi underground will be able to get away with when Germany is occupied; what type of agent can remain above ground and collaborate with the occupying authorities, and who will have to disappear; how much the Allies will swallow and where and when precisely they will begin to catch on.

Then, of course, Italy has the added importance of being a logical ally for the Nazi underground five or ten years hence. No matter what happens otherwise, Italy will have a hard time after this war, which means that there will be a great many disgruntled and unhappy people—there are plenty of them already. The neo-Fascist regime of Mussolini, when it increased wages and divided big estates, acted, of course, under pressure. The workers of Milan and other northern Italian cities had walked out—actually the first time that strikes had been carried through under a Fascist regime.

Later on, after the war, the Nazi underground will pretend that the Nazis really would have introduced Socialism if given half a chance. Or even Communism.

There will probably be some people who will believe even that.

During the few months of our occupation of Italy there have been too many examples of how easily our men can be duped and used as tools by scheming Fascists. This is as true of very high officers as of the ordinary soldiers. The Americans as well as the English are fundamentally unsuspecting, and the Fascists know quite well that their only chance of survival is to convince the Allies that they have been really nice, innocent people all along. They are actually trained in carrying through such deception, while the English and Americans are not adept at seeing through their lies.

Washington knew for some time that we would come up against such a situation if and when we invaded Europe. The last time enemy territory was occupied and administered by American troops—the Rhineland after the armistice of 1918—was an improvised affair. Colonel I. L. Hunt, the same officer who after the last war wrote a report on the collaboration of the occupying forces with the Imperial officials and officers of the Imperial Army also made a report to the War Department expressing the hope that the United States Army might never again be found unprepared for the important duties of military government. This report was taken up again shortly before America entered World War II, and among the measures which were subsequently decided upon was the foundation of a school for the training of experts for administrative duty in occupied territories.

The method of instruction in this school was set forth in a War Department release of May 15, 1943, as follows:

The course at the School of Military Government is divided into three parts:

r. A lecture program designed to acquaint the students with the principles of military government, military courts, proclamations, ordinances, state and municipal governments, international law and public administration in general; and also to acquaint students with detailed conditions and characteristics of the countries and regions which may be occupied.

2. Foreign-language studies.

3. A program of practical problems whereby the class, divided into small committees, actually prepares the plans for the setting up of military governments in certain cities, countries, and regions.

The reports made by these committees have a double value. They are useful as an applied method of instruction, and also as a basis for

plans which may be put into effect when called for.

Methods and procedures of our enemies are studied, not for the purpose of patterning our military government after the harsh and inhuman character of the military governments of Germany and Japan, but rather to acquaint the students of our School of Military Government with the conditions under which the peoples of conquered territories are now living and furnish examples of what not to do when our Army moves into enemy territory.

Our men are trained to be nice and understanding. In fact, the "military government should be just, humane, and as mild as practicable, and the welfare of the people governed should always be the aim of every person engaged therein."

There is no need to say that all this is excellent, that the idea of this training school and many of the words spoken in it will live long after this war as an example of the moral superiority of democracy.

But is it enough? Does it suffice to be nice to conquered people? It does if the conquered people want peace and are happy to collaborate. But it is certainly not enough if the conquered people, or even only some of them, use defeat merely as a means of preparing a comeback, or a sinister conspiracy, or a new war. In order to be able to see through such opponents—and there are many such to be encountered in Italy—our men should be trained in psychological warfare, and in psychology proper.

Some of our highest officers have fallen for Fascists and Nazis because these Fascists and Nazis seemed to be decent people and knew the right psychological approach. Our men have been duped because they judged the people they encountered, their enemies of yesterday, from an Anglo-American point of view. They believed those men to be motivated by the same wishes and desires, likes and dislikes, by which they themselves are controlled.

There is no use going into details here. A rich man is usually more suave, genial, easier to approach, than a poor man. The lead-

ing Fascists were very rich; the anti-Fascists were very poor. The leading Fascists could speak English; most of the anti-Fascists could not. The leading Fascists belonged to the same stratum of society as the high-ranking American and English officers. They were comfortable, poised, and calm. They emanated an air of ease and order. The anti-Fascists were nervous, haunted, worn out. Our men were there to "preserve order among a disaffected or confused people," to quote Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War. Hence they naturally found it easier to collaborate with the people who seemed least confused.

Much of this may repeat itself when we go into Germany. There, too, the better classes will be pleasanter to deal with than the small numbers of dispersed and haunted anti-Nazis, especially since these better people—who, of course, "had only become members of the Nazi party because they were forced to do so"—will be so fervently in favor of having law and order enforced.

They always were. And if the Nazis, the ones who have to go underground, had the slightest doubt about their strategy after the occupation of Germany, they must have learned from Italy that law and order, indeed, are the best things for Germany, too—a Germany which wants to turn Nazi again.

5

The Plan

THE HAND-PICKED STAFF selected personally by Heinrich Himmler worked hard in the offices at 11 Koenigsallee to complete the preparations necessary for building up and perfecting the machine which would have to function underground after the defeat. Himmler himself supervised and controlled their work from his headquarters in Prinz Albrecht Strasse, at least up to November 1943, when British bombs destroyed most of the building. Martin Bormann divided his time between his headquarters at the chancel-

lery, Himmler's office, and Koenigsallee. And from his desk at the Ministry of Economics Konstantin Hierl contributed some very interesting detail work which was to become an integral part of the whole scheme.

Hierl, born in Bavaria in 1875, finished World War I as a member of the Bavarian General Staff on the Western front. After the armistice he was called to Berlin, where he prepared regulations for the new army. He also participated in the numerous fights of the Reichswehr against the workers' uprisings in the early years of the republic. He wrote a book about these experiences called Conduct of War with Improvised Armies, which was published in 1923. Later he became prominent in the Schwarze Reichswehr. He entered Hitler's party in the early twenties.

In order to provide cadres for the army, Hierl hit on the idea of creating a youth labor service—a kind of "improvised army" which would become a part of the universal service obligatory for every young German. He organized this "improvised army" soon after Hitler achieved power. In 1939 this Minister without Portfolio was Secretary of State for the Labor Service and, as organizer of the Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service), controlled more than two million male and almost three million female workers.

In July 1943 he made an interesting statement to his most trusted lieutenants in the Labor Service in Munich:

The party achieved its utmost power and its greatest influence during its legal period when it was centrally ruled. Never was a party more efficiently centralized than ours. The principle for the illegal period which will come after the war must, however, be utmost decentralization. In fact, we must decentralize to such a degree that we must seem to have disappeared. The one hundred men who formerly marched through the street or attended a meeting will then be found in one hundred different plants or offices in one hundred different cities. Only thus can we survive.

Decentralization means the application of the system of cells. To work out the theoretical part of installing them was the task of Herr Hierl.

He had organized a similar system of cells for the party in the years 1931 and 1932. These secret cells never had to go into action at that time, because the party was not forced underground. But they will have to go into action this time. And Konstantin Hierl

has been working ever since the spring of 1943 at organizing them. They will have a great many new features, as compared with the cells of 1931-32. The main new feature will be, to use Hierl's phrase, "complete decentralization." There will be no connection between the different cells, no go-betweens, for many years after the party has submerged. The important thing for the members of these cells, according to Hierl, is to keep alive, to stay where they are, and to wait patiently.

The members of the cells will not know anything about the members of any other cells, nor even that any other cells exist. Only a few leaders who will not be in Germany will have complete knowledge of how many men are available and where they are. And only they can get in touch with these men whenever it becomes necessary.

Cells will comprise no more than three to six men. Only in a very few exceptional cases will cells of ten men be permitted, and that only later. In the beginning, according to Hierl, no such exception will be made, no unnecessary risks taken. Himmler and Hierl hope that in this way between 200,000 and 300,000 men will be hidden away within German plants, factories, city administrations, et cetera.

Himmler's over-all plan divides itself into two parts, one dealing with ways and means for the government to go underground, the other with ways and means for the party to go underground.

As to the government, the following system has been worked out:

Out of the countless offices or subdepartments of each ministry two or three departments have been chosen in which underground work will be continued after the end of this war. These departments, all of them outwardly of a harmless nature, have been filled with dependable Nazis, and new men who have been trained in underground work are constantly being added. Each department will be infiltrated with at least ten cells consisting of two persons each, a so-called A-man and a so-called B-man. The A-man is supposed to keep the contact with the higher-ups and the government, the B-man with the underground, that is, the illegal part of the movement. Each such government department has, furthermore, been duplicated in such a way that for each man there exists a re-

serve man who may supplant him at any given time for any reason whatsoever.

The following departments have been chosen for this type of infiltration (the list does not pretend to be complete—for obvious reasons):

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Kulturpolitische Abteilung (Cultural Department).

Ministry of the Interior: Kommunalabteilung (Communal Department). Gesundheitsamt (Department of Health). Landesvermessungsamt (Department of Surveys).

Ministry of Economics: the Statistisches Reichsamt (Statistical Department), which in a way will become a center of its own whose function will be discussed later. Grubensicherheitsamt (Mining Security Department).

Ministry of Labor: Sozialversicherungsamt (Social Insurance Department). Wohlfahrtspflegeamt (Public Welfare Department). Reichsversicherungsamt (Government Insurance Department).

Ministry of Justice: Reichsbahngericht (Railway Court). Reichspatentamt (Government Patent Office).

Air Ministry: Amt fuer Wetterdienst (Department of Meteorology). This department will be under direct supervision of the underground army to be.

Ministry of Posts: Reichspostzentralamt (Central Post Office). Reichsdruckerei (Government Printing Office).

Ministry of Traffic: Reichskanalamt (Department of Canals).

Ministry of Agriculture: Landwirtschaftliche Versuchsanstalt (Department for Agricultural Experiments).

Ministry of Culture: the Nazis will attempt to use this entire ministry for their underground. For some time it has been rumored that this ministry is really not Nazi at all. Many anti-Nazis firmly believe, and even assert, that it is opposed to everything the Propaganda Ministry does. The Propaganda Ministry, of course, will have to be sacrificed; but the Nazis hope that the occupying powers will believe the lie that the Ministry of Culture represents the spirit of Goethe, Bach, and Beethoven and must not be disturbed in its attempts to re-educate the Germans. The Ministry of Culture will also function as a means of contact between the Nazi underground and certain industrialists. The departments particularly suited to this purpose are: Technische Reichsanstalt (Govern-

ment Technical Institute), Chemisch-Technische Reichsanstalt (Institute for Chemical Technology), and the Reichsanstalt fuer Erdbebenforschung (Institute for Seismology).

It may seem strange that such departments should exist within the framework of the Ministry of Culture. But they do; and they have precious little to do with Goethe, Bach, or Beethoven. They furnish the ideal contact point between the Nazis and industry. The Ministry of Economics, which would seem to be the logical department for such a contact, will not be used for this purpose at all. This would be too obvious. The Ministry of Culture will also supervise and create a great number of cultural clubs all over Germany which will be excellently suited to serve as fronts for the Nazis.

While some kind of official government with its many departments will go on existing, the party will be suppressed, no matter what power occupies Germany after the war. The party, therefore, will be forced to employ a different system to go underground. It is not possible to plan for the continued existence of the party by transferring the main activities into departments of the party which have been more or less harmless; for each and every department of the party will be dissolved as soon as the war is over, or even before.

Himmler, Bormann, and Hierl have decided, therefore, to duplicate some of the important departments of the party. These duplications will start to work the moment the official party ceases to exist. Only the most integral and necessary departments will thus survive underground. And they will carry on only their most important functions. Everything has already been simplified as much as possible, and this process of simplification is still going on.

So far the following departments have been duplicated and are ready for underground work:

- 1. Rassenpolitisches Amt (Department of Race Politics).
- 2. Amt fuer Sippenforschung (Department for the Study of Ancestry).
 - 3. Amt fuer Schrifttum (Department of Publications).
 - 4. Auslandsorganisation (League of Germans Abroad).
- 5. Amt fuer kulturellen Frieden (Department for Cultural Peace).

- 6. Kommission fuer Wirtschaftspolitik (Department for Political Economics).
- 7. Kommission fuer Hochschulpolitik (Department for Universities).
- 8. Beauftragter fuer staatsrechtliche Fragen (Commissioner for Questions of State Jurisdiction).
- 9. Beauftragter fuer Siedlungswesen (Commissioner of Resettlement).
- 10. Beauftragter fuer Wirtschaftsfragen (Commissioner for Economic Problems).
- 11. Sachbearbeiter fuer Arbeitsbeschaffung (Expert for Provision of Work).
- 12. Sachbearbeiter fuer aussenpolitische Fragen (Expert on Questions of Foreign Politics).
 - 13. Sachbearbeiter fuer Wissenschaft (Expert on Science).
 - 14. Sachbearbeiter fuer Musikfragen (Expert on Music).
- 15. Vertrauensmann fuer Fragen der Volksgesundheit (Deputy for Public Health Problems).

All these departments which have been duplicated thus are part of the Bormann machine. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that only this machine is to be saved and all the other departments and machines—more than twenty—such as the Gaus, the propaganda setup, the Reichsorganisationsleitung, et cetera, are to be sacrificed.

All the cells or underground departments of the government as well as of the party will be under the supervision and direction of the underground Gestapo organization and in particular of its intelligence department. Each of these cells or departments will contain at least one or two Gestapo cells, the identity of whose members will be entirely unknown to any of the other Nazis. This should be relatively easy, since the men used for this purpose will be chosen, not from among the Gestapo men already known, but from an entirely new crop of members unknown to either the Nazi underground or the German people in general, to say nothing of the representatives of the occupying powers or the AMG.

The man who has been busy—at least ever since May 16, 1943—in devising and building these departments and cells, in selecting and rejecting possible candidates for each of those hundreds of

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posts and positions which will be of such decisive importance later on, is SS General Fritz Kaltenbrunner. This young Austrian is six feet tall, with dark brown hair and blue eyes and a heavy, awkward figure which has earned him the nickname "Gorilla Kaltenbrunner." He has been very little in the public eye, in spite of the fact that he has been director of the Gestapo ever since the death of the "late-lamented" Reinhard Heydrich.

His curriculum vitae shows that he is the right man for this difficult job. Kaltenbrunner, in spite of his youth, is an old hand at underground organization. In the early nineteen thirties he organized the Nazi students at the University of Vienna, who devoted themselves to attacking and beating up Jewish students. Their particular specialty was to throw their victims down the many stone steps which led to the main entrance of the university. While still a student Kaltenbrunner and his comrades from the university formed the SS Sturm 89, an organization which accepted as members only the most savage and beastly rowdies. Among those who joined the group were two of Kaltenbrunner's personal chums, Otto Planetta and Franz Holzweber, who were later to be hanged for the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss. That was during the putsch of 1934, in which SS Sturm 89 took a leading part.

After the failure of the 1934 putsch Kaltenbrunner had a chance to prove his talents for underground work. He distributed the members of his organization over the whole of Austria. Two or three would form a cell within a town, a plant, or a farm, under strict orders not to get in touch with other cells. For more than a year, till the fall of 1935, Kaltenbrunner made no move at all to get in touch with his men. When he did finally investigate he found that in almost all cases the cells had survived and their members had found work and lodging.

It was then that he began to transfer these cells into organizations of the Austrian Republic, particularly into the newly formed *Vaterlaendische Front*, a semi-Fascist group behind Chancellor Schuschnigg.

Some time after the *Anschluss*, during which Kaltenbrunner's organization proved itself of great help to Hitler, Himmler transferred Kaltenbrunner to Gestapo headquarters, where he soon became the right-hand man of Heydrich.

So much for Kaltenbrunner's past. It proves him to be an expert in the organization of the underground.

However, the task which had confronted him in Austria could not be compared with the task that he set out to fulfill in the spring of 1943: the manning of cells in countless organizations, the distribution of dependable men to key positions all over the Reich—in a word, the shaping of the underground army.

Next to Kaltenbrunner the most important man at 11 Koenigsallee is SS General Werner Heissmeyer—by no means a stranger to Allied counterespionage services. He has for many years been in charge of the saboteurs who were sent to foreign countries. It was he who dispatched the eight saboteurs in U-boats to the United States in 1942—to name only one of his many accomplishments.

Himmler once said: "All the SS should look as Heissmeyer looks." It must be admitted that he is really extremely handsome. Very tall, blond-haired, blue-eyed, and with regular features, he is one of the few prominent Nazis on whose lips the word "race" does not sound funny.

He looks romantic and, indeed, he is. He has been a daredevil all his life. As a young lieutenant in World War I he carried out more than three hundred dangerous patrols, some of which led him deep into enemy territory. After the war he became one of the most prominent members of the Free Corps and of the Feme organizations which engaged in killing Germans of the opposition and those "traitors" who favored fulfilling the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles and collaborating with the rest of the world. A Nazi since 1922, he was used during the late twenties mainly as a party spy in workers' unions. It is said—though this may be one of the many romantic rewritings of Nazi party history—that in order to do this job it was necessary for him to disguise himself and that on several occasions he was in great danger of death.

General Heissmeyer had his headquarters at 11 Koenigsallee for more than three years before May 16, 1943. It was there that he organized what has become known abroad as the sabotage school. Officially his office organized and ran the *Deutsche Heimschulen* (German Home Schools). These home schools—the German word says no more than does the English translation—had, as a matter of fact, nothing at all to do with the home. They were schools in

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which saboteurs and intelligence men were prepared for their difficult work abroad.

In November 1940 Heissmeyer made an official statement in which he declined to give out any information about these schools. (Had anybody asked him to give such information?) All he said was, "It is our most important goal to train young men for a dangerous and hard life and to school them to make the heaviest sacrifices for the Führer and for the Third Reich."

It is self-evident that the *Heimschulen* became very important in the plan for the coming Nazi underground. They were the logical place for the training of the young men who would form the basis of this movement. Formerly the thirty-five Heimschulen instructed their pupils mainly in foreign languages and foreign habits in how to use explosives and how to commit acts of sabotage, preferably without explosives and in the most untraceable way. In the spring of 1943 the curriculum of these schools was changed slightly. This was logical, for since the leaders of the Third Reich no longer expected to win this war, they now began to put the accent on the work that would have to be done after the war. Instead of developing spies and saboteurs, these schools were put to the task of developing workers for the coming underground.

This was true not only of the Heimschulen but of all the Politische Erziehungsanstalten (Institutions for Political Education), such as the Adolf Hitlerschulen, the Ordensburgen, and the Fuehrerschulen, which altogether have produced about 25,000 prospective leaders annually.

According to the Swedish daily Aftontidningen of October 13, 1943, the Nazi Ordensburgen were teaching their pupils how to behave "if extremely great distress should afflict the country." This report did not, of course, tell the whole story. While there will still be many changes in months to come, it seems pretty certain that the role of all the schools named above can be divided as follows:

r. The Adolf Hitlerschulen are doing mainly preparatory work. They train relatively young pupils not to lose faith in case of defeat and a general disaster. In short, they provide the reservoir from which the underground will have to be fed perhaps ten years hence.

- 2. The Heimschulen prepare the rank and file of the Nazi underground of tomorrow. The accent of their training is on preparation for certain roles, such as, for instance, the role of a farmer, a specialized worker, et cetera. They also give a special course in acquiring certain German dialects which will make it possible for, let us say, a Bavarian to go underground in Saxony or in Hamburg without being recognized by his manner of speech.
- 3. The Ordensburgen, which up to now have been used for the training of what was supposed to be the elite of the young Nazis, the coming Führers, are now devoting themselves to preparing agents of the Nazi underground who will have to go abroad. These agents will have to be physically fit young men who are better than average at a number of sports, and who speak a number of foreign languages fluently and, if possible, at least one without any trace of accent. They are also taught how to wear clothes properly, and how to behave in a number of countries in such a way as not to be immediately recognized as having been "made in Germany." Such is the curriculum that has been in force for some time past in two of the Ordensburgen: Vogelsang in Pomerania and Sonthofen in Bavaria.
- 4. The Ordensburg Kroessinsee in East Prussia has been converted into what is called a Versuchsanstalt (Experimental Station). It is typically German that the leaders of the coming underground leave nothing to chance. Before Rommel took his troops to Africa he had them trained for years in the so-called Tropeninstitut in Tuebingen, where they learned how to endure extreme heat and other conditions which they would have to encounter in the desert. Evidently Kroessinsee has for some time been the place where Heissmeyer has been trying out how the future members of the Nazi underground will stand up under the many handicaps they will have to endure. So far nothing definite about the Versuchsanstalt has leaked out. The world will learn in due time exactly how much the soldiers of the Nazi underground will be capable of enduring.

In spite of all this training they are giving the youth for future underground purposes, the leaders do not depend primarily upon these young people. In the first place, many of them will be dead at the zero hour, because many of them will have been thrown THE PLAN

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into the final battles of the war. But far more important than this is another very potent argument: these young men, many of them now still children, have never known the hard times of the Nazi party. They have lived the greater and the most decisive part of their lives in a period when it was very easy to be a Nazi and very dangerous not to be one. It is still an open question how these boys will behave at a time when it will be extremely dangerous to be a Nazi. It is and always will be doubtful how they will conform to party discipline at a time when much will depend on their personal initiative, and when it will be impossible for the party to supervise the actions of each member as closely as it has done in the past.

The so-called old guard, however, is experienced and tried. Many of them worked for the party during the time when it was without funds and was outlawed in many parts of Germany. Many of them have shown great personal initiative and valuable talent in improvisation. Almost all of them have proved dependable, even under the greatest stress.

The old guard—that does not mean the old men. It means men between the ages of thirty and forty. Among the younger "old" guard certain vintages are preferred by the leaders, as, for instance, those men who entered the party in 1931, at the age of eighteen. They are called, for short, vintage 18/31. Other preferred vintages are 18/32, 19/31, 18/30. There is probably a reason why these men have been put on the preferred list. Germans are systematic. In any case, many members of these vintages have been sent to Heimschulen for re-training during the later part of 1943.

It goes without saying that the over-all plan for a Nazi underground sketched on the preceding pages does not pretend to be complete. Under present conditions it is, of course, impossible to get a complete blueprint out of Germany. In any event, that blueprint is probably known to only very few people; and, furthermore, it is very likely still undergoing constant changes.

The important thing to be stated here is that such a blueprint has been worked out, and that the Nazis, and particularly the men stationed at 11 Koenigsallee, are working feverishly to put it into effect. They are working feverishly because they have to meet a deadline. The deadline is the day when the Germans, or the great

majority of them, will realize that the war is lost, and that it would be better for them to stop it today than tomorrow.

It is difficult, even almost impossible, to predict when this moment will come. Undoubtedly the extensive Allied air raids over Germany are helping to bring it nearer. The bombings of Berlin during the last weeks of 1943 and the first weeks of 1944 have made the capital a "dead city," to quote a Swedish newspaperman. But Germans can take a lot of punishment. And the Nazis have been at great pains to create the impression that the bombings of German cities have no influence on the outcome of the war.

Among their psychological tricks, particularly interesting is the establishment of underground workrooms somewhere in Berlin for one hundred and fifty architects who, according to Nazi propaganda, are drawing plans for rebuilding Berlin—a project which is supposed to take seven and one half years from the day the war ends—the implication being that Berlin will be rebuilt immediately after the war, because with the Germans victorious there will be no reason to attend to anything else first. Another of their tricks is the constant building of monuments in memory of some recent victory. These monuments are, of course, put up in order to convince the Germans that the war has consisted mainly of German victories. Paradoxically enough, among those monuments are even some celebrating victories in North Africa.

All these tricks serve to postpone the moment when the man in the street—if any streets are left by that time—will realize that the war has been lost by Hitler. But this moment will come, and on that day the Nazi underground must have all its preparations completed and must begin to function—underground.

When will this moment come? The answer may perhaps be contained in the words of a report which recently arrived from Switzerland: "The end will come on the day when the Gestapo or the SS will have to shoot at German women and children."

6 Zero Hour

NO MATTER when the war against Germany ceases, no matter when the final defeat of the Nazis becomes a reality, the Nazis themselves will not be taken by surprise. They will have had ample time to prepare down to the last detail.

How will their plan work? How will the leadership of the party and the government keep in touch with things, control and direct them after both groups have gone underground? The government, as we have seen, will have contact men in many government departments. But there will be only a few hundred of them, together with those in the underground party apparatus. They will be in danger of complete isolation unless they are able to collaborate closely with much larger groups of men installed in what one may call strategic positions all over Germany.

Let me, for better understanding, quote from a report about certain activities of SS General Kaltenbrunner:

Some time ago all the municipal fire departments were reorganized, as a result of complaints that the old system did not function fast enough to combat the effects of the new raids. Hence many new districts were formed, and the alarm system changed, and in many cases the fire department was divided into the fire police proper and a reserve. In some Gaus, where the new organization seemed to be taking too much time, Gestapo officials appeared and investigated and saw to it that things were stepped up.

There was nothing strange about that. In war things have to be stepped up. If there are investigations after the war nobody will be astonished that the Gestapo intervened. But the real reason why Kaltenbrunner sent his men there was to determine exactly who was going to be in charge of the reserve organization or to put his men in charge of it. . . .

Gestapo men also appeared in a number of waterworks, changing the crews rather suddenly, sending some of the old hands to the Russian front and replacing them with new men, all of them unknown in the particular district. In most cases the reason given for the changes was that the work could be done by fewer men; and, indeed, in most cases fewer men were installed. But in at least three cases more men were installed than had been there before.

Such goings on seem more mysterious than they actually are. It is logical that the organizations chosen as a hideout and field of activity for the members of the underground must be of a type which is likely to survive military defeat, revolution, and occupation. In a word, they must be necessities within the nation's life. And the fire departments and waterworks are undoubtedly such necessities.

It was Kaltenbrunner's idea to have all technicians working in public utilities undergo a training course in anti-sabotage prepared by the Gestapo. It seemed a logical thing to do. After all, why should the men who were responsible for light, water, or electricity not know how to protect themselves against sabotage? But this was not what they learned in the Gestapo course. They were taught mainly how to behave in order that they might appear to be merely harmless and decent workers while they carried on their own secret activities, and how to avoid creating suspicion if and when they might be investigated for political reasons.

The anti-sabotage department of the Gestapo will, of course, vanish completely before the party goes underground. Later on nobody will ever be able to find out which of the workers have been trained there.

Closely associated with Kaltenbrunner in creating the underground cells was Major Gustav Hoepfner. Deputy director of the Statistisches Reichsamt, Hoepfner was the man who could easily provide Kaltenbrunner with details of utilities and other machines within the state in which men can be replaced without endangering the continuation of the particular plant or waterworks or fire department concerned.

In 1919 the Allied troops that marched into the Rhineland cooperated with the representatives of the old regime. In 1943 they did the same thing in North Africa and in Italy. And though they will not want to co-operate with those they know as Nazis in Germany, they may be forced by necessity to co-operate with those Nazis they don't recognize as such. For they will not be able to administer the country, even for a week, without using the already existing machines and apparatuses of administration. These machines are full of Nazis, unknown, anonymous. If they should all be removed, everything would break down: supply, transport, the mails, electricity, gas, water. The heads of departments, the prominent Nazis, will either disappear of their own free will or be fired by the occupation authorities. But that is the only radical change that the latter can make. Any more would bring indescribable confusion and general disorder.

There are a great number of irreplaceable bureaus and organizations which no AMG will want to touch. For example, the numerous health departments, every organization which helps protect public health, will have to go on functioning. If there is any interference with them, the whole country, and this includes invading troops, might be swept by epidemic.

Naturally it is in all the existing organizations that Nazis will first try to hibernate at the end of the war, when they must play dead. They will be in fire departments and in utilities; they will sit in tax collectors' offices—an important strategic position, because it is these offices that will furnish the lists from which the Allies will determine reparations payments; and they will fill the offices of food-distributing agencies whose task it will be to avert famine after the war.

As far as the public health setup is concerned, it has already been organized for underground purposes. Werner Hilgenfeld, head of the *Gesundheitsamt* (Public Health Department), has reorganized a great many of its subdepartments, installing in them new Nazi cells which will serve the underground. The departments thus infiltrated are:

- 1. Department for the Mentally Ill.
- 2. Department for Cancer and Diabetes.
- 3. Department for Drug Addicts.
- 4. Department for Venereal Diseases.
- 5. Department of Food Inspection.
- 6. Department for Tuberculosis.
- 7. Department for Disinfection.
- 8. Department for Epidemics.
- 9. Department of Hospitals.

In other departments, such as the Department for Pre-Natal Care, Department for Cripples, Department of Health Resorts, no such cells have yet been organized. Hilgenfeld perhaps believes they may be suspended, or even completely dissolved.

There are, in addition, numerous organizations of public welfare, including the hospitals, which will serve as hideouts for the Nazis. Certain organizations which existed before Hitler, but which disappeared or were merged with others under his regime, may be re-established. The *Reichszentrale fuer Gesundheitsdienst* (Reich Central Organization for Health Service), for instance, which has existed only on paper since 1933, has been revived since October 1, 1943. Others will follow.

The question of what to do with the men crippled in this war presents possibilities for Hilgenfeld. As we have seen, he has not included the Department for Cripples in his underground scheme, for the Nazis seem to believe that no existing welfare organization for war cripples will be allowed to continue after the occupation is complete. The Allies will be particularly suspicious of the influences to which those cripples may be exposed; but something will have to be done about them, and since there will be more than a million permanently disabled men in Germany, an enormous administrative apparatus must be constructed to care for them.

At present there is in existence an organization comprising all German war cripples. Its head is Hanns Oberlindober, who was the head of a similar organization called the War Veterans' Aid Society, after World War I. In the thirties Oberlindober gained international importance as the leader of the War Veterans' Associations. Oberlindober himself made extensive travels to France and other neighboring countries, posing as a pacifist and staging touching scenes of international fraternization. Too late it became known to the French secret service that he used his organizations as an apparatus for espionage.

It can be assumed that Oberlindober himself will disappear after the defeat. He has become much too notorious. It may also be assumed that his organizations will not be allowed to continue in their present form. However, whatever administrative apparatus may be set up to take care of German war cripples after the war, the need for so-called experts will be great and thus opportunity will be offered for a number of "neutral" Oberlindober men to be slipped into the new setup. In this connection it is interesting to note that quite a few new men have been reported to have entered the Oberlindober organization lately, the arrangements with the War Ministry having been made, so it is said, by Oberlindober himself.

The German Red Cross, too, may play a doubtful part within this whole postwar setup. It must not be forgotten that the German Red Cross has become a Nazi organization during the past ten years. The active president, Dr. Grawitz, is not only an intimate friend of Hitler, but in his spare time an SS Brigadefuehrer. His closest collaborators are Dr. Hornemann, who has the title of a General Hauptfuehrer and Dr. Blumberg, who calls himself Generalfuehrer. It is not a coincidence that these supposed angels of mercy carry such military titles and that there are other equally military titles in the new Red Cross setup, among them Oberstfeldfuehrer and Feldfuehrer. Furthermore, every prominent Gauleiter and Nazi mayor has some kind of position or title within the Red Cross. And last, but not least, the Nazis themselves have boasted. in official statements, that they have reorganized the Red Cross in such a way as to fit it into the organization of the army. Thus the German Red Cross has long ceased to be an independently functioning machine. It is part of the army; and, even more, it has become part and parcel of the Nazi party.

And the head of the German Red Cross, the Duke of Coburg-Gotha, one of the most violent Nazis, has excellent connections abroad-so excellent, in fact, that when he visited Washington in 1940, when the Germans there were already being boycotted, for the rape of Poland had aroused public opinion against them-he cut quite a figure in Washington society. The Nazis are counting on the duke's international relations to help them after the war. With him at its head the German Red Cross, they believe, will be able to survive in its present form, since the Allies, or so they fondly hope, will look upon him as a Red Cross official rather than as a Nazi. Thus the German Red Cross would form an ideal front for the coming Nazi underground. Indeed, it would be something special within the new setup. The whole organization would be able to continue its existence lock, stock, and barrel. Unlike the government agencies and party departments it would thus constitute a perfectly legal setup within an illegal setup. A daring idea, but

one which, given international sentiment as to the real purpose of the Red Cross, has an excellent chance of succeeding. And there would, of course, be no difficulty then in supplying any number of valuable and dependable Nazis with "neutral jobs" within the Red Cross.

However, if this Nazi plan to use the Red Cross should not prove feasible the leading men of the German Red Cross will assign a cast of understudies to take their parts. These men will say: "Yes, we have been Nazis, but now we are working for the Red Cross and we are much too busy to think of the past." It is, of course, true that there will be much Red Cross work to be done after the war: exchange of prisoners, the transport of hundreds of thousands of men, helping families in destroyed cities all over the world. It will be almost impossible for the International Red Cross to do this work without its German branch. Thus this branch can provide an ideal front for the Nazi underground.

Another ideal place will be the police.

Herr Himmler has been quoted as saying that no AMG could possibly dissolve the entire German police without throwing Germany, and thus Europe, into complete chaos. He is probably right. He is also right when he says, as he has done so often, that within the police the SS comprises the most dependable forces of the Nazi party. It is, therefore, the SS which Himmler will try to save. But, on the other hand, the SS will be the first unit to be dissolved by the Allies and SS leaders will be arrested and shot.

Here, then, is the plan which Himmler has evolved in order to save as many as possible of his dependable men: A great many of these 250,000 or 300,000 are to be taken out of the SS proper and incorporated in police troops which may escape suspension. Such groups will be the Criminal Police, the *Ordnungspolizei* (regular uniformed police) the *Landjaeger* (gendarmes in the open country), and the *Feuerschutzpolizei* (Fire Police).

About nine months ago Himmler reorganized the gendarmes into a new organization called *Landwacht* (County Guards) whose supposed duty it is to prevent disorders in villages and towns. It is made up of the natives of each particular district and is supposed to be a non-political organization. Anybody who volunteers is accepted. Himmler's idea in forming the Landwacht was to have

ready a group of law-enforcing officers who were apparently completely non-political and who could be used by the AMG. It is into this Landwacht that Himmler has been sending men of his Elite Guard.

Himmler also believes that the Criminal Police and the regular uniformed police will not be dissolved, since these departments have never been completely identified with the party. It is difficult indeed to run a country or even a city without the help of a long-established criminal police or regular police force. The smooth working of a criminal police depends on personal contacts developed over a long period of time, on an army of tipsters and stool pigeons, on the intimate knowledge of the habits and hideouts of the criminals. Only in extreme cases will occupying authorities fail to use old hands in police matters. Hence here, too, will be a spot in which a few thousand SS men can neutralize themselves. Undoubtedly Himmler has already taken measures to plant some of his best men in the Criminal Police and the regular uniformed police.

In almost all cases so far only the older SS men have been transplanted. The SS possesses two reserve formations: In Reserve I are men between thirty-five and forty-five years. But this reserve exists on paper only, since most men over thirty-five have been sent to the front. Reserve II, however, is quite large. It comprises SS men over forty-five years who have seen more than twelve years of active service—in short, the oldest fighters, men ideally suited to future underground work. It is from this reserve that Himmler has chosen the men to be sent into the Landwacht and into the criminal and uniformed police, particularly in southern Germany. Only in exceptional cases have these men been told why they have been transferred and what they will have to do later. They have merely been informed that they were chosen because the Führer is certain that they will be loyal to the party under any condition, and that Himmler wants them to stay at their posts, no matter what.

All in all, Himmler hopes to have five thousand to seven thousand separate cells of former SS members. These men will leave the SS for good. Some of them will even leave the party, so as to be completely neutralized. These latter may officially disavow the party before public witnesses, who can be used later to testify how anti-Nazi they have been for a long time.

When Himmler first presented this plan to his collaborators, many of them thought that he was too optimistic and that the AMG would never use any police formations which had existed under the Hitler regime. The army's representative, Colonel Delius, is said to have declared that the occupying powers would rather risk disorder than work with the Hitler police. If such disorder occurred, he stated, the AMG might try to appeal to "responsible Germans" to organize an improvised police force which could guarantee law and order.

Similar improvised organizations, called Einwohnerwehren, for policing the streets of German cities were formed during the revolution of 1918–19. Although organized for the ostensible purpose of combating the Communist danger, they were at the same time used also as collecting centers for discharged officers and conspiring nationalists, and thus served as feeding organizations to the Black Reichswehr. Another equally useful organization, also founded during the revolution, was the Technische Nothilfe (Technical Emergency Squad). Outwardly this was an organization of citizens trained to take over the waterworks, power plants, the running of supply trains at the time when the radical workers walked out on strike, crippling all public service and endangering many human lives. This organization, too, was in close contact with the illegal army.

Colonel Delius proposed to repeat this old device of 1918–19 on a nationwide scale. In all German cities, officers too old for service, or who had perhaps been discharged on account of wounds, were to be dispatched to similar organizations, in no way affiliated with the party and apparently strictly neutral. After the war they would come out in the open and put themselves at the disposal of the AMG as improvised groups of armed citizens who could guarantee law and order.

Such groups have already been started. Konstantin Hierl, as well as the War Ministry, has furnished lists of suitable men.

There are any number of other organizations in which officers, non-commissioned officers, and military experts might be placed. One of them is the so-called Wach-und Schliessgesellschaft, founded fifty years ago as an organization on a national scale to supply private enterprises, such as department stores, and apartment houses, with night watchmen. This Wach-und Schliessgesell-

schaft became the refuge for hundreds of officers and soldiers after the last war and served as a front for the training of many secret military groups. In fact, it became part of the Black Army. Its sudden growth was explained to the outside world as being necessitated by the increase in crime and petty thefts in postwar Germany. Under Hitler these Wach- und Schliessgesellschaften existed in name only. But during the summer of 1943 certain branches were revived in Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, and Leipzig. And other branches will undoubtedly be formed.

The obvious idea is that though the AMG may dissolve all police formations, and even though they may not permit neutral Einwohnerwehren to exist, they will certainly have nothing to say against the continuation of an organization of watchmen to guard stores and houses. This means that a few thousand of the more important Nazis and army men will be provided with safe hideouts.

As for the cells that are being organized within the administration of the state railways, the mails, the tax-collecting offices, and the consumers' unions—since it is to be expected that the heads of each and every one of these departments will be dismissed and in many cases arrested—valuable Nazis are being installed in them as personal secretaries, stenographers, and file clerks. These people will be in extremely important positions when the head men are dismissed, for any new director of a post office or a railway station must depend on the personnel of his predecessor. He cannot attempt to do his job without the help of those who know the routine.

In this connection it is quite interesting to learn that the Civil Affairs Branch of General Eisenhower's Expeditionary Force has made preparations to dig up German civil servants of long standing "who joined the Nazis to keep their jobs" and who after the occupation may be allowed to retain their present posts. It was officially stated that "not everybody who belongs to the Nazi party will be removed." It was, furthermore, pointed out that any German, before he is permitted to hold a federal, state, or municipal job, must first satisfactorily answer a questionnaire and among the answers put down the reasons why he joined the Nazi party. Each will be warned that a false declaration will make him liable to twenty years in prison. A strange mentality, indeed, which wants to believe that those who are willing to rebuild the Third Reich

all over again and who in the case of their admitting the truth would be faced with death, concentration camp, or starvation, will be frightened by a prison term if ever they should be found out.

That naïveté is what the Nazis are counting on.

If one discards the possibility that the German police organizations will be allowed to continue in existence—and it is extremely unlikely that whoever occupies Germany will allow it—the largest single machine, almost made to order to serve as a hideout or point of assembly for the rank and file of the Nazis, is the vast organization of Albert Speer who, in addition to being head of the Munitions Ministry, also supervises the so-called Autobahnen (Highways) built by the famous engineer Fritz Todt. These highways, the most modern in all Europe, which made Hitler's rapid troop deployments possible, will be indispensable after the war. The AMG will need them to make shipments across Germany. According to German statistics, about fifty thousand to seventy-five thousand men are necessary to administer and control this complicated net of roads and tunnels. The same number of men will be needed to direct shipping on the numerous rivers and canals. The waterways, too, are under Speer's supervision.

Thus Speer now controls roughly 300,000 officials, employees, and workers inside Germany. If life inside Germany is not to be brought to a standstill, his organization cannot be demolished completely. A minimum of 100,000 men will be needed to keep traffic going on water and on land. There is, therefore, a good chance that the AMG will not altogether suspend Speer's organization. It will be said that it is not even a Nazi organization, that it comprises technicians, engineers, and a great number of workers who joined one of the Nazi workers' organizations only by compulsion. Thus Speer's empire becomes the ideal terrain for the incorporation of additional thousands of Nazi cells.

Organization of these cells began on August 1, 1943. Again Konstantin Hierl did most of the work. The army, too, had its fingers in this pie: it discharged a large number of engineers and sent them into the Speer organization.

This makes Albert Speer a rather important personality. And that is precisely what he is going to be within the framework of the underground-to-be.

The name of Professor Albert Speer was mentioned for the first time in reports dealing with the numerous conferences of Himmler and company toward the end of October 1943. These reports said only that he would play a decisive part in future activities. The date seems to imply that it was the influence of the generals which obtained him this "honorary mention." His selection would seem to have been a logical one, too, since Speer, though one of the leading Nazis, is much less Nazi than any of the others.

Albert Speer, a pleasant-looking man of agreeable, conservative bearing, not yet forty, is one of the youngest of the Nazi big shots. He grew up in southern Germany, studied architecture in Munich, and entered the party in 1932. He first became Hitler's protégé when the Führer saw and admired his designs for some party buildings. Later he drew the plans for other important Nazi buildings, among them the new chancellery in Berlin. For some time he took no part in political matters. This interest came to him only later, when he was called upon to draw up blueprints for the Siegfried Line. Afterward he built the fortifications on the French and Norwegian coast which became famous under the name of Festung Europa. After the death of Minister Todt, Speer took over the supervision of Todt's organization—consisting of engineers and technicians for building roads, fortifications, railways, airports, et cetera, and showed great talent in making it even more efficient and more streamlined than it had been planned. All these talents, together with the fact that he never had been guilty of an act which could cause his conviction as a war criminal, made him possible for "the day after."

There was, however, still another reason for choosing Speer for this post. While he was building the European fortifications hundreds of millions of dollars had gone through his hands. Many of these millions had never been used for the fortifications. Furthermore, all the big European firms and contractors who wanted contracts for the Festung Europa found that they had to give bribes to Minister Speer personally. Thus Speer had apparently amassed a huge fortune—but had he really? All these moneys, more than thirty million dollars in all, had been transferred abroad, mainly to Argentina. Obviously not for Speer, who needs very little personally—he himself lives very simply and spends frugally—but for the party, which would need it one day. In short, Speer had helped

to build up the vast fortune that the coming Nazi underground will need.

Is he, therefore, not the logical man to dispose of this fortune when the time comes?

Is he, perhaps, the man destined to be the Führer of the underground? The word Führer, in this connection, has not so much the meaning of a figurehead, of a man whose personality must inspire enthusiasm and loyalty, but the meaning of a practical and shrewd manager. The Nazis will need such a manager when they go underground—a man who will not have to go into hiding, but, on the contrary, can be used by the occupying forces; a man who controls the largest of the absolutely vital organizations, for the time after the war; a man, finally, with excellent connections in army circles, and, necessarily, with industry too. Albert Speer might be just the right man.

He will bear close watching.

Whichever of the organizations discussed here will be left intact—whether it be the welfare organizations or the hospitals, the Criminal Police or the machinery of Speer, the railroads or the utilities that will be most active in the coming Nazi underground—one thing is certain: the women will have to play a large part in its activities. Since it is practically certain that the Allies will not sentence any women as war criminals except in proved cases of capital crimes, there will be little reason for the leading personalities of the women organizations to disappear and be replaced by unknown personalities, although the organizations themselves will, of course, undergo a change.

Whatever is to be the specific part of the women in the whole setup, they are now being organized by the "Leader of German Women," Frau Gertrude Scholtz-Klink. In this connection it may be interesting to note that Frau Scholtz-Klink in 1940 married a certain August Heissmeyer, Reich Inspector of Military Academies, who is a distant relative of Werner Heissmeyer. However, no proof has come to my attention that Werner Heissmeyer and Frau Scholtz-Klink are collaborating for the future of German Nazism.

The lady in question was a violent nationalist and the leader of a number of women's organizations, some of them of almost military

character, long before Hitler came to power. Although Rudolf Hess always seemed interested in her and her work, the Führer was not impressed by her. Only in 1934, when Fräulein Lydia Gottschesky, whom Hitler had appointed leader of the Nazi women, suddenly became insane, was he finally persuaded to appoint Frau Scholtz-Klink in her place. He has never had to repent this choice. German women have been among the most ardent supporters of the Nazi regime ever since Frau Scholtz-Klink became their leader.

Among the tasks of women in the coming Nazi underground on which Frau Scholtz-Klink has to concentrate must be:

- 1. Replacement of compromised women leaders by unknown women.
- 2. Replacement of Nazi women's organizations by organizations of a professional or social character, such as cooking and sewing circles, or clubs for women swimmers, women accountants, women doctors, et cetera.
- 3. Replacement of compromised men by women in the underground.
- 4. Psychological preparation of the women for the time when the party will be illegal: it will be doubly important then for women to be behind their men, to encourage them in their work, et cetera.
- 5. Special training of stenographers, typists, filing clerks, et cetera—in short, of all female personnel likely to be used either by the occupying powers (AMG) or by a future German government.
- 6. The training of young girls, or rather their preparation for the time when Germany is occupied by hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers. After the last war, during the occupation of the Rhineland, if a German girl had anything to do with an American or English soldier, not to speak of intimate relations, it was considered by the family and the entire community as outrageous behavior incompatible with "German honor." This time such "outrageous behavior" will not only be encouraged, but practically demanded, by the Nazis, no matter what the official stand on this particular problem is. The reason is that young German girls entering into intimate relations with foreign soldiers may well convince these soldiers that the Germans are by no means the

bad people they are pictured; that the Nazis, too, had their good points. In short, these German girls are being trained as disseminators of Nazi propaganda.

7. The training of women who will be logical contacts between the underground movement or certain cells of the underground party and circles of influence, such as big business, industries, cartels, foreign politicians, et cetera.

Perhaps this last category will be the most important one, and the one which will have to do the most necessary work for the Nazi underground. However, few of the women who will be engaged in such activities will come from the rank and file of the party or from the many departments and organizations which are under the control of Frau Scholtz-Klink. They will come rather from more pleasant milieus, such as former diplomatic circles, industry, and big business. Only comparatively few women are needed.

Once the entire preparatory work is done; once all the Nazis selected and trained for the underground work have been assigned to their particular posts; once the gigantic reshuffling all over Germany has been completed and the new machinery is ready to start, a great many Nazis will find themselves out in the cold. For the future Nazi party will be a small one. The underground machine must of necessity be a wieldy one. It must not carry too much ballast. Hence its crew must be limited. Those who cannot be taken underground may not know it yet. They may not even learn it for some time to come. But their fate is already decided.

Among the Nazis who will be thrown overboard, the SA (Storm Troops) form the most prominent group numerically. The SA ceased playing an important role after the blood purge of 1934, which ended the life not only of its chief of staff, Ernst Roehm, but of most of its subleaders. Ever since then it has been carried along more for its nuisance value (the army has always been wary about the SA) than for any other reason. Roehm's successor, Viktor Lutze, did not play any role to speak of. After his death Wilhelm Schepman became chief of staff of the SA. Unlike Lutze, Schepman belongs in Himmler's inner circle. Hence it may be assumed that he knows what the fate of the SA is to be.

Party groups and party organizations which must get rid of a

great number of men have lately transferred these men into the SA. Such transfers have been put on record and by the time the Allies invade Germany, there will be hosts of such files and dossiers. These files will not be burned but will, on the contrary, be placed in the hands of the AMG and other authorities.

The underground will not oppose any revolts that may be attempted by the SA men against Allied administrations or armies of occupation. Neither will it oppose a bloody suppression of such revolts by the authorities. In this way it will get rid of a great deal of ballast and establish confidence in the minds of AMG officers. At the same time the idea of revenge will be planted in the mind of average Germans.

The other large group of men which the party wants to dispense with is the group which inside Germany is generally called the *Maerzgefallenen* (Those Who Fell in March).

In September 1930 the Nazi party comprised only about 250,000 listed members. Even in January 1933, shortly before Hitler took over, it had only about a million members. But after Hitler became Chancellor, particularly in March 1933, practically every German wanted to climb on the bandwagon. Old party members who had fought and suffered during the twenties were disgusted with these sudden converts to the Nazi cause, whom they regarded as distinctly inferior to themselves. They referred scornfully to these upstarts as the Maerzgefallenen, an expression originally coined in reference to the one hundred and eighty-seven revolutionaries who died on March 18, 1848, in Berlin.

The inner circle of the party never considered these upstart Maerzgefallenen anything but opportunists who could not be depended upon. It was decided, therefore, not to give them any opportunity to betray the party. This time the party will betray them. Now they are being flattered and honored as loyal Nazis; they are given medals and decorations. But in their files it will be recorded that they are wonderful Nazis who committed the most shocking crimes out of loyalty to the Führer and the party. These files will not be destroyed. Thus the Maerzgefallenen will certainly be taken care of by the Allies. They will also live on as martyrs in the eyes of the German people.

Meanwhile, they are useful. They work hard, and thus replace many of those officials and party members who can no longer attend to their various jobs because they are busy preparing the underground.

How far this double play with the Maerzgefallenen can go is evident from an order given early in the summer of 1943. Suddenly it was decreed that party insignia should no longer be worn by any civilian members of the party, the reason given, within the party, being that the public was becoming incensed over the many Nazis who were not at the front. After about two months another decree was issued which again allowed but did not order the wearing of the insignia. Of course the Maerzgefallenen, who have always felt a certain inferiority, immediately put them on again with great pride. However, many of the Nazis of much earlier vintage no longer identified themselves thus in the eyes of the public.

The purpose behind this subterfuge is obvious. A year hence many Germans may have forgotten that certain men once wore the party insignia. Perhaps it will work. In any case those who wear the insignia until the eve of an Allied invasion of Germany will have a hard time of it.

Bormann and Himmler have stated their hope of getting 200,000 to 300,000 men underground. Compared to the large size of the party this is a small number indeed. But an underground movement of 200,000 or 300,000 trained men, who know exactly what they have to do, who will make few mistakes and can profit by all the mistakes the other side makes, can achieve a great deal.

While everything has been done and is being done to denounce the Nazis whom the underground wants to throw overboard, no effort is being spared to make the lives of the prospective underground Nazis as secure as possible.

A great deal has been written lately about certain Nazis who have fallen out with Hitler. Rumors have suggested that there have been at least a hundred of them. We have heard that Baldur von Schirach, for instance, former Youth Führer and later chief Nazi of Vienna, has escaped abroad. Similar rumors have been spread about a number of officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, of course, many ambassadors and ministers. In some cases these men may really have decided to leave the sinking ship. But in many cases all they wanted was to create such an impression.

For instance, look at the members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary Luther and his right-hand man Buettner. They suddenly disappeared from their jobs in the spring of 1943. It was said that they had been involved in some dubious realestate transactions. Up to that time unsound transactions or outright thefts by prominent members of the Third Reich had certainly never seemed to interfere with their activity or their usefulness to the party. Then it was rumored that these two men were anti-Nazis. This may be true, but if so, wasn't it a bit late to discover it only in 1943? And anyhow, well-informed sources have always stated that Luther and Buettner are loyal Nazis.

The only explanation, then, is that their dismissal has been arranged in order to give them an alibi for the future.

This sort of thing has been going on for a long time. Several intelligence services have commented on the sudden disappearance of important personalities from political and party life. And it has become quite the accepted thing to everybody in Germany.

But what has not yet become known is that all this also applies to a much greater number of anonymous persons all over Germany, those on the second and third levels of the Nazi strata. These unknown personalities may be used later by the underground. Party functionaries who may be known locally, but certainly not nationally, can easily be transferred to another city or town, where they will suddenly appear as anti-Nazis.

The party helps in their masquerades. These men get new documents which "prove" that they have always been anti-Nazi. Notes are inserted in their personal files saying they must be watched on account of their anti-Hitler attitudes and "unworthy" behavior.

Some of them will undoubtedly be sent to concentration camps for crimes which they have never committed, but which will make them look dependable in the eyes of the Allies; some have perhaps already succeeded in joining anti-Nazi circles and are pretending to conspire against Hitler. Later on they will be able to use such activities as alibis.

Some may stage assaults on prominent Nazis, perhaps even on Hitler himself. Toward the end of 1943 and at the beginning of 1944 the so-called secret reports of leading Nazis said the Führer was in danger and that plots loomed against him and his intimates. Strangely enough, these reports found their way abroad,

though in former years no instance of such nervousness was ever made known to the world. The reason for this is obvious: The leaders of Germany have never been afraid that the Führer might be assassinated; and it is a good guess that they are not afraid of it now. If they really did fear such a coup they would certainly be careful not to let it be known to the world. On the other hand, all this talk will make the record of those who are supposed to be the plotters just that much more realistic.

And what are the chances for survival of the Nazis of the first order—Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels, and the others?

There is no chance of their going underground. They are too well known, too easy to discover. They may survive—but only if they can get out of Germany in time.

For some of them there is such a chance of escape. There are always U-boats ready to take them to Japan, if that country is still in the war, or to Argentina. There are planes to take them to Spain, Switzerland, or Sweden. Yes, most of them may be able to save themselves. It will depend only on the means at their disposal and circumstances at the moment of decision.

But will all of them want to save themselves? This depends on their characters. Some of them will want to save themselves for the simple reason that they want to go on living, no matter what. They may not be at all interested in the coming underground movement; perhaps all along they have been Nazis simply because they loved power and a good life. Yet others, for the very reason that they love only power and a luxurious life, and now see them slipping away from them, may decide they don't want to go on living.

Contrary to the general opinion, I think Goebbels will be among the second group. The little Propaganda Minister has an important job in the preparation of the underground. Needless to say, since it is necessary to the conspirators that the war last as long as possible, the maintaining of German morale has become a necessity of the first order. But Dr. Goebbels does more. In April 1944 he was appointed City President of Berlin and armed with powers superseding those of the mayor and of any other municipal official. Which means that he can reorganize anything connected with the running of the capital without outside interference. Thus he can

aid the organizers of the coming underground in any way possible.

Most people feel that Dr. Goebbels is a coward who will try to save his skin. I believe that Goebbels is, above all, a cynic. Here is a man who for a decade has done exactly what he has dreamed of doing all his life. The frustrated intellectual who failed in his career as a newspaperman, playwright, and author, has for more than ten years dictated to the whole of Germany and, during the last three years, to all of Europe, what to write, what not to write, what to play, what to say on the radio. He has had the great triumph—from, of course, his own point of view—of making people think and feel exactly as he has wanted them to think and feel. True, he has not entirely succeeded; his lies could not deceive all of the people all the time. But he has done well enough, everything considered. Furthermore, he has had a wonderful time of it, what with direct avenues of approach to many beautiful actresses. . . .

What is there left for a man like Goebbels? What could life possibly mean to a man who has thrived until now on his power over the thoughts of seventy million people, if he should have to live out his years in a faraway country? He has millions outside of Germany. But what does money mean to him? Goebbels will be a cynic to the very end. He will decide that he has seen and done and had everything—and will shoot his brains out.

Goering, on the other hand, may try to save himself. He enjoys life and, because he wants to continue to live pleasantly, he will run away. He has many connections outside Germany. Everywhere, even in this country, there are people who think that he is not so bad as Hitler. Furthermore, he is tremendously rich, and has most of his money salted away in neutral countries. So why should he not use his private plane to land somewhere in Sweden on the estate of one of his good friends, or, better still, take a U-boat and arrive at the ranch of one of his many friends in Argentina, a ranch which probably is his property anyhow?

Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, though a full-fledged Nazi, can go on living even after the party is overthrown. According to informed sources he already possesses several estates in neutral countries. Ribbentrop may not wait till the last moment to reach them.

Other prominent Nazis are less fortunate. Men like the head of

the Workers' Front, Robert Ley, or the numerous Gauleiters, such as Dr. Erich Koch, and the like, will have no place to go. Nevertheless, they may try to save their lives. Whether they succeed or not will depend partly on when they decide they are through and partly on Heinrich Himmler.

One can well imagine the Gestapo informing Himmler of the moves of all those who will want to get away; and one can see Himmler taking great pleasure in arresting a few of his former intimate friends just as they climb into the plane that could transport them to safety.

As to Martin Bormann and Generals Heissmeyer and Kaltenbrunner, it is not likely that they will be able to get out alive. Nor will most of the men who are working today at 11 Koenigsallee in Berlin.

Himmler himself is said to be resigned to dying inside Germany. At least nothing is known of any attempt on his part to save his skin. However, it may very well be that the underground has decided that he is too important an organizer to be sacrificed and that behind his back secret measures are being taken to save him at the last minute.

But there is one man who will never be saved, no matter what. That man is Adolf Hitler. The Führer is not the type to run away—contrary to the belief of many who have never forgotten that he did throw himself down on the street during the famous march to the Feldherrnhalle (Putsch of 1923) when soldiers began to use their machine guns against the Nazis, and that he finally ran away to hide himself. But that was only good horse sense then. He had a good chance for a comeback and didn't want to spoil it. This time he will not have a good chance for a comeback, and therefore flight would be sheer cowardice. He will not flee. He has dramatized himself to such a degree that he could never see himself involved in a humiliating escape and exile.

People who know Hitler personally, or who know enough about him to judge what his final reactions may be, are unanimous in their belief that he will fight to the last, that he will go on fighting even when German resistance is crumbling around him, and that he will finally flee to his famous Eagle's Nest on the Kehlstein near Berchtesgaden. The Eagle's Nest could easily hold off besiegers for a long time. Then Hitler will blow the whole thing up.

But even if Hitler should decide differently he will have no choice. He will not survive the downfall of his regime. He must die. And if he does not commit suicide, the leaders of the Nazi underground themselves will see to it that he perishes. True, they need the Führer for the future Nazi underground. But the Führer they need for that future is a dead Führer.

For they must create a legend, the legend of a great and noble leader. Once the Nazis manufactured a beautiful legend with nothing to work on but the dead pimp, Horst Wessel.

While Hitler is alive such a legend could never be started. Once he is dead, the Nazis will do with him what they did with Horst Wessel.

7

If I Were a Nazi Assigned to the U.S.A.

ON NOVEMBER 30, 1943, the senator from North Dakota, Gerald Prentice Nye, made a speech in the United States Senate in which he complained bitterly about certain newspapermen who had falsified statements made by him during a stay in Chicago. In an attempt to state what precisely he had said, he went on record as follows:

In answer to questions concerning Fascism and its future, I said precisely this, and in direct language that could not be misunderstood by those who would have wished to be fair and to report all that was said, not just a part of what was said, not something that had not been said at all. Asked if Fascism was not essentially militaristic and aggressive, I responded with these exact words:

"Not more essentially aggressive and militaristic than have been other forms of government we have known in this world."

I believe then came an inquiry as to whether Fascism would endure

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"Not more essentially aggressive and militaristic than have been other forms of government we have known in this world."

I believe then came an inquiry as to whether Fascism would endure

after we had won this war, and my response was to this effect, if not in these exact words:

"If Germany and Italy want that form of government, then under our policy of self-determination they should have Fascism. It is hard for me to believe that the people of Germany and Italy would tolerate more of it after what Fascism had brought to them. Maybe the United Nations will have to afford safeguards that will insure the people of Germany and Italy an honest chance to express their choice in reaching their determination."

That was the sum and substance, the total of what I said that would seem to have afforded the rank misrepresentation which has been reported and which I have been quoting at length. I let the record stand right here.

If this sort of reasoning of mine threatens our civilization, makes me a Fascist, gives aid and comfort to the enemy, constitutes a whitewash of Fascism or an advocacy of Fascism for America, then of course I am guilty of all that has been charged against me.

It was a long way between such a stand and the ideas of the young senator who arrived in Washington in 1925, a man of not yet thirty-three with a serious and energetic face and eyes whose color defied definition. This young man, who had been nominated senator by his governor after the elected senator died suddenly, had not been easily acceptable to the rest of the Senate. He was a liberal, even a radical, an admirer of the elder La Follette, and the more conservative senators were a bit suspicious of him. Finally, after many days of debating the legal aspect of Nye's nomination, he was admitted to the Senate. The New York *Times* complained in an editorial that this was "a bad day's work."

Nye became one of the most liberal senators in Washington. Though a Republican, from 1932 on he was on the side of the New Dealers in almost all decisive questions. In 1934 he became chairman of a Senate committee to investigate the earnings of the munitions industry during the last war and the possible role the men behind this industry had played in bringing it about. The investigation was an enormous success for Nye, who made the country conscious of the fact that indeed a few men had made enormous fortunes out of the bloody fight. Thus the senator almost automatically became the leader in what may be termed "the fight for peace." His followers comprised many liberals and even leftists.

In 1936 he fathered the Neutrality Law, which Congress passed. It made exports of arms or ammunition to any belligerent country illegal. In 1937 Nye made an important speech on the occasion of the dinner of the American League against War and Fascism which, to say the least, was a very leftist organization. In the same year he attempted to change the Neutrality Law in such a way that America could sell arms to the Spanish Loyalists whom he regarded as the representatives of real democracy. He did not succeed in that. But he did succeed in convincing conservative circles that he had become a dangerous revolutionary. Yale University did not allow him to make a speech there, and when he campaigned for re-election in 1938 he was aided by a non-partisan committee formed by such liberals as Senator Norris, Charles Beard, and Bruce Bliven, editor of the New Republic.

Then, suddenly, he underwent a complete change which has been one of the great mysteries of American politics. Only three months after his re-election he spoke against President Roosevelt's foreign policy—at a meeting of the German-American Bund. He had found a new base from which to operate. He demanded in the Senate that the United States not open their doors to Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria. And everything the senator has said since then has been precisely what the Nazis would have wanted him to say if they had exercised any influence on him.

To quote from his speeches after Hitler attacked Poland in September 1939 and during the following years:

"Britain is the greatest aggressor in modern history." "Britain's impending doom ought not to alarm us." "I oppose aid to a Russia populated by thieves, human butchers, and murderers of religion." "If Hitler should be victorious, there is no reason to think he would contemplate retaliatory actions." "The Robin Moor is sunk. The British might have done it. I would be very much surprised if Germany had."

From February 1940 on, when he became a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he voted against all measures proposed by the government for the defense of the United States.

On July 31, 1941, he made his first anti-Semitic speech, thundering against foreign-born film producers and against the Jews, who, he maintained, were the leaders in the movement against him. He also demanded an investigation of the moving-picture industry,

mentioning among other reasons that this industry was not impartial because it had engaged in propaganda against Fascism.

On December 7, 1941, he spoke at a meeting of the America First Committee in Pittsburgh. Before he began a reporter handed him a telegram with the news of Pearl Harbor. He read it, shrugged, and said, "This should be confirmed," and then made his speech. The same evening he said that Pearl Harbor was exactly what England had planned for the United States and that the President had pushed America into the catastrophe.

And though he voted the next day for declaration of war on Japan, he did not change the views he had stated on the platform of the German-American Bund.

Consciously or unconsciously, Senator Nye has done a lot for the Nazis and their sympathizers in this country. He is one of the few Americans who have been praised in Hitler's organ in the United States, the *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*. It is no mere coincidence that in many cases when Nazi agents, seditionists, or American Fascists were arrested, Nye's speeches were found in their possession. Evidently these men felt that Senator Nye could be regarded as an ally.

All of which means that the coming Nazi underground must believe that in Senator Nye it possesses a potential ally, and an extremely valuable one. After all, he has come out for everything they stand for and against everything they are against. What more can they ask than a senator who defends thirty men and women indicted by the Department of Justice as enemy agents, or at least sympathizers, as Nye did in January 1944? For even if these men and women are not sentenced because of technicalities, there can be no doubt in anybody's mind, least of all in a Nazi's mind, where they stand.

An agent of the Nazi underground working in this country after the war would perhaps refrain from getting in touch with any of those thirty indicted seditionists. It might get him unwanted publicity. But if he had any sense at all, he certainly would try to reach the senator who stood by those seditionists so courageously, and who stands for everything they represent, the senator who practically confirmed the right of existence for a Nazi underground with his speech of November 30.

Of course the underground agent may not succeed in getting

to talk to Senator Nye. The point is that if he acted logically, he would try.

The Nazi underground will have to send a great number of agents to every country in the world, or use those already abroad. But they will also try to make use of men and women everywhere who allow themselves to be thus used. They need not be Nazis themselves to be useful to the Nazis. Undoubtedly Senator Nye cannot be called a Nazi; neither could Senator Burton K. Wheeler. But both these men have allowed themselves to be made use of by the Nazis. For many years, almost since the beginning of World War II, German propaganda broadcasts have been quoting from speeches made by these senators. This does not necessarily mean that what the senators had to say was wicked. It only means that the coming Nazi underground must logically consider the senators potential aids.

If I were a Nazi working underground in the United States after this war, whom would I try to reach? What could I hope to gain through such a contact? In what way could the man I tried to reach be of help to my movement?

Let us, for a few minutes, dwell on a hypothetical situation. It was mentioned before that the Ordensburg Sonthofen, which was set up to create new Führers, is now training the agents of the coming underground who will go abroad. No details are available as to what these pupils have to learn. But it stands to reason that they will have to know a great deal about personalities who may sympathize with the Nazi movement later on. Let us suppose they have to pass an examination—Germans are so thorough!—and that SS General Werner Heissmeyer has arrived in Sonthofen to interrogate the pupils personally. Let us picture such a scene.

HEISSMEYER: "And whom would you attempt to get in touch with if you were in the United States, Gerhard Mueller?"

MUELLER: "I would try to reach Fritz Kuhn!"

HEISSMEYER (with disgust): "Mueller will be shipped to the Russian front. Why is this answer so completely idiotic, Schulze?"

SCHULZE: "Because Kuhn is too much identified with our movement. Even if he should remain in the United States after the war, he certainly could not put us in touch with any important people." Heissmeyer: "Very well. And whom would you pick, Walther Frimel?"

Frimel: "I might try to reach Charles Lindbergh. Of course Mr. Lindbergh has not made any public statements since the United States went to war, but he has never repudiated the wonderful things he said about the Luftwaffe and the Führer nor did he ever return the medal Marshal Goering gave him. Nor has he protested against being quoted in our newspapers and in our broadcasts."

Heissmeyer: "Not bad, not bad at all! And you, Knackebacher, whom would you try to reach if you had to specialize, let us say, in congressmen?"

KNACKEBACHER (rapidly, with closed eyes, as though he had been memorizing it for a long time): "Roy O. Woodruff, Fred Bradley, Dewey Short, Paul W. Shafer, John E. Rankin, Harold Knutson, William P. Lambertson, Stephen A. Day, Martin Dies, Hamilton Fish, Clare E. Hoffman." (He takes a deep breath.) "My reason is that all of these men have been collaborating with the so-called American nationalist groups, that is, groups who have been attacking all our enemies, such as Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Stalin, the Jews, et cetera, and never our leaders or any of our basic ideas. As to the senators . . ."

HEISSMEYER: "Come, come now, Knackebacher, you must not try to get next to the whole American Congress. Give Oskar Braun a chance too. Well, Braun?"

Braun (in dismay): "I was sick when we learned about the Senate!"

Heissmeyer (furious): "A German is never sick. Send him to the African front immediately." (There is a dead silence.) "Ach so! I mean the Italian front, of course."

KNACKEBACHER (seeing his chance): "And the senators who can be depended upon by the American nationalist movements are D. Worth Clark, Rufus C. Holman, W. Lee O'Daniel, David I. Walsh, Gerald P. Nye, Burton K. Wheeler, and Robert Rice Reynolds."

HEISSMEYER (overwhelmed): "Thank you, Knackebacher, the Führer will be proud of you. I will arrange for your passage to Argentina next week. There you will find further orders. Do write us a post card from the United States—after the war, of course." (Everybody shouts "Heil Hitler!" After Knackebacher has left.

who complains that "if you love Christ and love America, you've got to prove you are not a traitor," who promises to retire all Roosevelts from public life, send Wendell Willkie to Moscow, make Henry Wallace a milkman in China, and return the Jews to Jerusalem. But he is not an anti-Semite, oh no! "I have tried and tried to convince the Jews that I am their friend. But it seems that I have failed. What can I do?" There will undoubtedly be a great deal of amusement in Sonthofen when Reverend Smith is quoted.

Of course the boys in Sonthofen, if they have learned their lesson, will know that the reverend is not a conspirator or traitor to the American cause. It just so happens that his whole political conception is based on the probably justified assumption that there will be disorder and dissatisfaction in the United States after this war and that he and his friends may profit from such a state of affairs.

"Wait till the boys come back!" is his second word. And this is precisely the ideal state of affairs for the Nazi underground to begin its work, the more so if Reverend Smith and his friends increase this general confusion after the war by their demagogic demands. Is not the fourteen-point program of the America First party the ideal blueprint for the creation of more confusion? It demands better times for everybody and promises aid to industry and workers, to the little businessmen and farmers.

GENERAL HEISSMEYER: "What does this program remind you of?"
THE PUPILS: "It reminds us of the original program of the National Socialist Workers' party as composed by our Führer!"

(It is just as well that Knackebacher has already left for Argentina. He is so thorough that he might have added tactlessly that none of the promises contained in this program were ever carried out, nor were they intended to be carried out.)

The list itself of men and women of importance in the United States on whom the coming Nazi underground hopes it can rely would probably fill a book.

Among the many dossiers kept in the Propaganda Ministry there are extensive files containing everything the American press has had to say on any subject. These files are extremely important for Propaganda Minister Goebbels, because they tell him how he

out of the war. (2) Register and fingerprint all aliens. (3) Stop immigration for the next ten years. (4) Deport all criminal and undesirable aliens. (5) Banish all foreign ideas. On February 5, 1939, he gave an interview to the *Voelkischer Beobachter* in which he said, I am glad to be able to state without the least hesitation that I am absolutely against the United States waging war for the purpose of protecting Jews anywhere in the world.'"

(Everybody applauds and shouts "Heil Hitler!" There are also mingled cries of "Heil Reynolds!" After order is restored, von Zizewitz continues.)

Von ZIZEWITZ: "Later the senator went into the business of anti-Semitism, claiming that it was not the result of Fascism but solely the fault of the Jews. Said he:

"'Anti-Semitism is distinctly a manifestation of the resentment of the Christian, the Moslem, and other peoples to the determination of the Jew to live among others as a race apart, condoning practices abhorrent to his neighbors.

"'The well-meaning Gentile does the Jew a disservice by encouraging him to believe anti-Semitism is the result of causes which do not exist, rather than to point out exactly what are the real causes and to urge the Semite to make those corrections that only he can make.'

"Well, Mr. Reynolds said a lot of other nice things. But unfortunately in October 1941 he married an extremely rich woman and ever since then has been living a very luxurious life, much more so than Mr. Morrison, his predecessor. And it looks as though he will not be re-elected in 1944. That would be too bad. There is, of course, a chance that he will become President of America. It is an outside chance, though. It is the suggestion of Gerald L. K. Smith, former collaborator of the late and lamented Huey Long, that Mr. Reynolds should run on the ticket of the America First party which Smith founded. . . ."

And then, likely as not, General Heissmeyer will want to know about Gerald L. K. Smith, who has claimed that he has enrolled more than three million in his America First party and who has predicted that this is just the beginning. Some of the trainees at Sonthofen will give all the details about Reverend Smith, who says that he is "just a natural, old-fashioned Christian American," and

who complains that "if you love Christ and love America, you've got to prove you are not a traitor," who promises to retire all Roosevelts from public life, send Wendell Willkie to Moscow, make Henry Wallace a milkman in China, and return the Jews to Jerusalem. But he is not an anti-Semite, oh no! "I have tried and tried to convince the Jews that I am their friend. But it seems that I have failed. What can I do?" There will undoubtedly be a great deal of amusement in Sonthofen when Reverend Smith is quoted.

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should conduct his psychological warfare against America. Presumably the most important of these files have been sent via South America to 11 Koenigsallee in order to give leads to the agents of the future underground.

Let us open one of these files containing clippings from one American daily and notes about this paper.

There is an editorial under the date of May 15, 1932, demanding that Fort Sheridan be abandoned, and that the Great Lakes Naval Training Station be abolished. Why should America prepare for war?

There is a copy of a telegram from the year 1940 signed by the owner of the paper and addressed to a European correspondent who predicted that the Nazis would shortly invade Rumania. It reads: "Your fantastic Rumanian story, hysterical tone, and your recent cable and other vagaries indicate that you, along with Knickerbocker, Mowrer, and others, are victims of mass psychosis and are hysterically trying to drag the United States into war. Suggest you join Foreign Legion or else you take rest cure in sanitarium in neutral country until you regain control of your nerves and recover confidence in yourself. Until then file no more."

There is a clipping dated December 24, 1941, covering the Atlantic meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt: "From that conference came little except theatricality. The event was planned as Hollywood plans a supercolossal production."

There is another clipping from January 24, 1942, protesting against air-raid precautions in New York City. "Under the pretense of air-raid precaution, a dictatorship has been established in New York City such as never has been dreamed of on this continent. Fiorello LaGuardia has recruited a political force of 235,000 air-raid wardens. There is no legal curb on the conduct of the wardens in pushing the citizenry around or insulting and molesting women. . . . New York is now almost . . . completely under the tyrant's heel."

A clipping of March 31, 1942: "Influence on public affairs in this country... by the families whose daughters have married into British nobility... how effectively some of these people are working to break down the American republic and re-establish America as a British colony."

Or a clipping commenting on the November 1943 election which

went against Mr. Roosevelt: "Most people thought he was not conducting the war as it would have been managed if America had been foremost in his mind. His emphasis on the European war and his relative neglect of the war against Japan were evidence of the controlling influence that his Allies wield over him. His free-handed giving away of our substance was regarded as symptomatic of a desire to win good will for himself abroad and by this means to become head of a world government."

It may very well be that enclosed in the files we find notes pointing out how such statements concur with all the ideas the Nazis have ordered their agents to disseminate in the United States. They were told to spread distrust of the government and its leaders; to create doubts in their British and Russian allies; to criticize everything, and thus create the impression that everything was done very badly; to tell the Americans that it is more important for them to fight Japan than to fight Hitler; that they are being cheated by the lend-lease arrangement, and that while they feed other countries they will soon starve.

So the Nazis must be quite satisfied with what the files of that particular newspaper show them, and they must feel very hopeful as to the possible help such a newspaper may lend to them after the war. If they have the slightest doubt, they will drop it after they have found out that this newspaper has for a long time been a favorite source of quotation not only for Hitler's late American organ, the Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter, but also for a number of small-time sheets and magazines formerly owned by persons who are today either in jail for their close collaboration with Hitler, or who have at least been indicted as seditionists. Among them are Liberation, the Galilean, and Roll Call, magazines published by William Dudley Pelley, now serving a jail sentence for sedition; Scribner's Commentator, edited by Ralph Townsend, convicted as an unregistered Japanese agent; Publicity, a newspaper published by Elmer J. Garner, under Federal indictment for sedition; the Broom, a newspaper published by Leon de Aryan, now under Federal indictment for sedition; Patriotic Research Bureau News Letter, edited by Elizabeth Dilling, now under Federal indictment for sedition; X-Ray, a newspaper published by Court Asher, now under Federal indictment for sedition; Industrial Control Reports, a news service edited by James True, under Federal indictment for sedition; America in Danger, a newsletter published by Charles B. Hudson, under Federal indictment for sedition.

And Father Coughlin's late Social Justice; and, of course, Gerald L. K. Smith's magazine, the Cross and the Flag.

The paper which has this astonishing and interesting record is the Chicago *Tribune*. The man who runs it is Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick.

This is not the entire story. There are innumerable other items which should have endeared this newspaper to the Nazis. There is, for instance, the famous report of December 4, 1941, which appeared on the front page under the banner line "F.D.R.'s War Plans!" It was an account of secret War Department studies of production requirements for national defense in case of a war with Germany. It was the lifting of a military secret if there ever was one, and it was a dangerous thing to do. It could have had serious consequences since the war actually did break out three days later. And when Hitler declared war on the United States he used, among other things, the publication of this article as a reason.

Hitler acted as though he didn't know that the General Staff of every army in the world had to make studies of requirements for any number of cases of war, just in case. This was precisely the attitude that Colonel McCormick took. By publishing these studies he tried to create the impression that the Government of the United States was preparing a war of aggression against Hitler. In short, it was not so much what he published that helped Hitler but the fact that he published it and the slant he gave it. When Secretary of War Stimson, referring to this matter, demanded angrily, "What do you think of the patriotism of a man or a newspaper that would take those confidential studies and make them public to the enemies of this country?" he told only half of the story. What did the Nazis think of the usefulness of a man or a newspaper that was furnishing them with such an excellent alibi?

Then, hardly six months after Pearl Harbor, almost the same thing happened all over again. The Chicago *Tribune* published a story on the Battle of Midway which disclosed to the Japanese Imperial Staff that we knew in advance of the size and strength of the approaching Japanese fleet. The newspaper explained that it had been using the sources of the Naval Intelligence. The Navy

denied that it had given out any information. Whereupon the editors pretended that the accurate list of Japanese ships involved had been figured out in the Chicago office by simple deduction. This is hard to believe, since some of the basic information was so secret that it was never included in any printed catalogue of warships.

Even this second lifting of a military secret does not mean that the Chicago newspaper was guilty of high treason. Undoubtedly it had no such objective. Undoubtedly it regards it as its patriotic duty to publish such items, because they embarrass a government which the Chicago *Tribune* thinks is a bad government. That fighting the government with such means automatically provides the enemy with valuable information is something which evidently cannot be avoided. It is just too bad—but definitely not so in the eyes of the leaders of the coming Nazi underground, who can look forward to a lot of involuntary help from such a newspaper, just as involuntary, of course, as the aid and comfort it gave the enemy by publishing the items mentioned above.

If I were a Nazi working underground in the United States after this war, whom should I try to reach?

I most certainly should try to get in touch with those men who, during the war, when it was dangerous to come out openly with Nazi slogans or to promote ideas which were first publicized by the Fascists and Nazis, followed the Fascist and Nazi lines. I would make contact with them regardless of whether they followed such a line because they believed in it or because they wanted to help the Nazi cause, and regardless of whether they have acted from what they considered purely patriotic motives or whether they got their orders from somebody outside the United States.

I would try to work with them, because surely those who were not afraid to work for the Nazi cause at a time when their country was fighting those who have been identified with that cause will not be afraid to work for the same cause once peace is established and the risk of such activities has become practically nil.

But if I were a Nazi working underground in the United States after this war, I should have an even greater variety of men and organizations to collaborate with. I should at least make an attempt at such collaboration with those who up to Pearl Harbor followed the Nazi line and who since then have lain low.

Or have they lain low?

8

Have They Gone Under Cover?

ON DECEMBER 17, 1943, Francis P. Moran, former Christian Front leader in Boston, Massachusetts, was given a testimonial dinner by some seventy-five friends and former members of the Front organization, which was disbanded in 1942. Moran had been ordered to report for active service on December 27.

Said he: "I make no claim to liking the idea." He added that if he were killed in service his friends should not consider him a hero, because he was only obeying orders and not acting voluntarily. His parting remark was, "Twenty-four hours after the war is over and I am out of the service I will send every one of you my personal greetings and we will get together again."

They will get together again, regardless when and how the war will end. They will get together again and, of course, not for the sole purpose of saying hello to each other. They will get together again in order to go on working or fighting for what they have been working and fighting for before.

They are waiting. Not only the relatively few friends and collaborators of Francis Moran, but thousands and tens of thousands of men and women all over the country. They have been waiting since Pearl Harbor, when their organizations disbanded, because it then became a risky thing to say or write openly that one stood for everything Hitler stood for. They are waiting, and they are quite frank about it. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when questioning members of organizations disbanded since Pearl Harbor, have frequently received such answers as: "Of course, while the war is going on, we have to keep silent. But the war won't take forever. And then we will speak up again."

Some of them have to keep silent and inactive for the simple reason that they happen to be in prison for their pro-Fascist activities. Such is the case of George Hill, secretary of Representative Hamilton Fish, who perjured himself concerning his relations with the Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck; or Laura Ingalls, the speaker for America First, who was discovered to have been in the pay of the Nazis; or George Christian, the commander of the Crusader White Shirts, who was convicted of sedition; or Ralph Townsend, the editor of Scribner's Commentator, and a paid Japanese agent; or "Count" Anastase Vonsiatsky, who was unmasked as a German and Japanese spy; or the publisher William Dudley Pelley. The Bund leader Gerhard Wilhelm Kunze. Virgil Chandler and Parker Sage, who incited race riots. George Deatherage, the former head of the Knights of the White Camellia. Hundreds of names could be added. . . . The list is endless.

On Wednesday, March 22, 1944, Reverend Charles E. Coughlin made quite an interesting speech. He said that Soviet Russia had a great future under Stalin; that Stalin would restore full religious freedom; that Stalin had changed much of Communism, that Allied forces would free China from the Japanese; that Catholics should co-operate with Jews and Protestants; that Hitler was no good.

In fact, speaking of Hitler and denouncing the American Communists, he declared: "They were praising Hitler when we condemned him."

But had Father Coughlin ever condemned Hitler? Or was he just talking for the benefit of the FBI agents who were sitting in the audience of the Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Michigan? Perhaps this is the correct explanation of the speech, since it was in such decided contrast to what the same Father Coughlin had said only a week before—when no FBI agents were present. At that time he said, "It matters not what military force wins this war." Then he had predicted that America would have to fight the "yellow hordes"—China, Japan, and even Russia, which was "four fifths Mongolian." Then he had made quite definite anti-Semitic statements, urging his followers to "put away your cowardice and stop hiding behind a false tolerance which they are trying to sell you." He added: "Would you be tolerant—you

fathers and mothers—if someone defiled your little daughter?"

That was what his followers had come to listen to on March 22. But they were quite disappointed. They had hoped to hear some more cracks against the Russians, the English, the New Dealers, and particularly against the Jews and Negroes. After the second speech they felt let down. "He didn't have the old fire tonight," one of the father's female admirers declared. "He sure didn't."

Perhaps Father Coughlin hasn't the old fire any more or perhaps he has merely become more careful. After all, it would be somewhat risky, to put it mildly, to say now the things he used to say in former years. Take, for instance, the statement he made to the magazine writer Dale Kramer on September 19, 1936: "It is Fascism or Communism. We are at the crossroads. I take the road to Fascism." Or to quote from his newspaper, Social Justice: "Democracy! A mockery that mouths the word and obstructs every effort on the part of an honest people to establish a government for the welfare of the people. Democracy! A cloak under which to hide the culprits who have built up an inorganic tumor of government that is sapping away the wealth of its citizens through confiscatory taxation." "The Rome-Berlin Axis is a great political rampart against the spread of Communism. As such the Rome-Berlin Axis is serving Christendom in a peculiarly important manner."

Before Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia Father Coughlin wrote: "If the rest of the world is inclined to draw the conclusion that Germany under military pressure has menaced others, it is a gross distortion of facts,' declared Reich Führer Adolf Hitler... it seems to Social Justice that Chancellor Hitler's own words are a better indication of Germany's attitude toward the rest of the world than many columns of prejudiced editorial comment."

On December 14, 1941: "The famous words: 'We planned it that way,' uttered by Mr. Roosevelt, are as applicable to our participation in this world war as anything he has accomplished in his three terms as President."

On February 23, 1942: "Was Pearl Harbor an accident? Was the scuttling of the *Normandie* an accident? Was the diabolical program of government meddling an accident? Or was all this planned that way? Planned from within; planned by men who prated of democracy while blueprinting chaos."

March 23, 1942: "We have been out looking for a war with the

Orient for a good many years. Now we've got it. It's time we realized something of what we're up against."

March 23, 1942: "How long will this war be pursued by America? Will Americans graciously bow down to all the totalitarian decrees which will restrict their sugar, their motorcars, their oil, their apparel, their way of life, and their pocketbooks simply to satisfy the ambitions of those who translate victory to the complete overthrow of their enemies? Or will the American people want to listen to reason and terminate a war which no one can win completely, and which Americans can lose completely?"

Father Coughlin was no longer saying such things in 1943 and 1944. By then his newspaper Social Justice was no longer appearing and his organizations had dissolved. Or had they? Skeptical reporters had no difficulty in finding out that at the beginning of 1944 he was still maintaining close contacts with "skeleton Christian Front cells in Brooklyn, Queens, Boston, Detroit, Chicago, and many Midwestern towns."

But though Father Coughlin may be relatively silent, other principal leaders of the Coughlinist movement are not. James McDermott still edits the *Gaelic American*, which has constantly preached the Coughlin gospel. The chief columnist of this paper is still Father Edward Lodge Curran, who some time in 1943 held an "Anniversary Mass" celebrating the anniversary of Coughlin's entering the priesthood. The paper still inveighs against "international bankers," against our Allies, and for Franco's Spain.

Also still in existence is another offshoot of the Coughlinite movement, the American Rock party, headed by William Goodwin. Only lately discontinued is the Catholic International, another clerical Fascist publication edited by David Gordon, who used to publish a pornographic humorous magazine in which he said "Yes" to everything—or almost everything—Hitler promoted. Still appearing, too, is a newsletter, the Malist, edited by F. H. Sattler in Meriden, Connecticut, which fights the Masons and the Jews, who "control the United Nations" exactly as Father Coughlin did. This list, too, could be continued—ad nauseam. Father Coughlin may be silent, or at least cautious. But he has never disappeared completely from the scene. His organizations have never completely dissolved.

And the same thing is true of most of those organizations which disbanded after Pearl Harbor.

Shortly after Japan attacked us, between five and six hundred organizations with pro-Fascist leanings all over America went out of existence. That, at least, is what the record says. But a great number of new organizations came into existence. Not immediately after Pearl Harbor, of course, but pretty soon after, everything considered. They assumed different names. Judging from these names they had been founded to promote many completely different things. Their names would seem to indicate that the members were in the main businessmen who had become worried about the value of the American dollar; or mothers who were anxious that their sons should have a fair break in the war and after the war; citizens whose one wish was to preserve the Constitution of the United States and safeguard the rights which it gives to all American citizens; clergymen who wanted nothing but to bring a sinful nation back into the fold of the Church.

But what's in a name?

The leaders of these new organizations and the men and women who are running them are, without a single exception, the leaders of the organizations which disbanded after Pearl Harbor. But why, then, did they dissolve their organizations? Wasn't it because it occurred to them that now, when America is a party to this war, the activities of their organizations, the very fact of their existence even, are illegal? This is, indeed, the only possible explanation. But if these organizations are illegal, how can it be anything but a fraud to revive them even though under another name?

Of course there are certain differences between the old organizations and the new ones. For instance, the members no longer "Heil Hitler"—at the meetings, that is. But they are quite open in their isolationism, their anti-Semitism, their contempt for democracy. They fight racial equality and any form of world co-operation. They say that Roosevelt is responsible for World War II, they want no part of the Four Freedoms. They don't want to feed the world after the war, but they are perfectly willing to feed Germany. And above all they are afraid of the "Communist danger." They think that President Roosevelt's re-election must be prevented at all costs, and that we should negotiate a peace with Hitler now, no matter what becomes of our Allies.

No, they don't "Heil Hitler" openly. They are "American Nationalists." Before Hitler came to power in Germany there were

a great number of "German Nationalists." In fact, the men in the key positions who were influential in getting Hitler into power were not Nazis. They were just "German Nationalists."

The Nazis learned in 1933 that "Nationalists" are their best allies. They learned it again in Spain, where the "Nationalist Franco" was their friend; and again in Norway, where the "Nationalist Quisling" worked for them; and again in France, where the "Nationalist Pétain" collaborated with them.

What, from the point of view of a Nazi, is wrong with an American Nationalist?

If I were a Nazi preparing the coming underground at 11 Koenigsallee in Berlin, what would I think about the numerous nationalist organizations in the United States?

We have met SS General Kaltenbrunner, leader of a nationalist movement in Austria. Kaltenbrunner has loads of files. Certainly he must have canvassed the future possibilities in the United States. We may assume that he has elaborate dossiers on each and every nationalist organization in America for further reference. And even if his intelligence service has furnished him with only scanty data about the most important organizations, even if his files contain nothing but what any trained reporter in the United States could find out about them without going to any trouble, surely these dossiers would be far from discouraging to him.

This is how these dossiers may look:

The Citizens USA Committee, headed by William G. Grace. Grace was active before Pearl Harbor. The committee is a direct successor to The Citizens Keep America out of the War Committee, disbanded after Pearl Harbor. Meetings with an attendance up to 2,000 every Friday night in Chicago. Secretary is Earl Southard, also organizer for Gerald L. K. Smith's America First party. Among the speakers many German-Americans. Subjects of meetings: America is going to let German children starve after this war as after the last. The people who sheltered and hid the U-boat saboteurs are not traitors. Italy, Germany, and Hungary are the victims of too much democracy. Internationalism is a blood relative of treason; isolationism never is treason. Lindbergh would be preferable to Roosevelt as the commander-in-chief. The FBI is as bad as the Gestapo, if not worse. Committee puts out miscel-

laneous leaflets declaring this war to be a fight between nationalism and internationalism.

The Republican Nationalist Revival Committee is almost undistinguishable from Mr. Grace's group. Its president is P. H. Moynihan, active before Pearl Harbor, secretary to Grace. Group has had Senator Gerald P. Nye and Congressman Stephen Day as guest speakers; asked Colonel R. R. McCormick of the Chicago *Tribune* to run for President of the United States. In meetings Churchill's and Roosevelt's names are hissed and booed, the Führer's name never. Puts out numerous handbills. Also distributes literature of other nationalist movements.

The Institute of American Economics, before Pearl Harbor called the Midwest Voluntary Federation. Two of the founders of the institute, Otto Brennerman and Donald McDaniel, under indictment for sedition. Co-operates closely with Mr. Grace's outfits. Guest speakers, Senator Burton K. Wheeler and Congressman Clare Hoffman.

Constitutional Americans, a new group headed by George T. Foster and his wife, Mary Leach, secretary to Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling. Mrs. Leach active before Pearl Harbor. Group, according to Foster, "not opposed to having friendly relations to any other country." Pro-Franco, anti-Roosevelt, who, according to them, is a "Communist and controlled by Jewish bankers." Mrs. Roosevelt is denounced as having received a painting by Goya as a gift from the enemies of Franco. The British are responsible for Pearl Harbor. Among the literature a reprint of a speech made in Congress by John E. Rankin, who said that the race riots of 1943 in Detroit were fomented by "communistic Jews," who "go around here and hug and kiss these Negroes, dance with them, intermarry with them. . . ."

The Serviceman's Reconstruction Plan went out of business in 1943, was founded by Joe McWilliams, who called Hitler "the greatest man who ever lived." McWilliams later was indicted on charges of conspiring to set up a Nazi regime in the United States. McWilliams very active before Pearl Harbor. Organization was financed by Alice Rand de Tarnowski, a Chicago socialite whose former husband is a captain in the Army. She eloped with a soldier before going through the formality of getting a divorce. The soldier passed bad checks, is now in prison. Group published *Postwar*

Bulletin, edited by Alice Rand de Tarnowski in Barrington, Illinois, which fights "internationalism, the Four Freedoms, the United States Government."

The Church League of America, run by George Washington Robnett, active before Pearl Harbor. Robnett is in great distress because America may be taken over by "atheistic Communism." Robnett also speaks at Citizens' USA Committee. Group publishes miscellaneous handbills, also a mimeographed periodical News and Views, dealing with the Communist menace in the school system.

Patriotic Research Bureau, an organization of Elizabeth Dilling, who was very active before Pearl Harbor. Edits extensive monthly bulletin, mimeographed, proving that the Communists and the Jews who, it says, are identical, control the United States, while patriotic Christians are the victims of a horrible plot to upset the republic. Mrs. Dilling sent out literature in Congressman Hamilton Fish's franked envelopes, postage free.

Round Table Luncheons, run by William H. Stuart, who frequently appears at meetings of groups already mentioned. Stuart edits bulletin *Heard and Seen*, announcing important meetings of all nationalistic groups in Chicago, plugging nationalist leaders, telling the readers for whom to vote.

American Vigilant Intelligence Federation, offices in the building of the Chicago *Tribune*. Reputedly a research organization; run by Harry Jung, former labor spy, then anti-Semite, collaborator of William Dudley Pelley, active before Pearl Harbor. Quoted by the Chicago *Tribune* as an authority on Communism, puts out numerous periodicals, leaflets, booklets, and occasionally books.

The Anglo-Saxon Federation of America, run by S. A. Ackley, active before Pearl Harbor. Till a short time ago William J. Cameron, employee of Henry Ford, worked with this group. Based on racist theory. Says Anglo-Saxons are God's chosen people, but is against Great Britain and for isolationism. Jesus was not a Jew but an Israelite, as were all of His disciples except Judas, who was a Jew. Negroes created by God to do menial work. Publishes magazine *Destiny*, on slick paper in color, many illustrations. Source of financing unknown.

SS General Kaltenbrunner would find notes on organizations which may come in useful under the heading, "Chicago," because

all these organizations are domiciled there. Chicago, therefore, must be considered the center of "nationalistic" organizing in the United States. But there are many other organizations which do not center in Chicago.

There are, for instance, the so-called "Mothers' Groups," which were extremely active in combating democracy before Pearl Harbor, and which all closed up shop afterward. But not for too long. In 1943 most of them were active again.

They hold numerous meetings all over the United States, and it is self-evident that these meetings have been covered by Nazi agents. It would not be at all surprising to learn that, for instance, our old friend Knackebacher has been dispatched to take a look at these "Mothers." And, being as thorough as he is, he would take a good look.

And he would find out and immediately report to SS General Kaltenbrunner that many of these "Mothers" are not mothers at all; that most of them are middle-aged and not very attractive. Knackebacher would wonder at the odd way in which they are dressed, in clothes which must have been out of fashion even when they were new. And as to their hats— Oh well! Knackebacher will wonder if these monstrosities perhaps may have something to do with the secret weapon he has heard so much about.

And then he will learn of:

The Informed Voters of America, offices in Los Angeles, sends out copies of ex-Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin's speech "Some Questions about Pearl Harbor," blaming President Roosevelt for the war with Japan. Copies are being sent out under the congressional frank of Senator Nye. They are being sent to the nearest kin of war casualties. Among the leaders of the groups is Mrs. Frances Sherrill, who before Pearl Harbor ran the Los Angeles branch of the National Legion of Mothers of America. One of its leaders was Laura Ingalls, convicted Nazi agent.

Another one of Knackebacher's notes:

The American Defense League, headed by Mrs. J. Henry Orme, supposed to co-operate with Mrs. Sherrill. The group was active before Pearl Harbor. Mrs. Orme used to co-operate with the National Legion of Mothers, members of German-American Bund, salesmen of Social Justice. Perhaps Knackebacher will add something about the strange frustrated look on the faces of the women.

They must get a lot of fun out of shouting themselves hoarse, some kind of satisfaction. In fact, the whole atmosphere must remind him of Germany and of the ecstasy of the women there when they are allowed to shout "Heil Hitler!"

Still another one of Knackebacher's (probable) notes:

The Mothers of Sons Forum, Cincinnati, Ohio, headed by Mrs. Lucinda Benge. Group active before Pearl Harbor. Regular meetings at which women become hysterical at the slightest provocation. Some of the statements made at the meetings (they must delight Knackebacher): "Roosevelt has ordered the New Testament taken away from our servicemen." "Vichy France is being fought by our government because it is opposed to Jews." Meeting was addressed by Elizabeth Dilling, who said, "The Jews called Jesus a bastard and claimed that his mother was immoral. Internationalists are fast getting hold of this country." Mrs. Benge edits a mimeographed bulletin full of anti-Semitic poems. Ouotes: "Our objectives are the downfall of the British and of the Jews. The Jews should be run out of the United States and of all civilized countries, just as they were run out of Germany. . . . What are our boys fighting for? To establish a world superstate dominated by Jews, under the leadership of the British Crown?"

We, the Mothers, Mobilize for America. Run by Mrs. Clark Van Hyning, of Chicago, active long before Pearl Harbor. Many members marched with Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling to Washington to ask Congress to "keep'us out of the war" and impeach President Roosevelt. Group had many ties to Coughlin. Was publicized in Social Justice. Now considers Father Coughlin a "persecuted Christian." Distributes literature of Mrs. Dilling. Puts out a small newspaper, the Woman's Voice, condemning Jews, Communists, international bankers, all of which they say are the same. (They have terrible voices, though, thinks Knackebacher. It is fine when they damn the Reds, curse the Jews, and shout of Mr. Rosenfeld and what have you, but I wonder if they ever were young.)

Crusading Mothers of Pennsylvania, headed by Mrs. John Brown, of Colwyn, Pennsylvania, active before Pearl Harbor. Opposed to "World Government," which would make the United States "a slave to international politics." Sends leaflets to senators and representatives imploring them to "preserve your republic." According to Mrs. Brown, aim of the group is to break the "stranglehold of

the international bankers." Distributes copies of anti-Semitic speeches, articles, pamphlets.

Mothers of America, later called American Mothers. Headed by Mrs. Murray Knowles, Detroit, Michigan, close associate of Gerald L. K. Smith, often appearing with him on the same platform. Smith wrote about her, as "a student of the world government conspiracy . . . perhaps no one is better informed on world-government propaganda than Mrs. Knowles." Adding, "Mrs. Knowles is working with several members of Congress who are interested in her projects."

American Women against Communism, New York. Headed by Mrs. A. Crossey Morrison, active before Pearl Harbor in combating "Communism." Group distributes a leaflet, *Free Speech*, defending persons under Federal indictment for sedition. Leaflet has been praised by Earl Southard, organizer for Gerald L. K. Smith's America First party, and secretary of Chicago's Citizens USA Committee.

Knackebacher is thorough. He searches the whole country for Mothers' groups. There is no group which can escape him. He sits in at the meetings in little badly aired rooms among those horrible hats and strange dresses, listening to the shouting that goes on and feeling rather satisfied. That is how it began in Germany, he may remember—if he is old enough. Mr. Rosenfeld... the damned Jews who are responsible for everything.... How many Jews are there in America anyhow? Four million, five million? Well, how could so few be responsible for everything? But these women are too dumb to find out... or maybe they have no desire to find out....

And Knackebacher notes other groups, such as the Blue Star Mothers in Flint, Michigan, the National Women's party in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He even finds out about a group called the Pistol-Packin' Mommas in Urbana, Illinois. "Well, I'll be damned!" Knackebacher murmurs. "These Americans are really crazy. Time they get a Hitler. . . ."

And he ends his notes on the Mothers' groups, jotting down that in the beginning of 1944 plans were being made to get together a national convention of all the American Mothers' clubs and organizations in Chicago. Fifty clubs comprising more than twenty thousand followers were contacted.

Next to the Mothers' clubs two other organizations have been able to spread all over the United States. One is a string of so-called "money" organizations such as the Green-Back party, the American Army for the Abolition of Poverty, the Money-righters, and the Constitutional Money League of America. These groups are interested in economic theories only to a relatively small degree and in money only to the extent needed to aid them in disseminating propaganda for things which have nothing at all to do with money or economics, but very much to do with Hitlerism, "nationalism," and the fight against international bankers, Jews, and, of course, Mr. Roosevelt.

The second group consists of numerous "Gentile leagues" organized throughout the Midwest by isolationists, who have gone on record as being in favor of a negotiated peace. The leagues are. of course, anti-Semitic. They want a "Gentile peace," they ask their followers to "buy Christian," they intend "to halt growing Jewish power." The most important of them is the Gentile Co-operative Association in Chicago, which hopes to attain a membership of 5,000,000; this organization urges Gentiles "to do all in their power to win the war first on the home front." It campaigns for "the boosting of Gentile products, the perpetuation of Gentile business ethics and ownership, and the returning of Gentile servicemen back to their old jobs." The group is run by Eugene R. Flitcraft, active long before Pearl Harbor. Another anti-Semitic club is the Gentile League of Wisconsin with headquarters in Watertown. headed by Arthur Friede, who asks his followers "to combat those forces seeking to undermine the American way of life"—the Jews, of course. Donald Shea, associate of many Japanese and German propagandists, has been reorganizing this Gentile League which collaborates closely with the Mothers' groups.

Also of interest to Berlin—particularly in view of the coming underground fight of the Nazis—must be the Fundamentalist Protestants, who have a considerable following in Michigan, Kansas, Colorado, and Minnesota. To be sure, some of the Fundamentalists are among the most courageous fighters for democracy, but a great many of them are definitely pro-Hitler. Their reason for this stand is that Fundamentalists do not believe in freedom of religion, and they do believe that the Jews should be punished

because they killed Christ. They say that Hitler has been sent by God to "save Christianity and destroy atheistic Communism." To many of them Japan is the "oriental outpost of Christianity" destined to save Asia from the danger of a "Communistic China."

Most prominent among those pro-Fascist Fundamentalists is, of course, Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith. Almost equally prominent is Gerald B. Winrod, active long before Pearl Harbor, now under Federal indictment for sedition, but still preaching, still running his Bible school, still editing his magazine, the *Defender*. He is also busy publicizing the speeches of congressmen who have been supporting indicted alleged seditionists.

Winrod's friend, Harvey Springer, and a close associate of Gerald L. K. Smith, is pastor of the Baptist Tabernacle in Englewood, Colorado, teaches in various "Bible schools," and edits the newspaper *The Western Voice*. Strongly anti-Semitic, anti-British, and pro-Fascist, he and his newspaper have been praised by Senator Robert Rice Reynolds and Congressman John H. Folger.

Then there is William D. Herrstrom, Fundamentalist minister in Minneapolis, an associate of Winrod and editor of *Bible News Flashes*, which are opposed to Roosevelt, the British, the Russians, the Jews, and international co-operation. Herrstrom also wrote books of the same type.

The Christian American Association of Houston, Texas, must also be termed a Fundamentalist organization. It is headed by Winrod's friend Harry Hodge of Beaumont, Texas, who knows Martin Dies well and is supposed to have interceded with the Dies Committee not to investigate Winrod. (It's a rumor and it may not be true. But don't forget what you are reading here is what SS General Kaltenbrunner will, as likely as not, have in his files. Sure, Nazi files contain a lot of rumors.) The Christian American Association is run by Vance Muse and Lewis Valentine Ulrey, demands anti-strike legislation.

Englewood, Colorado, is the home of a National Organization of Christian Youth, which, in the beginning of 1944, was still by way of being established. It will be run by Kenneth O. Goff, who was a Communist till 1939, but, according to his own statement, "became a Christian" when the Communist party ordered him to Moscow and asked him to leave his wife at home. Some time in 1943 he joined the Fundamentalists. He occasionally collaborated with

Gerald L. K. Smith, addressed Chicago's Citizens USA Committee, combats the Jews, our government, our Allies.

He is backed by Harvey Springer, Winrod's friend.

Other Fundamentalists who have been fighting the Jews, the Administration, "Communism," or simply "modernism" are: Harry Grube of Mobile, Alabama; R. M. Parr of Detroit, Michigan; Glen Smith of Palmer Lake, Colorado; S. J. Greear of Denver, Colorado; C. K. Peterson of Phoenix, Arizona; Dennis Brown of Greeley, Colorado; W. C. Love of Hazel Park, Michigan.

The list of men and women who, while not directly connected with or leading any of the "nationalistic" groups mentioned above, share their ideas is enormous. There is the wife of the late Senator Ernest Lundeen, who makes speeches before different groups, always anti-Roosevelt, always anti-Semitic, never anti-Hitler. She is quite good-looking and many times it has been said before or after her appearance that it would be so much better to have a pretty woman in the White House, such as Mrs. Lundeen, than the wife of "That Man." There is Carl Mote, president and general manager of the Northern Indiana Telephone Company, who thinks Wendell Willkie is a Communist, declares that we are going to have "famine" in America and that "it was planned that way." He doesn't want any part of democracy. He edits a small periodical called America Preferred, demanding that all immigration should be barred for twenty-five years, and that aliens who came here during the last twenty-five years should be deported.

There is Joseph Kamp, who runs the Constitutional Educational League in New York, a close friend of Lawrence Dennis, an enemy of anybody he considers a Communist, which includes everybody in the United States Government, and who also is convinced that America is facing a famine in the near future.

There is Walter Steele, the editor of the *National Republic* and the *National Republic Lettergrams*, a favorite witness of the Dies Committee on the activities of "Communists, Socialists, anarchists, atheists, pacifists."

And there are countless others who feel the same way, who talk the same way, who have been feeling and talking the same way since long before Pearl Harbor. The list which has been compiled here is by no means complete. Probably no list could be complete, because hardly a day passes that does not see a new agitator or sympathizer springing up somewhere or other. The same goes for the "nationalistic" groups, whose number grows from day to day. Undoubtedly the Nazi files are as complete as humanly possible in this respect. Undoubtedly there is not one nationalist and not one Mother, not a Fascist Fundamentalist or an anti-Semitic founder of a new league on whom the Nazis do not have files. They have so many Knackebachers working for them.

A few of the enormous number of Nazi sympathizers in this country—only thirty—were indicted as seditionists by the United States Government at the beginning of 1944.

Among Kaltenbrunner's files stored away under the heading "North America" one may find the following interesting compilation:

- a. Democracy is decadent; a National Socialist or Fascist form of government should be established in the United States.
- b. A National Socialist revolution is inevitable if we are to rid our country of its decadent democracy.
- c. The Government of the United States, the Congress, and public officials are controlled by Communists, International Jews, and plutocrats.
- d. The Democratic and Republican parties and their candidates for public office are tools of International Jewry, and do not represent the will of the American people.
- e. The acts, proclamations, and orders of the public officials of the United States and the laws of Congress are illegal, corrupt, traitorous, and in direct violation of the Constitution of the United States.
- f. The United States is governed, not by the duly-elected representatives of the people, but by a group of alien-minded persons opposed to American principles and ideals and seeking to over-throw the Constitution of the United States.
- g. President Roosevelt is reprehensible, a warmonger, liar, unscrupulous, and a pawn of the Jews, Communists, and plutocrats.
- h. President Roosevelt is a Jew and is working with International Jewry against the interests of the people of the United States.
 - i. The activities and territorial acquisitions and plans of the Axis

Powers constitute no real danger to the national existence and security of the United States or any of its territorial possessions.

- j. The Axis Powers are fighting to free the world from domination by Communism and International Jewry, and to save Christianity, hence the United States should give no aid and comfort to the enemies of the Axis.
- k. The cause of the Axis Powers is the cause of justice and morality; they have committed no aggressive act against any nation and are fighting a solely defensive war against British imperialism, American capitalists, and the desire of American public officials to rule the world, hence any act of war against them is unjust and immoral on the part of the United States.
- 1. The nations opposed to the Axis plan to use American lives, money, and property to defend their decadent systems of government.
- m. The participation of the United States in the war has been deliberately planned by our leaders with the ultimate aim of promoting our enslavement by British imperialism and International Communism.
- n. The public officials of the United States of America are trying deliberately to provoke war with peaceful nations, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, who are seeking only to live at peace with the rest of the world.
- o. President Roosevelt and Congress, through a surreptitious and illegal war program against the Axis Powers, sold out the United States and forced the Axis Powers to wage war upon us.
- p. President Roosevelt, by his warmongering policies, is draining dry the resources of the United States to save Communist China, imperialist Britain, and atheistic Russia from inevitable defeat.
- q. Our program of giving American arms and equipment to foreign nations results in United States military and naval forces being inadequately armed and equipped and in their being exposed to terrible slaughter.
- r. The public officials of the United States are knaves who have deliberately concealed the truth that our unprepared boys, racked by disease and slaughtered like sheep, will be dumped in a million foreign graves to buy a valueless victory.
- s. The whole war is the result of a Jew-sponsored money-making scheme to bleed the United States Treasury.

- t. As the result of incompetence and corruption in public office, the United States is unprepared to wage war against the Axis Powers, who have the best-equipped and most powerful military establishment in the world.
- u. The present war is a dishonest war waged at the expense and measured in the blood and dollars of the people of the United States solely for the benefit of and to insure the continuance of world domination by "International Bankers," "International Capitalists," "Mongolian Jews," "Communists," and "International Jewry."
- v. The Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor was deliberately invited by the public officials of the United States, in order to involve the United States in a foreign war.
- w. The war with Japan was deliberately provoked by the insane, unjust, aggressive, and traitorous policies of officials of the United States.
- x. An honorable and just peace could be brought about speedily were it not for the opposition of Communists, International Jewry, and war profiteers.

What is this document? Was it composed by Dr. Goebbels for the use of Nazi agents working in the United States? No. This document was composed by the United States Department of Justice as part of the indictment of the thirty seditionists.

The indictment itself said:

In 1933 the National Socialist German Workers' Party, also known as the N.S.D.A.P. and the "Nazi party," came into power in Germany upon a program publicly announced by its leaders to destroy democracy throughout the world and to establish and aid in the establishment of National Socialist or Fascist forms of government in place of the forms of government then existing in the United States of America and other countries. As a means of accomplishing their objectives, the said Nazi party and its leaders carried on a systematic campaign of propaganda designed and intended to impair and undermine the loyalty and morale of the military and naval forces of the United States of America and of other countries. The . . . defendants joined in this movement and program and actively co-operated with each other and with leaders and members of the said Nazi party to accomplish the objectives of said Nazi party in the United States.

What, then, had the defendants done in order to accomplish the objectives of the Nazi party in the United States? According to the indictment they had, through "oral, written, and printed statements, representations and charges," asserted the very things which are printed above and which sound so much as if Goebbels had concocted them.

Perhaps he had.

Among the thirty indicted were: Joseph E. McWilliams, George E. Deatherage, William Dudley Pelley, E. J. Parker Sage, Gerald B. Winrod, Elizabeth Dilling alias Frank Woodruff Johnson, Gerhard Wilhelm Kunze, Lawrence Dennis.

It will interest SS General Kaltenbrunner very little whether the thirty persons indicted for sedition are sentenced or exonerated as the Chicago *Tribune*, the Senators Nye, Reynolds, Wheeler, the Congressmen May, Rankin, Hamilton Fish, et al., have demanded. It will interest him little whether all the charges are correct or not, or whether they can be proved or not. And since we are viewing these men and women exclusively from the point of view of those who are preparing the coming Nazi underground, it does not interest us here either.

The point is, if it is true that the men and women indicted for sedition have disseminated and spread the slogans and propaganda lies quoted above, they would be the ideal collaborators for Nazi underground agents in the future—after the war, when collaboration with Nazi agents can no longer be regarded as high treason. If they were not guilty of disseminating treasonable propaganda, a Nazi underground agent would have to find other men and women who are willing to spread such ideas or who have already done so.

And that should not be difficult, because the thirty indicted persons are an infinitesimally small group compared to the number of those who are saying and spreading these lies. That is why SS General Kaltenbrunner would hardly mourn them if they were sent to prison for a number of years. They can easily be replaced.

All of them, with the exception of Lawrence Dennis. It is safe to assume that any Nazi who hopes to work in the United States after the war must view the indictment of Mr. Dennis with nothing short of dismay. Here is the real intellectual leader of Ameri-

can Fascism. Here is the man who for many years has presented the isolationists, the Anglophobes, the pro-Hitlerites with the best slogans. Here is the man who must be considered the prime Fascist American philosopher, and on such a high intellectual plane that he has even been accepted by liberal circles as an intellectual, of course.

And Lawrence Dennis was very careful not to get mixed up with the authorities. Had he not explicitly stated that he was opposed to anti-Semitic measures? Had he not asserted that on the occasion of a visit to the Third Reich in 1937 he had told the Nazis that he did not approve of the persecutions of the Jews? Had he not tried to keep away from the gangsterism and rowdyism of Fascism and Nazism?

But aside from him, every other indicted pro-Fascist if sentenced can easily be supplanted by one or five or ten others. The same is true of any of the groups named here should the moment ever come when one or even all of them have to go out of existence, for hardly a day goes by that a new group with pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi leanings does not spring up.

The last one, and the one perhaps more dangerous than any of the others, is the Peace Now Movement, which suddenly emerged from nothing early in 1944. This organization, as its name implies, advocates a negotiated peace with Germany and Japan—now. It is run, for all practical purposes, by Miss Bessy Simon, active long before Pearl Harbor as the manager of the Washington office of the America First Committee. The chairman is Dr. George W. Hartmann, once a Socialist, who now feels that "if we continue fighting, we'll get one dictator instead of another, Stalin instead of Hitler"—precisely what Goebbels has been telling the world for the past two years. He also stated that we were "tricked" into the war because Roosevelt and Churchill faced Japan with the choice of war or "economic slavery of the United States of America."

The Peace Now Movement answers as follows the question whether we can do business with Hitler: "Most ordinary business transactions in America today take place between suspicious corporations or individuals. Nations can do the same. If we entice the German people with a fair set of terms, they will force Hitler to accept them whether he likes them or not."

Amusingly enough, the Peace Now Movement from its very start

sought the help and collaboration and even the membership of men and women who had been closely connected with pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi agents, among them former members of the Bund. In at least one instance it sent an invitation to a German alien to attend a meeting. The letter began: "We do not know how long you will be in Ellis Island nor whether you are free to come and go from there, but if you are free we would like to have you come to our meeting on December 30."

The addressee could not attend, however. He was being detained on Ellis Island as a dangerous enemy alien, according to our Department of Justice a potential danger to the safety of the United States. Otherwise he would undoubtedly have been fervently in favor of peace—now.

They want peace now. They want it now because the war has entered a stage where it is a dead certainty that Hitler and his gang will be defeated. They will not stop the war, of course. It is not up to a few hundred groups in the United States, it is not even up to all the people of the United States to stop this war. And nobody knows that better than the Nazis. But they also know that each such movement, each man or woman shouting at the top of their voices for "Peace Now!" and against everything the Nazis have been shouting against, weakens our war effort and thus prolongs this war. And that means much for the coming underground movement of the Nazis. What the men in Berlin need now is time.

What they will need afterward is friends. And whom can they consider as friends after this war if it is not the men and women who in their numerous organizations and newspapers, meetings and handbills, have been spreading all these Nazi slogans even while the war was going on? What more could they wish for as a basis for the work of their underground agents after the war than such organizations, newspapers, and magazines?

Peace Now? With the countless facilities at the disposal of Nazi underground agents after the war; with restrictions against free speech and a free press removed completely then, the fight will only have been begun—the hard, merciless, bloody fight of the Nazi underground here, in the very heart of the United States.

We are asked to make peace with the Nazis. Peace now. But the Nazis—will they ever make peace with us?¹

9

A. 0.

ONLY in exceptional cases have the Nazis ever used German citizens or former German citizens as agents in the United States. This is only logical. A man or a woman with a German accent would have small chance indeed of convincing a gathering of even the most stupid people that, in advocating America's isolationism or withdrawal from the war now, he is motivated solely by patriotic feelings for America. But, then, the Nazis have never depended solely on Germans for propaganda purposes in the United States. There have always been plenty of Americans who, sometimes without knowing what they were doing, performed such duties willingly. Take, for example, the case of the Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck, who, by fraternizing with certain senators and congressmen, got them to say exactly what he had been paid by Hitler to say, without himself coming out in the open. It was easier that way; it was smoother; and it was certainly much more effective.

In almost all of the "nationalistic" groups in the United States, too, German-Americans have either played no role at all or have been, for the most part, merely benevolent spectators, becoming active participants only when some group could not assemble a sufficiently impressive number of American members. This does not mean, of course, that the German-Americans in this country are inactive in movements which help the Nazis, or that they can be disregarded by those who are looking out for possible collaborators in the coming Nazi underground. Very much to the contrary!

¹A considerable part of the material on the activities of American pro-Fascist and "Nationalistic" groups was furnished by Friends of Democracy.

These American citizens of German descent are included in the calculations of the schemers in Berlin.

To understand the immense problem of the loyalties and disloyalties of German-Americans it is necessary to review their history-or, rather, the history of their relations with the Fatherland. For a long time, at least until after the founding of the German Empire in 1871, German emigrants to this country kept up practically no relations at all with the Fatherland. A man who left Germany was no longer considered German by his fellow countrymen. Even after 1871 this attitude did not change, except for a few resentful remarks about "deserters." Bismarck, for example, declared, "A German who discards his Fatherland like a worn coat is no longer German to me. I have no interest in him." And the Kaiser coined the famous phrase concerning "those runaways who have shaken the dust of their country from their feet." To the official representatives of the German Empire, German-Americans were either dangerous revolutionaries or descendants of such untrustworthy people.

The history of the German-Americans justifies this attitude: The first settlers-from 1670 on-came chiefly because they longed for the freedom of religious worship they could no longer enjoy in the little German states where they were born. They were followed by large numbers of immigrants who sought better economic conditions. Some of these latter were the victims of unscrupulous travel agents and had to work for years under the most difficult conditions in order to pay off the expenses of their immigration. During the Revolutionary War many German soldiers were sold to the English by their sovereigns and were sent over here to fight against the Colonials. Numbers of these soldiers remained here as settlers at the close of the war. Early in the nineteenth century, particularly after the failure of the 1848 revolts in Germany and Austria, new waves of immigrants arrived from there. These were mostly men who were unwilling to live in countries run by reactionary and dictatorial princes. Many of this latter group found it much more difficult to acclimate themselves to their new surroundings than had those who came before. For while the latter had been mainly workers, who quickly settled down in small towns and villages and on farms, and soon became an integral part of the communities in

which they lived, the new arrivals were intellectuals who preferred to remain in the cities, and thus were not so rapidly absorbed into their new surroundings. Furthermore, they were filled with a definite determination to return someday to their homeland, "to chase away all kings, priests, and moneybags from Europe with the help of an army of a hundred thousand men." Many of them did stay here, nevertheless, and became some of the best and most valuable citizens of the United States—and some of the most democratic minded. They, too, became American, just as the English, Irish, and Italian immigrants became American.

After 1871 the German immigration changed its character. Of those who came afterward, the majority were interested in the apparently limitless possibilities offered by the rapidly developing American industries. A smaller percentage were sons of good families, "black sheep," who, having disgraced their family name by gambling away a fortune, by being involved in a scandal, by marrying a woman whom society did not consider "acceptable" or even by actually having served a prison term, came to this country in the hope of making a fresh start here. It is interesting to note that German propaganda played up this part of the German immigration to this country to such an extent that most of those remaining in Germany became firmly convinced that the United States was populated almost entirely by such black sheep. This belief discouraged them from coming here themselves—which was precisely the intent of the propaganda.

The complete lack of interest in German-Americans on the part of official Germany continued throughout World War I. Whatever the Germans tried to accomplish by propaganda or later by sabotage in the United States was done without the German-Americans. And even after the Kaiser had gone and the Weimar Republic came into existence nothing changed, for a time, at least, as far as the relations between the homeland and the former immigrants were concerned.

A change did come in 1929, however. It was in that year that the depression began in the United States, and the middle class, in which the largest part of the German immigrants is to be found, suffered considerably. It was then that the Nazis, still many years before they came to power, began to interest themselves in Germans living abroad, particularly the German-Americans. The

methods they used to show this interest were so effective that in the minds of the former immigrants the whole picture of Germany began to change. While in the United States things looked hopeless to them, dynamic forces (they were told) were at work in the homeland making things better; and in all their misery they had at least the consolation of being proud of their homeland. So much the more so since the Nazis gave them to understand that the German-Americans, too, as well as the Germans themselves, would benefit from the new glory and prosperity of the Third Reich. It is small wonder, then, that with the growing successes of Hitler during the thirties, the pride of these German-Americans in Hitler, in Germany, in being a German or the descendant of a German, grew by leaps and bounds. There was, of course, a group of liberal or leftist German-Americans to whom Hitler Germany immediately became enemy Number One to a much greater degree than to most 100-per-cent Americans. But this group was small.

It became smaller and smaller as, during the thirties, Nazi propaganda agents did their utmost to win over the German-Americans. There were two motives behind their increased activity: They hoped to influence American public opinion to such a degree that Hitler would be able to negotiate extensive loans in the United States, and they also hoped that in the world war they knew was coming America would remain neutral. They expected to achieve all this by winning over the German-Americans, who, in turn, were to influence the rest of the Americans in favor of Hitler.

The Nazi agents did all they could. They bolstered the pride of the German-Americans by telling them that they and only they were the real Americans, since the Viking, Leif Ericsson, with thirty-three comrades had discovered America long before Columbus had. Of course Leif Ericsson was not exactly a German but he was Nordic, at least. And then they told them that there were really fifty million Germans in the United States, which made them almost the majority. How this figure was arrived at is still a mystery; but the Nazis have always regarded a German as a German, no matter whether or not he took other citizenship. Thus they even regarded families like the Astors or the Willkies as still German.

Then the German-Americans were swamped with letters and post cards from home. Business was thrown their way wherever

possible. They were invited to come "home" at reduced rates, and when they did go back they were treated like princes during their stay.

Almost from the beginning the Nazis wanted to see practical results for the money they spent. As early as 1933 an organization was founded in New York, that called itself the Friends of the New Germany. This society which was, in a way, the predecessor of the Bund, was actually nothing but a front for Nazi agents.

The leaders of the organization immediately made it clear that Berlin was not satisfied merely to have Nazi sympathizers in the United States. If these people were sincere Nazis, they must do something. What could these little German-Americans do for Hitler? They could give information. If they didn't have any they could look for it. In brief, it was their "patriotic duty" to become spies.

Which is precisely what many of them became, though perhaps the word "spy" is a bit too melodramatic in this connection. These little people all over America were not given the task of uncovering military secrets, important plans, or new gun models. No, the Nazis had other ideas as to how these people should be used. Economic and business intelligence, they knew, was just as important as military information. What Germany wanted was to arrive at a minute knowledge of every available resource of a country which might be decisive in time of war. And she proposed to use the thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of German-Americans here to make the exhaustive study which would yield her that information.

And then war came. The German-Americans had done a great deal of espionage up to the time of Pearl Harbor. Up to then such activities involved practically no risk. But now it was different. It began to be dangerous to engage in such work. Under duress the espionage organization which Hitler's agents had built in this country did not stand up too well. Deprived of their leaders, who were arrested by the FBI or sent to camps for enemy aliens and faced with long prison terms and perhaps execution, many of the rank and file simply forgot about their duties as Nazis. Berlin must have viewed these sudden changes of heart with dismay. There is little doubt that many schemes, such as the plan to ship

large numbers of saboteurs into this country via U-boats, never materialized because of the breakdown of Nazi organizations here.

There are, of course, Nazis who, in spite of the dangers and handicaps (mainly the relentless activities of the FBI), have continued to work for Hitler. Outwardly they have changed, have become patriotic citizens. They are the most ardent of air-raid wardens; the most successful with their victory gardens; they buy War Bonds in great quantities, sometimes more than they can afford—one might well ask at this point where they get the money for such activities? They can be found at patriotic meetings, gatherings of the Red Cross, and War-Bond rallies. They have found the perfect front.

They have even gone so far as to denounce each other constantly, and have had each other investigated by the FBI as "suspects"—an ingenious device, since one who denounces another as a Nazi creates for himself a certain prestige with the authorities. And since those denounced are careful not to do anything to which the authorities could possibly object, either at the time of the pending investigation or for some time afterward, they, too, may hope to escape surveillance.

It is impossible to state with any degree of accuracy how many German-Americans are still working for the Nazis today. To give an idea of how many of them are organized, though on the surface quite innocently, it may be stated that the register of German-American clubs and associations comprises one hundred and fifty-six pages, and that on each page there is an average of thirty clubs and associations. This means that there are roughly 5,000 such organizations where Nazis can gather without arousing undue suspicion since to all appearances the activities are entirely innocent, their purpose largely social: members bowl, eat sauerkraut and sausages, and drink beer, and appear to be completely unpolitical.

While many of the Nazis among the German-Americans have grown fearful and are now inactive, they have not really changed at all. At heart they are still Nazis, and the underground that is in process of preparation can depend upon them once this war is over and the laws which make it so dangerous to work for another country no longer are operative. The Nazi underground will also depend upon those formerly active Nazis now inactive because

they have been interned for the duration. People in this country who have had a chance to study what is going on in our internment camps for dangerous enemy aliens are unanimous in saying that the internees there are no less Nazi now than they were before their arrest.

The United States, in an overgenerous interpretation of the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war, has allowed these people to run their prison camps as a Nazi state within our country. They may heil Hitler; may refuse to have anything to do with non-Aryans—Jews or American Negroes; may arrange entertainments which mock the institutions and the leading personalities of the democracies; and they may even punish those of their own number who either have been always anti-Nazi or have come to doubt the value of the Hitler religion.

This state of affairs would not be so bad if, after the war, these men and women could be deported to Germany. But there is little chance of this since, outwardly at least, Germany will then become strictly anti-Nazi and the men who will be running the German government will have to make a real show of their anti-Nazi conviction by putting all confirmed Nazis into a concentration camp. This gives the prisoners interned here the right to appeal against being sent back to Germany; and the United States, being a humane country, will probably let them stay.

But many of these Nazis are not taking any chances. They are thorough. It is a fact, though it has never been published, that many of the internees find ways and means to meet their wives and have intercourse with them. The reason for this procedure—which, incidentally, is strictly against the law—is that a child may thus be produced, a child which, having been born on American soil, cannot be deprived of its American citizenship; and parents of such an American citizen are very difficult to deport.

All of which means that we can be quite certain of having these "dangerous enemy aliens" with us after this war. And that is what the coming Nazi underground is counting on.

The German-Americans, numerous as they are, constitute only a small part of the Germans or former Germans living abroad. There is not a land to which Germans have not immigrated. In certain countries they have been assimilated more, in others less.

But in every state on this globe there are, among the Germans or people of German descent, Nazi sympathizers and potential or real Nazi agents.

The mass organization of Nazi sympathizers in foreign countries through the party has from the beginning been the business of the A.O.—the Auslandsorganisation (League of Germans Abroad).

The A.O. was not founded by the Nazis. It came into existence in 1881 under the name of Verein fuer Deutschtum im Ausland (Association for Teutons Abroad). Later the German School Club, with branches all over the world, merged with this organization. Then in 1917, in the middle of World War I, the Auslandsinstitut (Institute for Foreign Countries) was organized in Stuttgart. After the war still another organization, the Protective League for Germans in Frontier Regions and Abroad, established itself in Berlin with branch offices in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. And finally there were the dozens of special organizations that were established in regions lost to Germany by the Versailles Treaty—the League of Baltic Germans, the League of Alsatians, the League of Sudeten Germans, to name only a few.

All these organizations were supernationalistic, and none of them recognized the flag of the republic, let alone the fact that Germany had lost the war. There were sound economic reasons for such a stand. The Germans in the surrendered provinces had lost most of their former property. The Germans living overseas had lost a great deal of prestige.

Thus it was no problem for the Nazis, long before they came to power, to put their men or men they trusted into these leagues. At a party meeting in Hamburg it was decided to set up Nazi cells within all these organizations. That was in 1930. One year later Rudolf Hess formed a special Foreign Department of the Reichsleitung (Reich Leadership) of the National Socialist party, which established card files on every member who lived abroad or traveled abroad. This was the basis of the gigantic files which the A.O. was to organize later.

In the spring of 1934 the Führer declared before a congress of delegates of Germans living abroad: "You are listening posts. Far from the front you must prepare certain undertakings. You must prepare our own groundwork for the attack. Consider yourselves under orders. Military law applies to you."

At the same time Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, a young member of the party born in England of a German father, was appointed chief of the A.O. into which all the other organizations and societies of Germans living abroad had by now been merged. In 1935 the A.O. moved from Hamburg to Berlin. By 1937 it had more than 700 employees. Before the war broke out this number had doubled. It had by then become an important party agency, and one of the best functioning organizations of the Third Reich, boasting millions of members all over the world and warehouses full of files and dossiers concerning these members and with their connections. Its basic idea, its ever-repeated slogan was: "Once a German always a German."

The A.O. laid the groundwork for the coming Nazi underground by organizing an army of millions of sympathizers all over the world, and it is of the greatest importance to the underground that the A.O. go on functioning. However, there is not the slightest doubt that the Allies will suspend and dissolve this organization, which has proved its nuisance value in almost all the Allied countries. Hence the A.O. will have to go underground too.

Bohle's deputy in the organization has been for some time Alfred Hess. Little is known about him—which is probably precisely what he wants. For some time now he, along with the Gauamtsleiter Emil Ehrich, another of Bohle's collaborators, has been reorganizing the A.O.

Hess and Ehrich should have no trouble staying alive and out of prison, for nobody will dream of accusing them of being war criminals. Therefore, they will be able to conduct the organization or organizations destined to take the place of the A.O.

This is the plan they have worked out for the period after the defeat:

Up to now the A.O. was divided into eight Landesaemter (Territorial Bureaus) covering northern and eastern Europe; Western Europe; southeastern Europe; Italy, Switzerland, and Hungary; Africa; North America; South America; Far East, Australia, England, and Ireland. These eight departments will be compressed into three:

Landesamt I will cover the whole of Europe with particular accent on the now neutral countries of Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

Landesamt II will cover South America, with Spain and Portugal thrown in.

Landesamt III will cover the Far East, Australia, England, and Ireland as well as Canada and the United States.

In addition to these three Landesaemter Hess and Ehrich have created eight organizations which will work independently of the Landesaemter to keep together representatives of certain professions-former Germans, of course, who may thus be of help to the coming underground whether they know it or not. These groups are: The Businessman Abroad, The Worker Abroad, The Official and Employee Abroad, The Educator Abroad, The Lecturer Abroad, The Student Abroad, The Woman Abroad, Youth Abroad. All of which looks innocent enough. Seemingly there should be no harm in letting former Germans organize along professional lines. Let them drink beer and sing German songs and talk shop if they so desire. So much the better for the Nazis if these groups dispersed all over the world do seem harmless-so much the easier for the Nazi underground to use them as fronts or as willing or unwilling helpers in years to come. The sillier all this looks to the rest of the world, the better for the Nazis.

One of the countries in which the A.O. has worked with particular success is Argentina. There it has been able to operate without any disguise or front. All of the more than 200,000 Argentine Nazis are members, not of an Argentine suborganization of the Nazi party, but of the German party itself, and hold membership cards signed by Robert Ley, leader of the German Workers' Front—which means, quite obviously, that Berlin considered, and still considers, Argentina not so much an independent foreign country as a German Gau.

Such conditions are likely to become worse ten or twenty years hence.

Main points of support in the long-range Nazi strategy in Argentina are the countless German schools there. These schools have the same rights and privileges as Argentina's. In them the children of German immigrants not only learn the German language but are taught Hitlerism pure and simple. The books used in these schools are "donated" by the German Embassy. Hitler's picture hangs in every classroom. "Heil Hitler" is the obligatory greeting. The

pupils are forbidden to speak to Jews. They are told that the Germans belong to a race superior to other races; that they have been chosen to dominate other nations; that the National Socialist culture is superior to all other cultures; that democracy is a lie; that—and this may be the most important of all—every German must stick to the National Socialist idea "whether it wins or loses."

These schools have been in operation for ten years now. They number among their former pupils a great many of the most active Nazi agents in South America today. And the teachers do not restrict their activities to German schools. They also teach foreign languages in Argentine state schools, and thus command an influence over the cultural life of the nation from which the Nazis have profited and from which the Nazi underground will profit. All these Nazi teachers must, in fact, be regarded as full-fledged agents. So effective has been their influence that some of the wealthiest and most prominent citizens of Argentina have for some time been sending their children to German schools because, they say, the latter are so much better than the state schools. Among those who adhere to this curious practice are even a number of Argentinian inspectors whose duty it is to supervise all schools impartially and to issue licenses to them. Such being the case, we will see more and more German schools in Argentina.

The army of German Nazi sympathizers in Argentina comprises German farmers, whom the Nazis helped by purchasing their products, and German businessmen who were granted a monopoly over exports from and imports into Germany.

The word "army" may also be taken quite literally. Since 1936—more than three years before the outbreak of World War II—every male German living in Argentina has been informed that he need not go back to Germany to do his military service. He could fulfill his obligations to the Fatherland by entering one of the countless party storm troops that had been organized in Argentina. These storm troops were divided into infantry, cavalry, and air force. Those who were sent to the cavalry received thorough technical and practical training in tank warfare. The troopers assigned to the air force were trained by German pilots and engineers in the employ of South American air lines controlled by Nazi Germany.

By the end of 1939 the Nazi army inside Argentina numbered more than 8,000 men. In addition there were 64,000 storm troopers

—SA men—under the command of 274 trained group leaders. These storm troopers, though not trained for military purposes, could nevertheless be considered as reserves. They had sworn loyalty to the Führer "until death."

This army experienced a considerable increase in man power shortly after the beginning of the war, to be precise after December 18, 1939, when 965 officers and sailors of the pocket battleship *Graf Spee*, which had been scuttled, arrived in Buenos Aires. These men were, of course, interned. But that did not mean much, since they were at liberty to leave camp, live and work where they wished, in return for their word of honor not to leave Argentine soil. Most of their "work" consisted in training and advising Hitler's private army in Argentina.

Soon a strange thing happened to the crew of the *Graf Spee*. While according to the records none of them actually died, their number diminished during the next two years from 965 to 845; in short, 120 of them skipped Argentina, in spite of having given their word of honor to remain. If the Argentine government ever complained about this breach of faith no notice was taken of the fact by the outside world, though all of those who had fled went back to Germany—by no means an easy feat—and, once repatriated, continued to do their not-inconsiderable bit for the Fatherland. Could all this have been achieved without the aid of the Nazi forces in Argentina?

The escape of the Germans was, indeed, not a series of disconnected individual acts, but part of a well-organized plan which had been worked out by the German Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires, Dietrich Niebuhr.

Perhaps even more interesting than the escape of the *Graf Spee* men is the story of those who did *not* escape. Little has ever been said or written about these men who still live in Argentina. On the surface all seems to be in perfect order, but if one looks more closely one discovers some rather interesting facts.

Many of these men stayed on, not so much because they had given their word of honor to stay, but because they were not considered valuable enough to be shipped back to Germany. Some decided to look for work outside the camp—a move their comrades did not approve of. They also chose to become friendly with natives of Argentina—another move frowned upon by their fellow

prisoners. When these lone wolves decided to marry Argentine girls and applied for Argentine citizenship, they were declared traitors and every tie between them and the other Nazis was broken.

But are they traitors to the Nazi cause? This much is certain: these men are going to stay in Argentina and are, on the face of it, anti-Nazis. They will have no difficulty later in getting in touch with other anti-Nazi Argentinians. They will be trusted, they will acquire valuable connections. All of which will be extremely useful to the coming Nazi underground once this war is over. If only a dozen of the men who have "deserted" can be depended upon by the Nazi underground, they will have proved themselves more valuable than their comrades, who after their return may have manned U-boats and have sunk some thousands of tons of Allied shipping.

One of the tasks of the Nazi underground in Argentina will be to take care of the Nazi big shots who will flee from a doomed Germany. The U-boats are already waiting. I do not refer here to the five to ten leading men of the party and of the government, but the second- and third-line men, for instance, the twenty Reichsleiter (Reich Leaders) and the members of the Verbindungsstab (Liaison Staff) of the Führer. According to intelligence from Buenos Aires preparations have already been made for their reception and housing. All of them—altogether about 400 to 450—who are expected to seek refuge in Argentina possess passports of South American states. Some of them are supposed to become Argentine citizens immediately, and here again definite preparations to this end are already completed. This would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Allies to demand their extradition as war criminals.

Lesser party officials will take their chances on getting out of Germany on South American passports, and of finding space on passenger boats traveling from Spain to Argentina. Once arrived, they will have to make contact with the underground themselves. This should not be too difficult, however. Among other things they will have in their possession a little booklet which will help them a lot. This booklet was published by a typical German institution called the *Verein der Vereine* (The Club of Clubs). All German

associations and groups all over the world are members of this "Club of Clubs," and their addresses, which are duly recorded in the little booklet, will tell the new arrivals in Argentina—and in other countries too—where to go to meet friends.

But perhaps all this secrecy will not even be necessary in Argentina. Up to the time of the official break with Germany-early in 1944—the official headquarters of all Nazi undercover activities was the German Embassy, a paradoxical situation, it is true; but then the Nazi underground there has always operated much too openly to deserve that name. It still does. The fact that Argentina has broken off relations with Germany by no means implies that the work of the Nazis has become more difficult. The very government which once broke off relations with Germany was more pro-Nazi than its predecessors. German espionage agents and German Gestapo agents were still working in Argentina at the beginning of 1944 and they will continue their work. Pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic newspapers still appear, and pro-democratic ones are still being suppressed. This will not change either. Indeed, the situation in Buenos Aires is such that the Nazi underground works openly while those who fight it must work underground. The Nazis have good friends and strong ones. They are sitting in the government and in the key positions, controlling the whole country.

This is not so much the doing of the A.O., which can reach and control only Germans and former Germans, and is in any case a mass organization. It is, rather, the doing of Count Kurt von Luxburg.

For a long time the German Ambassador, Baron Edmund von Thermann, was suspected of being the head of the Nazi conspiracy not only in the Argentine but in the whole of South America. In 1941 a great stir was made about secret messages he is said to have received through a special short-wave set. Liberal Argentinians protested against his remaining in Argentina and accused him openly of conducting a fifth column. It is true that most of the activities concerning the Nazi movement in Argentina were conducted from the embassy. But the baron was only a front. The man behind him was Count von Luxburg.

The name Luxburg is not unfamiliar to those who still remember World War I. Up to 1917 the count was German Ambassador

in Buenos Aires. During those years he suffered a great deal from the repercussions caused by the sinking of Argentine ships by German U-boats. Then one day in 1917 he had a brain storm. If the ships attacked by German U-boats could be sunk without leaving a trace, and no member of the crew left to tell the tale later—well, nobody could blame the Germans. He wrote a letter to Berlin in which he advocated that in the future ships should be spurlos versenkt (sunk without leaving a trace). Unfortunately for him, the British got hold of that "humane" document and published it. Argentina broke off relations with Germany and the count was forced to leave.

But in 1925 he came back, settled down, became a citizen, and waited. When Hitler came to power, von Luxburg began organizing the Nazi underground in Argentina. He did a good job, for he had grown older and wiser since 1917. He no longer wrote indiscreet letters but worked in the shadow and allowed others to take the limelight.

Luxburg has connections all over Argentina. There are, for instance, the powerful landowners. They are much under the control of Luxburg, and with good reason. Ever since 1925, the year when Luxburg arrived there, Argentina has shipped enormous quantities of wheat to Germany, payment being made either in blocked marks or German industrial stocks. Since Germany did not need gold to pay for the wheat, she could sell much of it to other countries, thus building up a reserve of foreign exchange with which she could buy vital war materials. This explains why both the Nazis as well as the Argentinians have kept completely silent about the whole transaction.

If Germany should lose the war, these particular Argentine investments will have to be written off as valueless—a terrific blow indeed, since the price of five million tons of wheat is at stake. It is for this reason that the Argentine landowners will go to any lengths to help Germany avert final defeat, which, as far as the present is concerned, means that they will collaborate with Luxburg, and no holds barred. And after defeat their only chance of saving some of their money will be to continue this collaboration.

Then there are the Argentinian banks, which are and will continue to be on extremely good terms with Luxburg because they handle for him, among other German business affairs, the transfer

of millions from Germany and occupied countries to Argentina. Under his direction they also administer numerous large accounts ostensibly belonging to Argentinian citizens, but in reality moneys which will be used for financing the Nazi underground.

These banks, too, serve as fronts for operations involving Swiss and Swedish holding companies which own the majority of shares in industrial enterprises in Germany or Hitler-occupied Europe—operations which have become so complicated and involved that it will be difficult ever to find out exactly which Nazi owns what—and even then it won't help. Because as far as international law goes the Nazi in question will not own a cent. Argentinian citizens will be the owners.

The vaults of these banks are full of stocks and bonds as well as of gold and jewels belonging to Nazis or to the party—stolen goods which have mostly been transported in U-boats.

Then there are the officers of the Argentine Army who, as recent events show, are completely under the influence of Luxburg or of other Nazis, and who have been working hard to help the Nazi cause in Argentina, fomenting revolts against the government whenever it seemed to be in danger of falling in line with the rest of the Americas and becoming part of the anti-Nazi front.

To keep up good relations with the Argentine Army involves considerable sacrifice on the part of the Nazis. At least up to the beginning of 1944 and probably even now arms have been sent from Germany to Argentina. This can be done easily enough by way of Spain. The arms and ammunition are declared as Spanish goods. Thus the transaction seems to be a simple matter of two neutral countries doing business with each other.

There is, of course, always the possibility that in spite of the efforts of the Argentine Army the country will finally go over to the Allies and declare war on Germany. But even that would not change much. The coming Nazi underground has already established itself so strongly that, aside from temporary setbacks, nothing much can happen to it. Even if a genuine Argentine revolution should throw those who collaborate with Luxburg out of their key positions, it would mean only that the German underground will have to work underground in Argentina—for a little while at least.

10

The Second Front

THE MAN who must be credited with inspiring the Argentine Army with pro-German and pro-Nazi feelings is General Wilhelm von Faupel. He had quite an international career. In 1900 he went to China as a member of the military legation, later going in the same capacity to Moscow. In 1911 he joined the staff of the Argentine War College in Buenos Aires. Back in Europe during the war, he distinguished himself on the Western front, but in 1921 he returned to Buenos Aires, where he obtained the job of military counselor to the inspector general of the Argentine Army. He did a thorough job. He not only taught the army men his military theories, but also influenced them politically. For five years he stayed in Buenos Aires, where he placed many other German officers. When he left, the little Argentine Army was not only immensely improved but could be considered a dependable ally of Germany if and when Germany struck again.

Von Faupel later took other posts: he trained the Brazilian Army, and then the armed forces of Peru. Hating the republic passionately, he did not return to Germany until the Nazis were about to take power. But while he was away he had kept up excellent relations with industrialists such as Fritz Thyssen, Georg von Schnitzler, and Herr von Schroeder. After all, these gentlemen had elaborate interests in Latin America. And so had von Faupel. In fact, he boasted openly among German military and industrial men that he could conquer the whole of Latin America.

But the key to Latin America had always been and still was Spain. And that is why the general had to conquer Spain first. He conquered it. If it can be said of any single person that he is responsible for the Spanish civil war, it must be said of General Wilhelm von Faupel. It was he who sent his agents into Spain to

contact and negotiate with men he considered capable of overthrowing the democratic and constitutional regime. It was he who ordered Eberhard von Stohrer, the military attaché in Madrid during World War I, to talk business with such men as General José Sanjurjo, who had tried a putsch in 1932; Gil Robles, a rightist and Jesuit political leader; Juan March, one of the richest men of Spain and a financier of all Fascist activity; General Goded, the first of the generals who started the revolt of 1936, and, of course, General Francisco Franco.

It is probably von Faupel who must be considered the victor in the bloody Spanish war. Indeed, informed circles in Madrid believe that Faupel is today the real master of Spain. As such he is one of the key men of the Nazi underground being prepared today. And his position will grow even more important the closer the moment of Germany's collapse approaches. For Spain will be one of the most important countries to which this underground movement can deploy. Not only will it serve as a haven for those who must leave Germany in a hurry; not only will it be of immense importance to the German industrialists who will be able to conduct their various complicated enterprises via Spain and Argentina; but conditions in Spain today are such that an active and militant Nazi underground organization can flourish there without its existence even being suspected from the outside.

It does exist already. The front behind which it has been built is the Falange, originally an organization of rowdies and gangsters organized and led by the son of the late Spanish dictator, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. From 1935 on, General von Faupel proceeded to present this group of criminals and killers with political leadership, political ideals, and goals. They were glorified as the storm troopers of Spanish Fascism although up to then most Fascist groups had been unwilling to do any business with the Falangists. This, too, was Faupel's work. He recruited young men everywhere, particularly in South and Central America, and saw to it that the Falange was built up around them into an international organization with branch offices all over the world. For a long time almost no one realized that behind the Spanish and South American rowdies, Nazi saboteurs or propagandists were doing their dirty work. It was only in 1943 that a few reporters dug up and published facts which proved the close connection between the

Falange and the Nazis. This should have been a tip-off as to how important the Falange will be for the Nazis once the Nazi organizations become legally non-existent. In addition, there are many influential people in the United States and in England of strictly anti-Nazi leanings who have, nevertheless, discovered a soft spot in their hearts for the Falange. Even as late as the beginning of 1944 three American foreign correspondents published statements to the effect that the Falangists were almost harmless, and certainly not so dangerous as the Nazis.

The Falange, then, will become the logical collecting center for those of the rank and file of the militant Nazi organizations who will want to go away or may be able to leave Germany.

General von Faupel was perhaps one of the first to realize that the war was lost for Germany. As early as April 20, 1942, he had a talk with General Franco, and later commented on this conversation in a letter, in which he noted that the Spanish dictator no longer seemed sure of a German victory. Neither, Faupel added, was he, though he had not seen fit to discuss his own misgivings with the Spaniard.

Since then, Faupel has been busy making arrangements against the time when the defeat becomes an accomplished fact.

There are two possibilities with which the Nazi underground must reckon in Spain: either General Franco will be strong enough to retain his power, or he will be chased out. If he stays in power the Nazis certainly have nothing to fear, which is why they are trying very hard to see to it that he does remain in power.

What can the Nazis do about this? Since most of the criticism of Franco is directed toward his friendship with the Nazis, obviously the logical thing for him to do is to make the world believe that he and they are no longer on very good terms. This has, in fact, already been insinuated. Official but uncensored news reports have issued from Spain, indicating that since December 1943 and January 1944 the Nazis have sent thousands of new agents into that country. Why? Evidently because they were no longer certain of Franco's friendship. This sensational news was printed all over the world.

There was nothing to the story. Germany has had so many agents in Spain for so many years that nothing decisive had to be done now to replenish the reservoir. Perhaps a few were replaced by new men. But if the world believes these reports of the waning friendship with the Nazis then it will not feel so angry at Franco. If Franco does not like the Nazis any more the world will like Franco better.

But if Franco cannot keep himself in power then it is vital for the Nazis to have somebody in power on whom they can depend, just as they now depend on Franco. Of course anybody who comes to power in Spain after Franco will—at least for some time—be regarded as an improvement by the world in general and particularly by the Allies and other democracies, no matter what happens under such a regime, no matter how much it facilitates the activities of the Nazi underground.

If the Loyalists should gain control again in Spain it would mean a colossal defeat for the Nazi underground, because certainly it could not hope to get any protection then, and, more, it could not even hope to survive there. The Nazis know that a Loyalist comeback must be prevented. On the other hand, a monarchistic revolution, a return to a failure of the past might not be popular, either with the Spanish people or with the world. But if a monarchist coup could be disguised as an anti-Nazi coup—that would be quite another thing.

This is the course the Nazis have decided upon if Franco can't stay in power: They will stage a monarchist anti-Nazi coup d'état. When a Bourbon again mounts the Spanish throne, everybody will be convinced that the end of Franco will be the end of the Nazis in Spain.

This is a clever scheme, and Wilhelm von Faupel and his cohorts have lost no time in helping to bring about such a state of affairs. The man who has evidently been chosen to play their game is General Juan Beigbeder, an officer in the Spanish Army. In 1942 he went to London, and in 1943 he came to the United States as the chief of a military mission, making it plain in both countries that he had broken off relations with the Franco regime.

He had met Eberhard von Stohrer during World War I and was concerned in a conspiracy to involve Spain in the war on the side of Germany. In 1934, while he was military attaché in Berlin, he conferred with von Faupel, and the two men worked in close collaboration throughout the entire Spanish civil war. Now he is in

Washington, working hard to convince everybody that only a Spanish king can save Spain from the Germans.

Another important personality who wants to restore the Spanish monarchy for exactly the same reason is Count Francisco de Jordana, at present Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Toward the end of 1943 he made it his business to receive three prominent American journalists, all of whom assured their readers that Jordana was a nice man, opposed to the Falange and anxious to suppress it as a group of gangsters and killers. However, he did not explain why it was that, in spite of such views, he tripled the allocation of funds for the Falange from \$15,400,000 in 1943 to \$47,500,000 in 1944. Nor did he explain why he permitted whole units of the Falange to be incorporated into the Spanish Army. Maybe he would have answered that this was the way to do away with the Falange. But it seems more logical to assume that the effect will be the opposite.

No, Jordana is hardly the anti-Nazi he now pretends to be. For more than twenty-five years he has been closely connected with the Fascist Juan March, Perhaps the most valuable collaborator Wilhelm von Faupel has in Spain. March is also a close friend of Georg von Schnitzler, with whom he is associated in many business enterprises and cartels. I. G. Farben owns shares in many of Juan March's companies, and the prominent Madrid lawyer Thomas Peire is working for Juan March as well as for I. G. Farben. Count Ralph Jordana, the twenty-five-year-old son of the Foreign Minister, is employed in his office.

Still another man now playing the role of an anti-Franco man is one of his former closest friends, the enormously rich José Antonio Sandroniz, who was given the post of Spanish Ambassador to Venezuela as a reward for his aid to Franco throughout the civil war. Suddenly he resigned his post and went back to Europe. He settled in Switzerland, taking quarters close to those of Spanish monarchist circles. Supposedly informed persons in London and Washington whisper that Sandroniz broke with Franco because he could not stand the Nazis.

But Franco did not seem to mind. And a few months later Sandroniz went back to work for the Spanish dictator as an envoy with General de Gaulle in Algiers, where he has ample opportunity to tell the world that the Nazis must be driven out of Spain and that this can be done only by restoring the monarchy.

Faupel has gone so far as to form a cabinet to take over after the monarchist coup. José Maria Gil Robles, a so-called enemy of Franco, will be Prime Minister; General Orgaz, Minister of War; General Juan Beigbeder, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In order to carry through his complicated and exciting Spanish game, General von Faupel needed an apparatus. This apparatus was the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin. The general became its head early in 1934. Up to then the institute had been run on a purely scholarly basis as a cultural clearinghouse between Germany and Latin America, Now it was revamped. Five sections were created, covering every one of the South and Central American states. In each of these countries the institute installed several bureaus. On the surface these bureaus were interested only in matters of culture and education. Their real purpose, however, was to use the great influence of Spanish circles, particularly the aristocracy, to further German interests everywhere in Latin America. Thus it was only logical that the institute, which originally had no connection whatsoever with Spain, came to work more and more closely with the Spanish Fascists. And through this collaboration the institute became, almost automatically, the logical organization where contacts could be established and kept alive, not only with Spanish industrialists, leading bankers, and army officers, but also with important personalities in other countries who were not primarily interested in or connected with South America.

What this institute and its employees all over the world accomplished in the thirties was originally intended to be the task of the Internationale Gesellschaft fuer Raumforschung (International Society for Space Research), an instrument of Professor Haushofer and his pupils. But after Haushofer acquired such unwelcome notoriety the plan was discarded, and the Internationale Gesellschaft fuer Raumforschung confined itself to proposing and discussing geopolitical programs and publishing essays which nobody, with the possible exception of Professor Haushofer, could understand.

The Ibero-American Institute continued to do the task for which

it had been founded, namely, to bring about better cultural relations between Germany and the South American states. But behind this harmless front a lot of things went on of which the founders of the institute never dreamed.

There is a strong possibility that later, once the Nazis have gone underground, a great many things will continue to go on behind the front of the Ibero-American Institute. Again the men who run it will not even suspect what is actually going on. For, naturally, General von Faupel will be out and so will his intimate collaborators. But many of them will stay behind: minor, apparently harmless employees, sitting in dusty rooms working on elaborate reports that deal with the most involved cultural problems.

But they are not so harmless, and they will continue what they have been doing for the last few years. Thus the institute will be within the framework of the coming underground, what it has been within the setup of the Nazi regime. It will not only establish and keep contact between German Nazis and their helpers in Spain and South America, it will establish and hold on to that contact all over the world. It will constitute an enormous net of contacts, a net covering the entire globe—something like the A.O., only on a higher and more selective level.

The A.O. will be there to keep the masses in line. The Ibero-American Institute will be there to keep contact with foreign leaders and subleaders, chosen from prominent personalities all over the world. The A.O. will be an instrument of the underground party abroad. The Ibero-American Institute will be an instrument co-ordinating the work abroad of a selected group of agents who outwardly no longer have any connection with the party, but who will in reality work for the Nazis. The A.O. will be the first front in the battle to come, the Ibero-American Institute the second front.

In order to operate under water to best advantage, a submarine must make use of its periscope. There is no sense in its remaining submerged, poised for attack, if its captain has no chance to find out what is happening above water. He can act successfully only if he has information on when and where to act.

The same is true of underground movements. An underground movement, too, needs information. An underground movement.

too, must put out its periscope. Only it must have more than one. The periscopes of an underground movement are the contact men. These men must not appear to have any connection, let alone sympathy, with the movement. This would not only endanger them but render them useless. It is, therefore, to their interest as well as to the interest of the movement that they have an alibi. They should be "ousted" as Thyssen was in 1939. Or they should be "thoroughly disgusted and fed up," as Herr von Schnitzler was in 1943. Or they should be "through with Hitler," as Dr. Schacht pretended to be, also in 1943.

Industrialists and bankers with international connections are ideally suited to become such "periscopes." So are diplomats and former diplomats, because they also have vast international connections. Of course a man like Count von Luxburg may have identified himself too closely with the Nazi regime or with the Nazi underground in Argentina to be of much use for the time after the war. But there are others.

There is, for instance, Richard von Kuehlmann.

Sometime in 1942 Richard von Kuehlmann, a retired German Foreign Office man, wrote an article which appeared in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung called "The Diplomacy of the Nations." It was a historical essay which could not possibly have hurt the Nazi cause. Hence everyone was completely amazed when the Propaganda Ministry stepped in and suppressed the issue of the newspaper in which that article appeared. And, again to the general astonishment, Herr von Kuehlmann seemed to take the incident very seriously. He packed up and removed himself to Stockholm, from which vantage point of safety he announced that he had fled on the advice of his good friend Hjalmar Schacht. He also seemed disturbed about the Nazi regime in general and the horrible things which had been happening in Germany and all over Europe. It surely must have seemed strange to those who listened that he had begun to have such misgivings only after almost ten years of the Nazi regime. It must have sounded like Thyssen in 1939 all over again. But he stuck to his tune.

Let us look a bit more closely at this friend of Dr. Schacht's. Some thirty years ago Richard von Kuehlmann was very much in the international limelight. He was then first counselor of the German Embassy in London, where he prepared a German-English

treaty which might have settled many questions, or at least eased many difficulties.

But things moved too fast for Kuehlmann. Before the treaty was signed an Austrian archduke was shot at Sarajevo and World War I began. During the war Kuehlmann was Ambassador to Turkey, and in 1917 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. As such he fought against Ludendorff and the Pan-Germanistic clique. He was working in the direction of a negotiated peace. He even hoped to convince the Kaiser—behind Ludendorff's back, of course—that the Germans would have to give up occupied Belgium—an almost revolutionary point of view for any member of the imperial government. When he made a speech before the Reichstag in which he said that arms could not win the war for Germany, Ludendorff demanded and obtained his immediate dismissal.

However, Kuehlmann was not so opposed to Pan-Germanistic ideas as his speech may indicate. After all, he concluded the peace of Brest Litovsk with the Bolsheviks whereby he annexed a large part of Russia. And if he had been a really progressive or liberal man, he would have had a chance to work for the newly created republic. He was still young. Instead, he retired to his estates, where he administered the large industrial holdings of his children, served on the board of directors of several industrial firms, wrote a few books on diplomacy and one bad novel. When Hitler came to power, he did not budge. He did not leave the country. He never spoke against the Nazis in any way. Did he consider that his career was finished? Or was he waiting? And if so, waiting for what?

Then in 1942 came his break with the Nazis and his flight to Sweden.

One possible explanation for his exile is, of course, that he does not want to be mixed up in the final general catastrophe. But why, then, did he wait until the Nazis banned one of his articles before making his escape? Would it not have been more logical to get away before he had attracted attention? On the other hand, why did the Propaganda Ministry suppress a perfectly innocent historical essay? There seems to be only one explanation: the Nazis wanted to furnish Richard von Kuehlmann with an alibi.

As to Schacht: He may actually have saved Kuehlmann, as the latter claimed he did—indeed he had in the past occasionally saved other people who were in danger of being arrested. But then,

again, Schacht might have arranged the whole business—and for a very good reason: it would render Kuehlmann acceptable to the Allies; to such an extent that he might even become eligible for a post in the postwar German government. After all, Kuehlmann can remind the Allies of his pre-Hitler record. He can claim that he never collaborated with the Nazis—that, in fact, the Nazis objected to him. Will he not have the evidence of his forced "flight" from Germany to prove it?

The evidence, though, is not clear any more because Richard von Kuehlmann suddenly returned to Germany again. That was in December 1943. What had happened? Something must have gone wrong. A ridiculously small thing happened—or rather failed to happen—and all the calculations were upset. Richard von Kuehlmann had been left without money in Stockholm. The Reichsbank, no longer under the leadership of his friend Schacht, had stopped sending him his monthly "allowance." Probably some minor clerk made a mistake. In any case, Richard von Kuehlmann, who had fled the Nazi terror, but who was not willing to move out of his apartment in the Grand Hotel in Stockholm and face the terror of a furnished room, decided that enough was enough. But apparently matters were ironed out somehow because by spring 1944 he was back again in Stockholm.

As to promoting Richard von Kuehlmann: he would make a perfect front. This man, who has been finished for a long time as far as politics are concerned, who is completely burned out, will be nothing but a puppet dancing to the tune of his master, Hjalmar Schacht. But Kuehlmann would make a puppet with good connections, with much international good will to his credit—in short, he would be very useful.

There are countless other men in the German diplomatic service now or men retired from the diplomatic corps, who would fit into such a role just as well as Kuehlmann. There is, for instance, the paunchy and bespectacled Dr. Hans Luther, once Prime Minister under the German Republic, later president of the Reichsbank, from which job he was kicked out by Hitler in order to make room for Dr. Schacht. Luther was then sent as Ambassador to Washington, but was soon replaced. The general consensus then was that Luther had not been active enough in the Nazi cause. This "objection" to him on the part of the Nazis is something he

will be able to use as a point in his favor after the German defeat. He will also be able to remind the Allies of the fact that ever since he was recalled from Washington he has been in retirement—apparently too disgusted with the Nazis to work for them any longer.

But was Luther really so disgusted, or is this only a blind? And have the Nazis been keeping him in reserve for a moment when they would have to put to the fore a man who appears to be through with them, but on whom they can depend to serve them as an international contact, as they did when they dispatched him to Washington?

Another minor diplomat who may be used in the same way as Luther is Herr von Scherbenberg, son-in-law of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, currently employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an economic adviser. This young man who, under the republic, had been a member of the Social Democratic party, had never been in favor with the Nazis. Still, Schacht's influence was strong enough to keep him in the Foreign Ministry and away from the concentration camps where other Socialists were taken. Schacht's influence was even sufficient to keep him in his job after Schacht himself had "fallen in disgrace." Not only that, but Scherbenberg was even sent on a special mission to Stockholm. On his return he was suddenly arrested—the reason given was that he had talked too much; that, among other things, he had spoken openly against the Nazis.

Well, if he can keep up his alibi, Hjalmar Schacht may have in him still another trump card for the future.

Such front men as Kuehlmann, Luther, and Scherbenberg may not always know what goes on behind their backs. They may not know that they are puppets in a game far too big for their limited conception. They may not know that without them, without such fronts, the Nazi agents would have a very difficult time indeed getting themselves established so that they can start their work abroad.

They may be innocent, difficult though that is to believe. But once the whole scheme begins to work they may awaken to the realization that they have been working for the benefit of the Nazi underground. Then they may also discover that they are involved in something from which there is no escape. They may find that they are no longer their own masters. And they may, willingly or unwillingly, join the group of those men who consciously work for the comeback of the Nazis. Thus the front men may become contact men.

Take, for instance, the case of Dr. Wilhelm von Schoen, former German Ambassador to Chile, for many years a leading figure in the South American intrigues of the Nazis. He was one of those who collaborated closely with Dr. Kurt Heinrich Rieth, one of the most effective German agents, who arrived in South America in March 1941, later going to the United States, where he was finally arrested. In the same year Schoen was found to be conspiring with Fascist leaders in Chile with the goal of overthrowing the government. Compromising documents and even extensive caches of arms were found in houses of prominent German citizens. Some of the Chilean newspapers bluntly demanded that the German Ambassador be made to leave.

However, he stayed on until Chile broke off its relations with Germany in 1943. And then he did a very strange thing: he demanded asylum in Chile for himself and several of his collaborators, saying that he did not want to return to Germany—the implication, of course, being that he was strongly opposed to the regime there, and that he would have to face the consequences of that opposition if and when he went back. However, when Schoen was told by the Chilean Government that he could not stay there, but might instead have himself interned for the duration in the United States, he thought it over and decided to go back to Germany after all. And then, shortly after his return to Germany, he left the Fatherland again, this time to settle in Switzerland.

It is obvious that the reasons Schoen gave for wanting to stay in Chile were false. If he was opposed to Nazism, if he was afraid to face German authorities, he certainly had twice the reason to be afraid of them after he had made his demand to the Chilean Government—a step which was discussed in the entire world press. Surely, if this demand had not been made in connivance with the German government he would have had to face the most serious consequences upon his return. Since he actually did return, and apparently suffered no ill consequences, there is every reason to believe that the Nazis were in on the whole matter from the start.

However, some of Schoen's collaborators did not go back to Germany. Those who decided to stay in Chile will bear watching,

especially after the war is over. They may be ideal contact men for the coming underground.

Front man or contact man, both have the same function within the scheme of the underground. They both have to camouflage the movement and arrange for contacts with influential men or organizations. Some of them may not know what they are doing. Some of them may accomplish their purpose by just being there, without doing anything. Some of them may be used constantly, others may be called upon only for special assignments.

All of them will help to keep the Nazi movement alive and to prepare for its comeback.

Next to the diplomats and industrialists it is the women, or rather certain women, who may play an important part as fronts or contacts—or, occasionally, even as intelligence officers of the underground. In most cases it will be women closely connected with diplomats or industrialists, or, even better, women connected with both. Such a woman is Lilo Scholz, born Lilo von Schnitzler, the daughter of Georg von Schnitzler, and wife of a former Secretary to the German Ambassador in Washington, D.C.

It might be more just to say that she is the daughter of Lilly von Schnitzler for, indeed, she is the daughter of her mother. And it might, therefore, be a good thing, before we talk about her, to have a look at this remarkable mother.

When Lilly became engaged to the young Herr von Schnitzler more than thirty years ago, her father is said to have remarked, "Lilly could have done better than this man; he will never get very far."

Schnitzler's father-in-law had a valid reason for such a remark even though he did not prove to be a very good prophet. For Georg von Schnitzler was a quiet and unassuming man who never aspired to a big position. It did look as if Lilly might indeed have done better. But any man she married would have made a big career. Lilly was the sort of woman to see to that. The career of her husband has been more her work than his.

Lilly von Schnitzler, who must now be about sixty, was extremely beautiful as a young woman—a tall, almost fragile blonde with strange dark eyes which, according to those who know her, were like bottomless pools of inky blue. In spite of her moderate circumstances, she always managed to dress well, owing to a knack she possessed for copying the Paris creations of her more fortunate friends.

The Schnitzlers lived first in Frankfurt, later in Munich, and finally in Berlin. They had many friends, most of them Jews or half Jews. The Schnitzlers were by no means anti-Semites. Indeed, at that time such an attitude would scarcely have been advantageous for a business career. (In all fairness it should be added, however, that Lilly von Schnitzler, at least up to 1938, occasionally went out of her way to be kind to her former Jewish friends.)

Lilly knew how to approach the right people at the right moment, and she constantly pushed her less-ambitious husband ahead. Occasionally, it must be admitted, she also interested herself in the careers of other men—that is, when she became interested in the men themselves. Such was the case with the young Austrian Prince Anton Rohan, who edited a European review. Lilly decided to manage him. It was her influence which caused several prominent French politicians, among them Aristide Briand, to become active in Rohan's behalf.

There were two Schnitzler daughters. Lilo looked very much like her mother. She, too, was tall and blonde and fragile, but her beautiful blue eyes were much harder than Lilly's. And according to an intimate friend of her mother, "Lilo lacked the fluid gracefulness with which her mother moved in a salon." Somehow she was more robust. She had boundless vitality and she soon became very direct in her methods. Perhaps, as the source quoted above suggests, she wanted to "out-Lilly" Lilly. In any case Lilo was not very discreet. She had different affairs at the tender ages of seventeen and eighteen. As far as can be judged from the outside there was never any deep love involved. Lilo's affairs were invariably with prominent men who might be useful to her someday. She was generous, even occasionally using her charms for the benefit of the Fatherland. Such was the case shortly before Hitler came to power, when she visited Premier Tanner in Finland and aided the German diplomatic corps in its work considerably.

Lilly von Schnitzler was not exactly happy when, shortly after Hitler's rise to power, Lilo became an almost steady guest at the chancellery. At that time Hitler was not yet entirely accepted by Berlin society. Still, Lilly was philosophical about it. It was perhaps just as well to be on the inside—one never could tell.

Lilo's presence in Hitler's house was due mainly to the fact that a certain Herbert Scholz was in love with her. And Scholz, in turn, was close to SA chief Ernst Roehm. In 1934, when Lilo declared that she was going to marry Scholz, the announcement created considerable surprise in Berlin society. Perhaps Lilly, too, was surprised because Herr Scholz was, after all, a "nobody." But she covered up for her daughter. She said: "What can one do? It is the great love, you know."

Then came the blood purge which ended Roehm's career so abruptly. Many of his friends and followers were liquidated. Scholz left Berlin in a hurry, hiding out in Bavaria in the vicinity of Chiemsee. When he finally turned up again it was mainly due to Schnitzler's influence that nothing happened to him. And it was Schnitzler who finally arranged for his son-in-law to enter the foreign service.

A year later Herbert Scholz turned up in Washington as First Secretary to the Ambassador, armed with special instructions from Heinrich Himmler. During his stay in America he was one of the key Gestapo men in this country, at one time perhaps *the* key man. But then people knew nothing about that part of his business.

Washington society was delighted with the young Scholzes. Certainly Herbert Scholz was good-looking, pleasant to talk to, and, except for his distressing habit of wearing his SS uniform on festive occasions, he seemed quite all right. He played a good game of tennis and of golf, he was an efficient cocktail mixer. But it was Lilo who really turned the trick. The beautiful young woman simply brought Washington to its knees. She became enormously popular; she was invited everywhere. Even President Roosevelt was delighted with her when she was introduced to him at a White House reception.

There was more to Lilo's popularity than met the eye. She was not only a charming woman who knew how to entertain well, and whom it was pleasant to have at parties. Maybe most of the Washington crowd thought that was all, and the chances are most of them still think so. But it was not all, by any manner of means. Lilo's marriage to Herr Scholz had not changed her basic strategy of influencing people or of getting information. Since her adven-

tures in Finland she had only become that much more experienced and thus that much more entertaining. . . .

Later, after Scholz had been transferred to Boston as Consul General and his connections with the Gestapo began to be mentioned in the press, things became less pleasant for Lilo, and on her occasional visits to Washington she found that she was no longer the favorite she had formerly been.

After all, during those last months before President Roosevelt closed the German consulates and the Scholzes had to go back to Germany it was next to impossible for Washington society to receive Nazis. Washington had already decided to be pro-British.

Still, once the war is over things may be different, quite different. Lilo Scholz and others of her type will always get by, in one way or another. Of course, in order to become persona grata again in social and diplomatic circles she may have to part with Herr Scholz. But that may not be too great a sacrifice. At the present writing it is said that the Scholzes are no longer on friendly terms. The great love is finished. Swedish friends of the Schnitzlers have been heard to remark that the husband has, after all, been a great disappointment to Lilo. So are all the Nazis, probably.

Assuming that Lilo Scholz will take up after the war where she left off in 1941—and we may assume precisely that—where would that leave the Nazis? In a rather interesting spot, actually. Lilo may not be very much worried about the future fate of the party. She is probably interested only in what becomes of herself. And this is where the Nazis come in. Because they know enough about Lilo Scholz and have enough compromising information about her in their hands to make life in the grand world of diplomacy or society rather difficult for her.

Of course none of these files may ever become known to the outside. They may all be kept a secret between the Nazis and beautiful Lilo, which will enable the Nazis to ask little services from Lilo; and the chances are that she will satisfy them. She will have to satisfy them—or else.

There is a great deal that a woman like Lilo Scholz can do for the Nazis. She can inform them as to the general setup in international diplomacy, not the official setup, of course, but about what is going on behind the scenes. She can promote a new man whom the Nazis may want to send somewhere. She can create good will toward such a man or toward a specific issue. And Lilo may do much more. She may be used to find out things about public figures in other countries, or about specific plans of other countries. In short, she could become what is generally known as an espionage agent.

Lilo Scholz may thus become one of the most efficient agents of the Nazi underground during the years to come. But she is only one case out of many. For the last five years or so there have been frequent instances of marriages between members of old and accepted families and the new "aristocracy" of the party. Such unions may prove "useful" later. Marriages between representatives of old and good names and those which are too new in power to inspire much confidence are not a device invented by the Nazis. This sort of thing has happened in every century and all over the world. In former times, however, this device was used only occasionally. The Nazis have put these political marriages on the basis of mass production, so to speak. They have thus been able to assure comparative security to a great number of their leading male and female members in the event that the party should no longer be able to protect them.

Take, for instance, the case of beautiful young Aglaja, daughter of Hermann Neubacher, of Vienna, who, before the Anschluss, spent a long time in a concentration camp on account of his Nazi activities and was later, for some time, mayor of Vienna. This young daughter of his married Herr von Chapeau Rouge, a minor official in the Foreign Office, a young man from a good old family. He was supposed to be rather anti-Nazi and definitely not a member of the party. The marriage which took place in Bucharest became an important society affair, and Goering and all the other Nazi big shots sent presents. Immediately afterward Herr Neubacher's son-in-law began to be promoted. Chapeau Rouge is now with von Papen in Ankara.

As a man who has never been pro-Nazi he will probably be able to continue in the Foreign Office after the war. He may even play an important part there. And his wife will be in a very useful position, as far as the party is concerned. Of course she may no long be the determined Nazi she once was when as a comparating youngster she went with her father to the concentration camp. A

then again she may not have changed her views at all, no matter what she says. On the other hand, she may really have changed her views, but may be forced to do some things and to find out about certain matters because, after all, the party has many a hold on her.

Lilo Scholz, Aglaja von Chapeau Rouge, and perhaps another dozen or two young ladies scattered over the international scene may easily do the trick. In some cases the ladies in question may have to perform services for the Nazis because the secret files contain material which they would not want to be made known. In the case of some of them, their relationship to the Nazi party may easily be deduced from their past. In most instances, however, no relationship will be apparent, and the woman involved will violently disclaim any sympathy for the Nazi cause.

These latter will be the most dangerous cases.

The Gestapo possesses much information about certain personalities which should make it downright impossible for them to try to break with the Nazis. They are involved for the rest of their lives. The secret files constitute a sword of Damocles forever hanging over their heads.

Nor is much imagination required to guess the identity of the people those files deal with. Not only do they include the names of most of the German industrialists, but also some of the prominent English, French, and American businessmen who have so ardently tried to perpetuate the Hitler system. Also certain politicians of the Allied nations. As to the type of information contained in the files: one can find anything there—the report of a confidential meeting where everything discussed was off the record; a story of certain deals never meant to be known to the outside world; private scandals that were hushed up with the greatest difficulty; a black spot in the life of a married woman; sex habits and inclinations of various individuals, et cetera.

These files are voluminous. Many of them will be preserved, in order to provide information for the underground workers, if and when there should be any need to make contact with personalities outside the movement proper. Some of these files have been stored in bomb-proof cellars—this transfer has not been carried through to any great extent yet, because Professor Speer and his engineers have been too busy building underground munition works which,

of course, enjoy a priority—or they have been shipped abroad. Up to the beginning of 1944 there was no difficulty in getting copies of the files out of Germany. They were sent by diplomatic mail or in diplomatic moving vans to Madrid, Lisbon, Berne, and Stockholm. They were stored, not in the embassies, but in warehouses belonging to nationals of the country to which they were sent, where in all probability they will never be looked for. Some of the most important files were translated into code. These coded dossiers will not leave Germany but will be hidden away in some safe place. They contain mainly the names of Germans who have officially never played a part in the Nazi party, but who have, nevertheless, collaborated with Hitler, and who would be compromised forever if the contents of the files became known to the outside world.

The Nazis will have no difficulty in finding men who will be able to handle this gigantic blackmail in the future. Perhaps their best card, particularly when it comes to playing this game of blackmail on an international scale, is Franz von Papen, Nazi Ambassador to Turkey. This feared and unscrupulous diplomat belongs among those who, though not 100-per-cent Nazi, did a great deal to bring Hitler into power and to keep him there. It was Papen who arranged the first treaty Hitler ever signed—the Concordat with the Pope in 1933. It was he who prepared the rape of Austria in 1938. And since 1939, as Ambassador to Turkey, he has been busily engaged in trying to keep Turkey from joining the Allies. In all his deals and intrigues he has shown himself not only as a shrewd diplomat, but as a ruthless and completely cynical blackmailer whenever the occasion presented itself. But that is by no means all he has done. During the five years of his stay in Ankara he has built an enormous espionage and propaganda net covering the whole Near East. Three times the British Intelligence working hand in glove with the Turkish police was able to smash his organization, three times he built it up again. Some of his best agents were arrested, others simply disappeared. But he continued. One wall of his study is covered with an enormous map of the territory that stretches from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean. In this study he planned the revolution in Iraq and the revolution in Syria and the revolts in Egypt; here it was that he tried to get the Arabs to take up arms against the English. His plans failed, not

because they were bad, but because the British Intelligence was even cleverer than he. But his machine is still working.

According to German newspapers, Papen's relations with Adolf Hitler have not been of the best since the end of 1942. At various times there have been hints that he was on the point of being ousted.

In the summer of 1943 he made two decisions. One was to invite his daughter and his son to the embassy in Ankara for a short vacation. The "short vacation" has turned out to be a rather lengthy one, as it happens, for his son and daughter have stayed there ever since. The second decision was to do something about his mining interests in the Saar region. He arranged for the formation of a Swiss holding company to take over these interests. And Schacht saw to it that this business was properly carried out.

The implication in these two moves was, of course, that Papen no longer felt safe and feared the Nazis might take reprisals against his family or that they might take over his possessions if he refused to come back. Another logical conclusion seems to be that Herr von Papen, no longer believing in a German victory, wanted his family to be outside the danger zone, and wanted his property to be as far as possible outside the reach of the Allies.

In any case, during the summer of 1943 Papen began to tell people on whose indiscretion he could depend that the Nazis were doomed. He did not seem too sad about this, and it looked to those who talked to him as though in his mind there were only two alternatives: the doom of the Nazis or the doom of Herr von Papen.

Where does that leave Papen? It makes it possible for him to point out after the fall of Hitler that he has been anti-Hitler for some time, so much so that he feared for the safety of his family. Such a declaration would, he reasons, make him acceptable to the Allies. Papen is so convinced that this will happen that he has already made his plans for the future German government. He has suggested names of outstanding Catholic dignitaries who might play a decisive role in postwar Germany. This sounds logical enough, since he himself is a Catholic. But those who know him are aware that Papen is at odds with the Catholic dignitaries suggested by him, who fought Nazism in Germany during a period when Papen was doing everything to aid it. But then Papen's plan does not include himself as a member of the government. All he

wants is to retain a certain amount of influence and a certain standing which will enable him to keep his finger in many pies, and will thus enable the Nazi underground to keep its fingers in the same pies. For no matter what we may hear about von Papen's quarrels with the Nazis he will go on working for them. And he will not be just another "periscope" or front, or not even a contact man. His will be one of the key positions. The machine which he has built up so carefully will go on working, the only difference being that instead of working for the Nazi state it will work for the Nazi underground. While Papen himself may play the part of the nice old conservative who is happy to be done with the Nazis which would make it easy for him to take up with his friends in other countries again—the men under him will continue to conspire in the Near East and engage in espionage and sabotage. They will create disturbances, possibly a crisis for the British Empire. It may very well be that Papen's Ankara machine will be the headquarters from which the entire future strategy against the British Empire will be mapped out and from which it will be directed. We may hear of incidents or revolutions in India or of anti-British riots in China-and these things and countless others will have happened because somebody in Ankara pushed a button. But even then it will be difficult to prove that it was Herr von Papen who pushed that button.

In January 1944 the assistant to the German military attaché in Ankara, Dr. Erich von Vermehren, suddenly left his office and went to the British Embassy with material which proved to be extremely useful to the Allied war effort. It so happened that this man had been working for the British Secret Service for more than a year before. In brief, there is not the slightest doubt that he is a bona fide worker on our side. Such desertions may happen as the war draws toward an end, but they may not always, as in this case, be bona fide desertions. Sometimes they may be staged.

Perhaps some staged flights have already taken place. Ankara is just now a place to which a lot of "fugitives" are repairing. Toward the end of 1943 there arrived in that city a certain Dr. Kurt Rey, formerly of the editorial staff of the Frankfurter Zeitung, who for more than ten years had written and edited along Nazi lines. Now he had suddenly become disgusted with the Nazis and "escaped."

The former editor in chief of the same paper, Rudolf Kircher, has also taken residence in Turkey, where he had been vacationing. He was supposed to go back to Berlin in December 1943, but changed his mind. It was by no means a coincidence that two of the most prominent newspapermen in Nazi Germany happened to have chosen Ankara as a place of "refuge."

There have been many foreign correspondents among the intelligence officers of the Third Reich and some of them were very successful. Dr. Goebbels felt, and rightly so, that a trained newspaperman has many opportunities which an average citizen does not possess. The coming underground, too, will need an intelligence service. Of course it will not be able to use the known Nazi journalists, especially those who have been revealed as intelligence officers, as, for instance, the Ankara correspondent of the *Deutsches Nachrichtenbureau*, Dr. Walther Brell.

On the other hand, newspapermen who have gone on record as having broken off with Hitler, such as Count Anton von Knyphausen of the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* and Edward Schaper of the *Berliner Boersenzeitung*, both of whom are stationed in Helsinki, will certainly create no undue suspicion.

It is much too early to say for sure where the center of the intelligence service of the underground will be located. Probably the Nazis themselves don't know that yet. It may be in Ankara, or perhaps in Lisbon, or it may be somewhere in Switzerland. The identity of the man who will be in charge of the intelligence service, however, is pretty well established. It is Emil Rasche, a tall, handsome man, who until the summer of 1943 was First Secretary of the foreign section of the Press Department in the Foreign Office. Even then Rasche was an employee of the Gestapo. It is not known where he is working at present, though it may be assumed that, wherever he is, he works hand in glove with 11 Koenigsallee. But it is known that he is in control of certain intelligence units in Lisbon, Zurich, and Stockholm, which operate behind the front of bookshops and magazine-selling enterprises. These outfits are working today for the Third Reich, but there is every indication that they will continue their work later on for the underground.

For the coming underground will need to gather a great variety of intelligence. It will need to know exactly what the powers that it

must consider as enemies are doing or intend to do. It cannot afford to be in the dark. In fact, later on there will be a number of intelligence services covering different countries and working for different departments of the underground, for the government as such or for the party, for the A.O. or for the Ibero-American Institute.

Espionage is not an art practiced for art's sake. It is the gathering of information in preparation for war. The coming Nazi underground will have to organize a world-wide net of espionage, or rather a whole series of espionage systems, because the Nazi underground means war. In the last analysis the coming Nazi underground is war in itself—or, to change a phrase of Clausewitz—the continuation of war with different means.

11

Germany Occupied

THE COMING NAZI UNDERGROUND is war itself. If we want to get a clear picture of how this war will be waged, it is necessary to differentiate between short-range tactics and long-range strategy.

The strategy of the comeback which may be put into effect ten or fifteen years hence depends largely on what the world will be like ten or fifteen years hence. As for the short-range tactics, they, too, will depend on what happens. But since the choice of what may take place inside Germany during the last stage of the war and immediately afterward is limited, the choice of tactics the underground can employ is limited too.

The worst thing which could possibly happen to the Nazi underground is a decisive Russian victory, with the Russians alone occupying part or perhaps the whole of Germany. The Bolsheviks know from their own experience that it does not pay to be forgiving. So they will be ruthless. They will shoot one hundred people in order to be sure of liquidating ten dangerous ones. They will

shut down any number of plants, organizations, or offices which might serve as hideouts for Nazis. They may shut down hospitals if need be. They don't mind confusion and disorder. If they think that they will deal Nazism a deathblow by closing power stations, large German cities will go without light. In brief, if the Russians take over in Germany, many of the ruses planned by the Nazi underground will have been in vain.

The same thing will happen if the armies of the now-occupied countries should go into Germany. The Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the French won't be easily deceived. They know plenty about underground methods. Neither the Americans nor the British will be so dangerous to the Nazis as the Russians and the now-enslaved peoples. We know little of the technique of underground work. We will try to be fair, we will see to it that the war criminals get a chance to defend themselves, we will be considerate—and will lose time thereby. As to shutting off the waterworks or closing the hospitals—no, that would never do.

It is not only of decisive importance to the Nazi underground who occupies Germany after the war; how the war itself ends is equally important. If the country has to be conquered foot by foot; if many cities, towns, and villages are laid in ruins before the German Army surrenders, the psychological situation will be far more favorable for the Nazi underground than if Germany gives up before the invasion. The average German will hate the invading enemy in proportion to the amount of harm the latter inflicts. On the other hand, to have meted out to them even a small proportion of the cruel punishment that they themselves have visited constantly on other defenseless countries might arouse a certain amount of fear and respect for the Allies in the minds of many Germans. So much so that they may not feel prepared to aid a movement which will lead the country into another war.

There is also the possibility that even though the greater part of the army will give up before the actual invasion, certain units may fight on. There may be free German movements inside Germany, nationalistic guerrillas and partisans. Some cities may be defended in the manner of Stalingrad, especially in places where the majority of the population has reason to believe that it is less likely to be killed by the enemy than shot in the back by the Gestapo.

Some groups of partisans may try to fight on in the mountains

and in the woods—though aside from the Bavarian Alps there are no mountains to speak of in Germany and men defending themselves there would not be able to hold out for long against heavy artillery.

The advantage of such holdouts, however, will be that confusion will reign, and during this period of confusion some men can disappear. They may go underground, in the literal sense of the word. That is, they could lead an illegal existence for years to come. That this can be done has been proved in recent years not only inside the occupied countries, but also in Germany proper, whence dependable reports have come to us about Germans, particularly Jews, who, while fighting the Hitler regime, have for years led such underground existences. By demolishing city halls and other administrative buildings where birth records are kept the Nazis could make it relatively easy for a considerable number of people to go underground.

Then, too, many of these last-ditch fighters may escape across the frontiers into a neutral country. Switzerland, for instance, is ideally situated for such a purpose. It is easy to get into Switzerland by way of the Bavarian and Austrian Alps. Of course such escapes would be organized down to the last detail. Once over the frontier, the fugitives might be disarmed and perhaps put into internment camps. But Switzerland would hardly extradite them. And in due time they could make their way to other countries—to join others who will want to continue the fight for Hitlerism.

With enough active fighters outside Germany proper, the Nazi underground may revive an experiment which the army attempted after the defeat of 1918: the so-called *Baltikum* adventure.

This project was planned by the German military leaders in 1917, when they began to consider the possibility of eventual defeat. Their plan then was to leave units of German soldiers in once occupied and conquered territories instead of taking them back to Germany. Such a procedure was feasible because in certain territories—Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, for example—sympathizers with the German cause were at the top; these men were supposed to naturalize the German soldiers who stayed there; and thus a certain part of the German Army could have continued its existence outside of Germany proper.

The Baltikum adventure (so named from the fact that its centers of activity were in the Baltic States) came to naught partly because the French Prime Minister Clemenceau saw through the ruse and demanded that the generals call their men back, but also because actually there was no need for the generals to go to so much trouble. They found that they could nurse their armies under the very eyes of the republic itself.

A repetition of the Baltikum adventure, on a larger European scale, perhaps, would by no means depend solely on the last-ditch fighters who make their escape during the final confusion. It will depend—as in 1919—on soldiers who while their armies are retreating to Germany decide to stay in these countries and hide out. Or on the Germans who have already settled in these countries during the war. Indeed, a great many Germans have settled in the Baltic States and, according to reports, have been welcomed there. After the war they may be citizens of these states, in which case it will be difficult to get them to leave. Also a great number of Germans have gone to the Balkans. In February 1944 a report from Switzerland said that 700,000 bombed-out Germans would be settled in Hungary. How many of them will go back to Germany?

And, finally, how many of the soldiers whom Hitler poured into Hungary and the Balkans in March 1944 will return? How many of them have been sent there for the specific purpose of not returning?

As far as the Baltic states of Lithuania, Esthonia, and particularly Finland are concerned, it is evident that the political setup in those countries at present is one which will aid the Nazis. If Russia has her way, however, these governments will disappear and no Nazi sympathizer will have control of things to come. If, on the other hand, we Americans have our way, the independence of "little democratic Finland," for instance, will be guaranteed. And if this happens Baron von Mannerheim, the man who helped the German generals with their Baltikum adventure in 1919 to 1921 and who has proved a dependable friend of the Nazis up to now, will stay in power. And there is no doubt but that Mannerheim would work hand in glove with the Nazi underground movement.

Spain, too, might become a hideout for last-ditch fighters—possibly the ideal one. Here is where the Falange comes in, if it then still exists. There is nothing to prevent Nazi guerrilla fighters from

getting themselves Spanish passports and joining the ranks of the Falange. Or they may join the Spanish Army, as members of the Blue Division returning from the Russian front. It will be easy.

The ideal place for these Nazi partisans to escape to and to reassemble would be Argentina because of its enormous ranches, many of which are owned by Nazi sympathizers or by German Nazis themselves. Argentina, however, may be difficult to get to during the last stages of the war and immediately afterward.

The Nazi guerrillas and partisans who hold out in Germany until the zero hour will have a great nuisance value. They will take up much of the Allies' time and energy, as long as they are still active. It will undoubtedly take months, perhaps the better part of a year, to dispose of them. And also certain organizations of the early twenties which featured political assassinations may spring up again in order to prevent those Germans who are eager to collaborate with the Allies from betraying the guerrillas.

But it is not the guerrillas or their aides who will make up the dangerous part of the Nazi underground. It is, rather, those who will not make trouble openly; those who will seem to co-operate with the AMG; those who, in order to demonstrate their good will, may quite conceivably betray the guerrillas and become stool pigeons for the AMG—in minor matters, of course.

This peaceful Nazi underground will have various ways and means of establishing an aura of confidence. Undoubtedly some of the "peaceful collaborators" will even support separatist movements or Allied plans to create such movements. Nothing would be more favorable for a Nazi underground than a split-up of the unified German administration into many state administrations. In the first place, such a solution would create fierce resentment among the Germans—and it is on this resentment that the Nazi underground must live and grow for years to come. But even more important than the resentment such a change would arouse is the fact that while it will be difficult for the Allies to survey and control a central administration of Germany, it would be next to impossible for them to watch a number of administrations. They would supply the Nazis with literally thousands of chances to place their people in unobtrusive key positions.

Among the "peaceful collaborators" the most prominent group

numerically will be formed by those who, to all outward appearances, were never Nazis at heart, but who had to go along with the party for reasons of bread and butter or because otherwise they might have been thrown into concentration camps. A great number of civil officials are in this category, as are also a great number of German officers (except for the topnotchers, of course). These men have a good reason for pretending to come over to our side: they don't want to lose the right to their pensions.

This again presents a parallel with 1918. After the last war the German Republic decided to pay pensions to all imperial officials and the officers of the army and the navy. In the minds of German Socialists and Democrats the officers had done their duty; they could not be blamed for the war, and that was that. It never occurred to them that they were thus feeding their worst enemies.

If Germany does not go Communist, there is an overwhelming likelihood that this time pensions will again be paid. Indeed, the Nazis are counting on it. It is undoubtedly because of these pensions that the officer corps of the German Army and the Navy have become so unbelievably large. There are today about 700 admirals in Germany, almost twice as many as there are in the United States Navy, although the German fleet hardly exists any longer. The amusing and revealing feature about this situation is that, while the German fleet has steadily grown smaller and smaller, the number of admirals has just as steadily grown larger and larger. As for the army, it may have between 4,000 and 5,000 marshals and generals. Including colonels, there will be about 20,000 commissioned German officers who will get pensions large enough for them to live on. With their incomes assured, the recipients will be able to devote their time and energies to something else. And to what better activity could they devote their time and energy, so they must think, than to make Germany once more a strong and feared nation? That is what the Nazis count on. It is why the Nazis have promoted these officers—so that they can live without worrying about their daily bread and butter. The Nazi underground will take full advantage of them.

There must be no misunderstanding: not all of these officers are Nazis. Indeed, many are not. Most of them have not even any definite ideas, let alone definite plans, as to how to achieve Germany's comeback. They are just good Germans—or at least what

they believe to be good Germans. They think that Germany should be strong, should have a strong army and navy, and that all the features of the Hitler regime which, in the last analysis have brought about this war, should be retained.

While the United States Government, unlike Moscow, has not vet given the German officers in American prison camps a chance to speak their minds, we are nevertheless informed by some former German officers living at liberty in this country precisely what the German officers' corps thinks, and what kind of future its members would like for Germany. Take, for instance, Gottfried Treviranus, who with his fifty-six years and white hair is still a handsome and elegant man, and always looks a bit the officer in mufti. He was an officer in the last war, the successful commander of a German torpedo boat. After the war he went into politics, joining the rightist and conservative Deutschnationale party, which for almost ten years carried the main burden of the opposition against the Weimar Republic. Even as a politician Treviranus remained the German officer. In 1930 he joined the Bruening Cabinet. Rightist circles felt that he had gone to the left, but if he did so at all it was only a mild change. He fell with Bruening, but still retained excellent connections with rightists such as Baron von Gayl, Minister of the Interior under Franz von Papen. When Hitler took over he waited, in the firm conviction that the Nazis wouldn't last. He waited almost too long.

He was among those who were supposed to be purged on that now-famous—or, rather, infamous—June 30, 1934. Not having the slightest suspicion of what was in store for him, he was in the middle of a tennis match on his private court in the west end of Berlin when he saw Elite Guard men arriving in a car and entering his villa. He understood immediately what this meant, climbed over the fence of the tennis court, and ran away as he was, clad in white trousers, racket still in hand. For almost two weeks he remained hidden in Berlin. Then he made his way to London. In spite of this attempt on his life by the Nazis he never made a statement against them, nor did he join any party or movement with anti-Nazi aims. He kept quiet, and was officially out of politics, although he began to fraternize with certain English politicians who later were called members of the Cliveden set. Eventually he came to Canada and finally to America. Up till now he has kept out of the limelight, but

whenever he makes a statement, it is never very hard on the Nazis, but rather against anti-Nazis. About the beginning of 1944, for instance, he spoke over the radio against those refugees who had taken a stand in favor of punishing German war criminals. In the typical arrogant manner of a German officer he flatly accused them either of being Communists or of being moved by personal resentments and eager for personal revenge. Those who were against him, he stated, were "Communists" or "stooges of the late Comintern who partly changed their name though not their spots." Treviranus made it clear that he wished the English and Americans to occupy Germany for a long time so that law and order might be guaranteed there. It was evident that he was afraid leftists might disturb an otherwise idyllic state of affairs. He did not seem afraid that the Nazis, once thrown out of power, might also be a threat to law and order. In certain meetings with Wall Street representatives he suggested that Germany's heavy industries, including her war industries, be kept intact in order to prevent unemployment and economic instability, adding that these industries could perhaps help in the defeat of Japan.

Mr. Treviranus not only tried to exercise his influence in Wall Street, he was also active in Washington, though of course backstage. Still he has been in on numerous conferences with officials to discuss various plans for the future of Germany.

And Treviranus is not the only émigré who has sat in on such Washington conferences. Other personalities thus honored have not, as one might think, included those men who actively fought Hitler from the first, and who warned constantly against him and the rising danger of war. Not at all! They have included only persons who either have kept themselves completely neutral or who tried to collaborate with Hitler until they found it impossible, mainly because Hitler found it impossible to go on with them. The most prominent among them is Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl, nicknamed "Putzi," for fifteen years one of the closest of Hitler's friends, until for some yet undisclosed reason he decided to leave Germany. At the beginning of the war he was arrested in England and put in a Canadian internment camp. Evidently, the Canadian authorities were not quite certain that he had become a genuine anti-Nazi. American authorities, though, must have been convinced because they asked his release and invited him to Washington. For the last two years he has been living in a luxurious home outside the capital and acting as an expert adviser on German affairs. Dependable sources have it that Hanfstaengl is mainly busy in devising lists of German cabinets. He has already proposed more than twenty different German governments.

How about the German government after Hitler? It stands to reason that it will be of the utmost importance to the Nazi underground that no man or no group of men who are sincerely anxious to do away with the Nazis and who have sufficient energy to carry out their intentions shall take over. And as far as can be seen now, there is little danger that such men will be called upon to form a new German government. The lists that so far have been suggested to the State Department in Washington and to 10 Downing Street do not contain a single name whose bearer has been known as a militant anti-Fascist. (If the Russians, too, have pondered over such lists they have not made anything known. Therefore, their prospective candidates, if any, cannot be discussed here.)

Anglo-American lists seem to feature as the coming man in Germany one Dr. Erwin Bumke, president of the Reichsgericht (Supreme Court) of Germany, a man widely unknown inside as well as outside of Germany. He is sixty-four years old, and enjoyed a normal career under the Kaiser and under the republic. He had become President of the Reichsgericht before Hitler came to power and was not chased out of his job. A medium-sized, white-haired man of smooth behavior, he has always preferred to stay out of the limelight.

Those who have passionately aided his candidacy have pointed out that if we make him the successor to Hitler, we would automatically re-establish the constitution of the Weimar Republic, according to which the president of the Supreme Court is the automatic successor to the president of the Reich in case of the latter's demise.

But this, of course, is only one of the reasons why Bumke seems the logical man of the hour in Washington. His supporters tell us that he has never been mixed up with the Nazi movement as such; that he was not in any way party to the reform of German "justice" which took place under Hitler; that he presided over the court that exonerated the Bulgarian Communists accused of start-

ing the Reichstag fire—all of which seems to indicate that he was completely independent of any Nazi influence.

Some of his supporters in Washington have even pointed out that Bumke occasionally—in private, of course—disagreed with certain features of Hitler's policy, such as the persecutions of the Jews. It seems, indeed, as though everybody except the very highest Nazis has disapproved of Hitler's anti-Semitic activities. At least everybody says so—now—though they were very careful to conceal their disapproval while the atrocities were being committed.

In any case, Erwin Bumke has never opened his mouth to protest against what was going on in Germany. At best he was silent. But remaining at his post as the highest judge of Germany could not mean anything but silent approval of what was going on: approval of the murder of thousands of people; approval of the banishing of hundreds of thousands to concentration camps; approval of replacing a sound system of justice by a caricature devised along the lines of the slogan: Justice is anything that is good for the Germans.

No, this quiet, unobtrusive Bumke never had the makings of an anti-Nazi. Indeed, the Reichsgericht, while it was under his control during the years of the republic, was the most reactionary institution in the whole country. It was here that Hitler's predecessors, the political assassins, were exonerated. It was here that charges against certain high officials of German justice, friends of Bumke, who later admitted gaily that they had conspired with the Nazis against the republic, were dismissed. It was here that revelations were quashed which might have made things difficult for the still-struggling Nazi party. It was here that one of the great journalists of all time, Carl von Ossietzky, a man who constantly warned against the dangers of Fascism, was sentenced for high treasonbecause he had published details about the conspiracies of the Black army. Scarcely free again, he was rearrested by the Nazis as soon as they came to power. Later, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while he was being held in a concentration camp. He was to die shortly after his release, a victim of Nazi brutality.

Perhaps Herr Bumke is not a Nazi. But he certainly is guilty of a great crime: he was weak when his job demanded strength; he compromised when the occasion demanded decision.

A weak man, a man of compromises—that is exactly what the

Nazis will want, a man who to all outward appearances will be opposed to all Nazi ideas, but who will actually remain what he has always been: a reactionary, unable ever to break away from the influence of the people he has lived with all his life—the reactionaries. A man who cannot possibly have any understanding of anything new. A man who will aid the Nazis as in the twenties he helped the Black Reichswehr and the numerous conspirators. A man who will imprison for high treason any newspaperman who, he fears, might later reveal the conspiracies of the Nazi underground, as he imprisoned Carl von Ossietzky.

The other man who has been mentioned for the job of President of Germany after the war is Pastor Martin Niemoeller.

This man presents a much more complicated problem than Bumke. For, unlike the judge, in the past he has definitely come out against the Nazis. The world remembers it. He protested violently against Hitler's interference in Church matters. He tried to protect non-Aryan priests of the Protestant Church when they were in danger of being removed from their pulpits. He organized strong Christian resistance all over Germany to Hitler's attempt to give the Protestant Church a leader in the person of the former army chaplain, Ludwig Mueller, one of the most problematical figures of the Third Reich. He wrote and delivered sermons in his little church in an elegant suburb of Berlin which caused everybody to fear that he might be arrested any Sunday. He was finally arrested and, though the court acquitted him of all the trumped-up charges that were made against him, he was put in a concentration camp—where he still is as far as anyone knows.

This is one side of the picture. But there is another one. Martin Niemoeller comes from one of the most reactionary families in Germany. A former navy officer, he was one of a group of the most Pan-Germanistic men in the navy. During World War I he became a successful and famous U-boat commander. The revolution made him a bitter man. He was against everything it represented, for everything the old German Empire had represented. He became prominent among the young men who formed illegal military units. He enlisted as a member of the Black Reichswehr.

Today it is conveniently forgotten by those who sponsor him that he was one of the first members of the Nazi party and that for many years he was an admiring follower of Adolf Hitler. Not a word did he have to say against the Führer and all the horrors he perpetrated, up to 1933. It was only then that he disagreed—with remarkable courage it must be admitted. He decided to leave the party, thus depriving himself of great advantages which every old member was certain of, and expose himself to great danger. Yes, he had courage. He was probably the only Nazi who left the party in the year 1933.

But as far as his quarrels with Hitler go, they do not include the whole Nazi philosophy. Niemoeller objected only to certain features, certain events, certain personalities. If Hitler had left religion alone, Niemoeller would never have fought him. If instead of trying to make his friend Pastor Mueller head of the Church, Hitler had chosen a better churchman, or if he had left the choice to the churchmen themselves, Martin Niemoeller would have been delighted. He said so himself.

How limited Niemoeller's divergencies with Hitler are became obvious at the beginning of the war, in September 1939. The pastor had by then been in prison for many years. He had repeatedly declined offers of freedom under the condition that he give up preaching. It was his constant contention that he must tell the world what he thought of Hitler. But now, when Hitler began his war against the world, this no longer seemed important. It seemed more important to help Hitler win the war. The martyr to his faith volunteered—as a submarine commander. Which means that he has hardly changed since 1914.

If Niemoeller were to become the head of the German government, he certainly would do away with all those features of the Hitler regime which he has so violently and courageously protested against. But he would not take the initiative in doing away with any of the features of that regime against which he has not protested, and with which he is in complete accord.

Niemoeller was a Nazi from the very beginning and he will always remain a Nazi. He has never fought against the political philosophy of Nazism as such, which means that if he attained power the illegal representatives of this philosophy will possess in him a good and powerful friend.

Which makes the choice of Niemoeller as the coming man in Germany an almost ideal opportunity for the Nazi underground.

What applies to Niemoeller applies as well to all the men on the lists compiled by the Anglo-Americans of those who should be included in a future German government. Some of these men are former Nazis who later decided to quit the party. Perhaps they have even deserted the very idea of Nazism. Among such men are Otto Strasser, who broke with Hitler because Nazism was not revolutionary enough; and Hermann Rauschning, who broke with Hitler because Nazism was not conservative enough. There are others who have never been genuine Nazis, such as Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who used the Nazis and let himself be used by them, and Dr. Otto Meissner, who was something of a glorified personal secretary to the first President of the republic, Ebert, and to his successors, Hindenburg and Hitler. He has been able to play many instruments and to be on many sides. So have any number of other men who are now being mentioned for posts in the future German government: Franz von Papen and Erwin Plank, one of the great intriguers in the Army Ministry during the time of the republic, for example. There are still other men who have been mentioned as possible members of a German government; for instance, Gottfried Treviranus and his former chief Heinrich Bruening who, while definitely on a higher level than the rest of the candidates, is, after all, the man who proved himself completely unable to stem the Nazi tide. Why, then, should he prove himself more capable of doing so this time?

All of these men, including Bruening, will be palatable or even welcome to the Nazi underground because none of them will be overeager to do anything drastic about the underground. None of them will want to hurt any former friends. And most of them would not even dare to risk doing so, because the Nazis will be in possession of files containing information which, if known to the rest of the world, would make life very unpleasant for these men.

If any one of these men heads a future German government or becomes a member of such a government, the Nazi underground has little to worry about. It can bide its time.

Let us sum up:

The picture in Germany immediately after the war would be somewhat as follows: at the top a few "decent, neutral" statesmen who, at first sight, seem to have no connection with the Nazis. Be-

hind and around them a great number of men who seem willing, even eager, to collaborate with the AMG and the occupying authorities in order to retain their positions. Behind them innumerable front organizations and Nazi cells biding their time, waiting, lying low. And finally, at least during the first period of occupation, the relatively small group or groups of those who wage active resistance, the guerrillas and partisans.

By the time this resistance has died out, the Nazi cells will slowly begin to become active. Nothing spectacular will happen—at least not for a long time. Rumors will be circulated. Nervousness will be artificially increased all over Germany. Criticism of what the occupation authorities are doing, and of the collaborating government. will become louder. Slogans will spring up. The general discontent and resentment will not be allowed to die down even if, after the first months, the hardships of the occupation diminish. A subtle type of sabotage will be carried through. Not that there will be any explosions or killings; nothing much will happen-which in itself is a kind of sabotage too. Nothing much will come of the reconstruction of Germany. Things just won't move. Nothing will get done; or, if done, it will only make things worse. From a general impression of confusion people will gradually arrive at the certainty that things are in a bad state. Not only will there actually be a bad mess, but they will be made to feel that there is. They will be made to feel that nothing is getting better, that Germany will never recover and never get anywhere again, unless something—anything -is done.

Then the people will begin to whisper of the good old times by which they will mean the times under Hitler.

There is no telling in what measure or at what speed this sort of thing will grow. It is logical to assume that if the government of Germany and the AMG act in a way that makes it easy for the Nazi underground to exist and infiltrate everywhere, the whispering campaign against them will be conducted with great caution. For the underground has no reason to want a revolt against such convenient authorities too soon. If, on the other hand, the government should prove disappointing to the Nazis, criticism and dissatisfaction will increase by leaps and bounds. But even if the underground should thus be able to achieve a change in the government, that does not mean that it will take over the government

itself. Not by a long shot. This final goal is not to be reached for many years—not until the world has had time to forget what the Nazis did in Germany the last time. Otherwise there might be an international intervention which would throw them out of power before they really got settled.

In this business of psychological warfare the right type of propaganda is, of course, of greatest importance. Dr. Goebbels himself will not be around to contribute his splendid ideas. The man who seems to be chosen as his successor, as far as the underground is concerned, is a propaganda expert called Leopold Gutterer, a former newspaperman, who has been lately an undersecretary in the Propaganda Ministry. In April 1944 he was relieved of his post by the Führer "for reasons of health" and appointed chairman of the board of directors of the Ufa Film, holding company of all German moving-picture concerns. Sometime toward the middle of 1935 he wrote an article in the Zeitschrift fuer Politik, in which he remarked that you can disarm a nation, but you can never disarm propaganda. For propaganda, he said, can be made without control of the press or of the radio. Effective propaganda can be made, he emphasized, even in the most subjugated country, and under the most adverse circumstances.

The question of the right slogans will loom important in the propaganda ministry of the underground. After the last defeat, in 1918, the question of the right slogans was of great importance too. At that time the General Staff itself attended to finding them, setting aside a special office where ideas were to be worked out, which should explain to the German people that Germany had not been defeated by the enemy. The legend of the "stab in the back" administered to the army by Socialist Jews and misguided civilians in general was the first and most successful slogan to be composed in the special office of the General Staff. It made its way all over Germany and all around the world.

The defeat of Germany in 1918 was a real military defeat. Rarely has any historical fact been more obvious. The record cannot be misconstrued or explained away. It was Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff themselves who, in October 1918, demanded that an armistice be concluded, since they could no longer guarantee to hold the front. There is no record anywhere that consideration of

the civilian morale at home played any part in the formulation of that decision. But only two years later a whispering campaign began about the stab in the back. No proof was ever offered that such a stab had been administered, or, if so, how it had been administered. It wasn't necessary. The Germans wanted to believe that their army was unbeatable. If this belief could be bolstered up by the myth that its defeat was caused by trickery, so much the better. Thus the slogan of the stab in the back fell on fertile ground. Rumor became news; news became history. Future generations of historians may well speculate as to whether or not Hitler could ever have succeeded in pushing the German people into World War II, if they had not been firmly convinced that they had not lost World War I, or that, in fact, they could not be beaten at all.

There is no reason why the fairy tale of the stab in the back should not be used once more; why it should not be said again that Germany won the war against a world of enemies, against an incredible superiority in raw materials, man power, and money, and that then again she was betrayed, stabbed in the back. This time Italy will be the guilty one. If Italy had not concluded an armistice, the enemy would never have been able to beat Germany. Why, even after the collapse of Italy, Germany was strong enough to occupy Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Slovakia singlehanded. But, of course, the stab in the back was deadly. It was the old German tragedy: the unbeatable hero Siegfried being slain by the coward Hagen who drives a spear into the soft spot between his shoulder blades.

This will be the chief slogan. Others will be grouped around it: "America's gold against German women and children." Or: "The world assassinates German culture." Or: "Asia will rape Europe." How great a part the Jews will play as the villains in these new slogans does not seem certain yet. After the Jews inside Germany have been almost completely exterminated it may be difficult to arouse public ire against them. Then, too, anti-Semitic slogans may arouse international suspicion again, and the underground will want to avoid for a long time everything which might link it to the Hitler regime.

But inside Germany the name of Hitler and the memory of his deeds will not be allowed to die. Forgotten will be the fact that

he was responsible for the death of millions of young German men, that he brought Germany down to ruin and disaster, that he dragged the world back to barbarism. It will be remembered that under him Germany became the most powerful country in the world, that at one time it held all of Europe under its sway, that it once gained control of a large part of Soviet Russia, and that it even brought proud England almost to her knees.

It is not difficult to deceive posterity about "heroes" of former times. Napoleon, who betrayed the Revolution; who threw France into countless devastating wars; who is responsible for the death of the flower of France; who—notwithstanding his great genius—brought France to ruin; who—notwithstanding his numerous conquests—left France smaller than she had been when he came into power, will always be remembered as a great success, as a man who brought glory and riches to his country. Hitler, who really should not be compared with Napoleon, will be remembered for precisely the same things.

But, of course, he has to be dead first.

Since it is probable that Hitler will perish in his Eagle's Nest, his body may never be found. Yet even if he should end in a less spectacular way it will be rumored later that it was not Hitler who ended thus but a double or a stand-in and that Hitler's body was never found. German history knows many cases of heroes whose bodies were never found. It helps Germans to dream of such heroes sleeping somewhere inside a mountain, perhaps waiting for the day when they will come out again. It is a good guess that there will be such a Hitler legend before long. If there isn't, the propaganda ministry of the underground will have missed a good chance.

12

What Can We Do About It?

ONLY about ten years ago Adolf Hitler made the modest claim that the Third Reich would last one thousand years. While it always seems unwise to make such long-range predictions, it looked at that time as though the Third Reich might have a reasonably long life. Perhaps not exactly a thousand years, but at least from thirty to fifty.

Are the thousand years up now? It would be wrong to make a flat statement. The Nazi regime which is about to fall may come back. The thousand years, or at least a part of it, can still be continued later. And the Third Reich after it goes underground cannot be counted as completely out of the running.

How long it will take for the Nazis to come back, to emerge on the surface—if they succeed in their aims—is a question which cannot be answered at all. Even under the most favorable circumstances—that is, most favorable for them—it will take ten or fifteen years. Even then it would be a blitzkrieg, an underground blitzkrieg with somewhat different conceptions of time.

The Italian underground needed a half century to achieve its goal, the Irish a whole century, the Bonapartists thirty-five years, and the Russian Socialists twenty-five. The Russians needed two lost wars to bring about their revolution. The Nazis cannot wait for another lost war. They want to come to power so that they can start World War III.

This may take a long time. A whole generation may pass before they will emerge again. Hence the tactics of the first hour will matter less than the grand strategy they adopt for the duration of the underground. And the slogans of the first few years will not be enough to keep the followers of the underground in line over a long period of time. Something less short-lived will be necessary, particularly since the Nazis will not be able to use their best mediums of propaganda: parades, uniforms, music, mass meetings, speeches.

Something that strikes deeper than slogans is needed: a religion, perhaps. And, interestingly enough, it is a new religion which seems to be in the making in Germany during these days before the final collapse. The Nazis have not entered into this new venture without some preparation. For more than ten years they have done everything they could to alienate the masses from the Church. They have worked out a whole Führer cult, they have flirted with the heathen creed of the old Germans and with a misunderstood pantheism. Then they discovered that it might be their best bet to adopt for Germany the Japanese state religion, the so-called cult of Tenno.

Das Schwarze Korps, Himmler's SS weekly, on November 25, 1943, published articles in which the German and the Japanese faiths were discussed and compared at great length. "We have often during this war admired our courageous and heroic ally in the Far East. We have envied him his creed, in which God and his people, according to their mythical origin, are a unity, and according to which every single Japanese knows himself to be eternally reborn after his death and raised to become a Godlike hero."

If the Germans were ever to believe in this and if they thus followed the Japanese line to the end in its complete contempt for danger and its lack of fear of death, the underground would profit. It would assure courageous fighters who might willingly die for the movement, and it would also mean that those who survive could not easily be discouraged. Therefore, Das Schwarze Korps stressed the fact that even those who are dead participate in events on earth. "As the souls of the dead loved ones do not cease to participate in life here on earth, the souls of the imperial forefathers, too, take part in it." Here is the link to Hitler, the Hitlerlegend-to-come and, generally speaking, the idea, or rather the promise, that the leader or any successor of the leader will be there to watch his loyal ones. In general, Das Schwarze Korps has done everything to emphasize the fact that the Tenno and the Führer are identical. "Tenno is the concrete part of the idea of the empire ... he is the reason for the unity of culture and politics of the empire. . . ."

Another feature of the Japanese religion they stress is the necessity to have faith to believe implicitly, sometimes even without regard for reality or fact. This, Das Schwarze Korps wrote, the Germans must do. Finally, the Nazi paper quoted a somewhat free translation of the song of the unknown Japanese soldier as follows:

If you fall
Your high praise is sung
And your glory is greatest
When the time of your fall comes.

Is it a coincidence that ever since the summer of 1943 the German youth in school has been taught a new song which, referring to the Nibelungen Saga, goes as follows:

We mount the thunderheads of war, Valhalla is our destined place, The earth be shattered to the core, When falls the master race.
When Etzel forced the Nibelung band, His house crashed down in fire, So shall Europe flaming stand, When German men expire.

To sum up: with the collapse of Germany imminent, with an underground struggle ahead which will cost dearly in human lives, the Nazis are trying everything to make death fashionable; in fact, to make a religion of it. What the underground needs is fanatics who believe implicitly in the duty of dying and thus living on for the Führer so that he may eventually come back.

So much for the psychological strategy. As to the military strategy of this total underground war now in preparation, it will be dictated by the final goal. This goal is the same as it has always been: domination of the world by Germany.

In the future, Germany or the underground may not have a choice of allies. They will have to collaborate with whoever is willing to accept them. Since it seems pretty obvious that Soviet Russia will not want to collaborate with Fascism under cover, the greater probability is that at some future date Germany will revive

the now much publicized idea that she is the safeguard of the world against Bolshevism. How the world will react to such maneuvers, to what degree other countries or their governments will help the Nazis back to power in order to fulfill their "mission" of fighting Bolshevism, remains to be seen. Certain countries, or forces in those countries, will undoubtedly become the logical allies of the Nazi underground—the Finnish circles around Baron von Mannerheim, for instance, or the Polish colonels' clique, which once so ardently fought for everything the Nazis fought for and which, except for the fact that it was thrown out of its own country, has not changed at all.

No matter, however, who falls in with the Nazis and who does not (for it may be that Mannerheim or the Polish colonels will not have so much to say after this war) the final result of any alliance with the Nazis will be war—World War III.

This is no mere speculation, no mere daydream. Even today, while World War II is still being fought, the more realistic German generals are discussing what must be done to prepare a new war. In November 1943 the Algerian weekly *Combat* published a few remarks of these generals. General Otto von Stuelpnagel even composed a lengthy memorandum on the war to come. He wrote:

What does a provisional defeat matter to us if, because of the destruction of man power and material which we will have been able to inflict on our enemies and neighboring territories, we have obtained a margin of economic and demographic superiority greater than before 1939? The conquest of the world will require numerous stages, but the essential is that the end of each stage brings us an economic and industrial potential greater than that of our enemies. With the war booty which we have accumulated, the enfeebling of two generations of the man power, the destruction of the industries of our neighbors and that which we can save of our own, we shall be better placed to conquer in twenty-five years than we were in 1939. The interval of twenty-five years is a limited interval, for that is the time which will be required for Russia to repair the destruction we have visited on her.

We do not have to fear peace conditions analogous to those which we have imposed because our adversaries will be always divided and disunited. Our enemies recognize already that the 1920 formula, "Germany will pay," lacked sense and worth. We will furnish them some brigades of workers, we will restore some art objects or out-of-date

machines, and we can always say that those which we do not restore were destroyed by enemy bombardments. We should immediately prepare as camouflage a list of such objects destroyed by Anglo-American bombs.

Marshal von Rundstedt made a speech in the War Academy in Berlin in which he argued along much the same line:

The destruction of neighboring people and their riches is indispensable to our victory. One of the great mistakes of 1918 was to spare the civil life of the enemy countries, for it is necessary for us Germans to be always at least double the number of the peoples of contiguous countries. We are therefore obliged to destroy at least a third of their inhabitants. The only means is organized underfeeding, which in this case is better than machine guns.

Marshal von Mannstein, in a confidential circular to brigade commanders September 17, 1943, advised that "our pillage should be methodical and organized. It is necessary to import above all commodities of little weight representing great value, such as jewelry, precious metals and stones, cultural objects, books, linen, stamps, et cetera, in order to sell them easily and transform them into monetary deposits in inviolable places."

Perhaps the most astonishing fact about such statements is that they were made at all. German generals are not in the habit of going on record as to what they think. However, there is no doubt that they think and feel in such a way, and that they are in complete agreement with Himmler and the rest of the gang: that they are planning another world war.

To transmute such plans into reality the Nazis must once more come into power.

Who, then, are the men and women who will form the prospective army of the underground, the army which in due time will emerge above ground to try once more what Hitler tried before?

They will be everywhere. From the point of view of the underground, all Germany will be considered fertile ground from which to draft men.

Everything that happens to Germany in the last stages of this war and afterward will throw the majority of the Germans into what may be termed a defensive psychological situation. Once more they will feel that they are being enslaved—because they have not been allowed to enslave the world.

Many of the returning soldiers will be disillusioned because they saw victory snatched away from them just as it was almost in their grasp. Among the embittered ones will be, for example, the many officers who have not served long enough to be eligible for pensions. Unable to work in another profession, they will slowly deteriorate. There will be the disappointed German aviators who thought they were masters of the world and who will now have to come down to earth in every sense of the word and take up dreary little jobs far beneath what they had envisioned before. There will be the prisoners of war returning from other countries. Far from being disgusted with the Nazi regime which cost them so dear, far from working for a better and genuinely democratic Germany, these returned prisoners will be more Nazi than ever before. For this the underground may thank the English and American governments who, in their almost superhuman fairness, are keeping to the letter of the Geneva Convention and do not interfere in any way with the lives of their prisoners of war. It is impossible for these prisoners to become acquainted with any ideas that are opposed to the Nazi doctrine, for they are kept under the strictest discipline by their camp "Führers"; they read only what the Führer approves of; and are permitted to think only what the Führer approves of even to the point where, in some cases, those who did not obey the strict Nazi discipline were murdered by their fellow prisoners.

Then there will be the average Germans, who will feel that they have been treated badly because some part of the old Reich, perhaps East Prussia, is no longer German. In due time they will believe that the war which was started by Hitler in order to take over most of Europe was actually initiated by the other side in order to take East Prussia or other territories away from Germany.

How easy it is to promote such ideas has been demonstrated by the behavior of some refugees in the United States who are strictly anti-Nazi but who have, nevertheless, been unable to keep from protesting violently when they thought Germany might lose some of her territories after this war. A typical reaction of that sort set in after the Russians had suggested that the Poles take over East Prussia—an idea which seemed quite reasonable to Winston Churchill. These people, who had been thrown out of Germany, who had been told so uncompromisingly by the German people, or at least by representatives of the vast majority of the German people, that they were no longer wanted, now suddenly became patriotic Germans. They were outraged. They wrote letters to American newspapers declaring that German territory must not fall into Polish hands. This, they declared, would be the most terrible thing that could possibly happen in a world in which so many terrible things had already happened. Did these men protest as a unit when German troops marched into Poland? They did not. Did they protest when German troops marched into France, into the Balkans, or into Russia? They did not. Did they sign statements condemning the *Anschluss* of Austria, the rape of Czechoslovakia? They did not. But now they felt they had to protest.

Being the political master minds they are, they of course have no conception of what such a statement means to the Nazis. It means not only strengthening the Nazi position now, since people all over the world will say that for once the Nazis may be right in protesting because, after all, did anti-Nazis not join them in the protest? But it means also—and this is much more important for the future —that it will become progressively more difficult for an outsider to see where the Nazi front ends and where the anti-Nazi front begins. Nothing that such "patriotic refugees" have said these last years, particularly since it has been certain that Germany will lose the war, is detrimental to a Nazi party preparing to go underground. It is exactly this kind of talk, this kind of indignant patriotism, in which these men excel, that enables the Nazis to keep in the background while others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. If German industries are left intact, not because Herr Schacht or Herr von Schnitzler demand it, but because anti-Nazi refugees demand it; if East Prussia remains within the Reich, not because Field Marshal von Mannstein demands it but because the Hitler victims desire it, so much the better for the Nazis. Because if they are not forced to make their demands openly, but can get others to do their dirty work for them, these demands will have a much greater chance of being fulfilled. As far as the record goes, they will not be Nazi stipulations at all, but rather the ardent expressions of the desires of anti-Nazis.

Hence it must clearly be understood that the Nazi underground

certainly has every interest in keeping such men in the public eye. They are extremely useful.

If in no other way they serve admirably to camouflage the work of the underground. A group formed by men who have fled from Hitler Germany could never be pronounced Nazi. Would not a group of such German patriots be the perfect setup for a Nazi to use as a front? Membership would afford the Nazi agent who joins a great measure of security. It would also provide him with excellent contacts. In short, it is made to measure for an agent of the coming Nazi underground.

Thus even anti-Nazis may unsuspectingly become part of the army behind the Nazi underground.

Then there will be the youth. Young boys and girls who have never witnessed the terrors of the Hitler regime will be easily persuaded that everything was wonderful while the Führer was still there. Conditions will be bad inside Germany for a long time to come, and the youth will feel that matters should be changed. German schools will find ways and means to foster such an impression in them. In history courses teachers—always pillars of Pan-Germanism—will talk about the glorious victories of the Führer. These victories will be celebrated, perhaps in great secrecy, which makes them all the more romantic—but Hitler's defeats will never be mentioned. Youth groups, such as the German equivalent of the Boy Scouts, will keep the Hitler cult alive. Sport clubs will also be active.

In short, the whole of Germany may be regarded as a prospective army of the Nazi underground. Every German who feels and acts in a way that can be termed patriotic is a potential member of such a prospective army.

What Hitler and his men did to Europe has been a strong enough motive for the growth of many different underground movements there. Reality, indeed, has thus created a new reality—or so it seems. But are these underground movements really something new? What has happened? Nothing much has happened except that a Europe which existed before the war has continued to exist. Only, since it could not exist openly, it had to go underground. All of Europe submerged.

But Europe did not change. It could not, because the forces that

made Europe what it is are far stronger than Hitler's forces. The fact that the underground movements in all the occupied countries are characteristic and representative of the traditions, the basic conditions, the ideas alive in those countries before the war, is decisive proof that those basic conditions and those ideas are stronger than Hitler.

What makes all these underground movements so important, far beyond Hitler, is the fact that they are the logical, and only remaining expression of a world that, though "conquered," is still very much alive. As Europe has remained Europe, Germany will remain Germany. The Nazi underground will be nothing fundamentally new, though once the world takes notice of its existence it will be acclaimed or cursed as a new threat, danger, or achievement. In the last analysis it is nothing but the whole of Germany with all its talents and faults, its violence, arrogance, and strange inferiority complexes, its eternal wish to be free and its eternal desire to dominate the world: a Germany which has gone underground—a Germany which, according to its philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, believes "The world will one day be healed through the German spirit."

Or as the modern German philosopher, Moeller van den Bruck, the man who coined the expression "Third Reich," once said of the Germans: "It is our mission to give the world no rest."

What can we do about it?

Lately there has been an avalanche of opinion on "what to do with Germany." There is Ernest Hemingway's idea of sterilizing the Germans and Dorothy Thompson's fervent desire to trust them and give them another chance. There are Lord Vansittart's extremely well-written essays on the eternal German threat; there were the many books by former foreign correspondents, all of whom demanded stern measures against the Germans because, as one of them, Sigrid Schultz, said, they will "try it again." There is Louis Nizer's fine analysis of the small value adhering to treaties signed by Germany. There are George Bernard Shaw's amusing observations about things that should not be done with Germany and H. G. Wells's exasperated comments on what had to be done. There are numerous plans for disarming the country, destroying its war industries, re-educating the Germans, and supervising the

schooling system. There are the English and American newspapers asking their readers how Germany should be treated after the war, and the countless answers to that disputable question; and there are the Gallup polls taken on different potential measures to be used against the vanquished Nazis.

Practically all that has been said and written on this subject so far represents only private opinion. No government has yet made a definite statement about what it intends to do, though Moscow has dropped certain hints. Perhaps the most "official" plan yet to get into print is the well-known revelation of Kingsbury Smith about what the United States State Department is planning to do about Germany. It is the plan for the AMG, involving American so-called Gauleiters for Germany, and a long period of re-education while Germany is occupied. Many arguments were advanced in favor of the plan, the chief one being that it would prevent unrest and revolution. Smith also revealed that collaboration with the German Junkers was not considered out of the question.

The publication of this plan, the validity of which was neither confirmed nor denied by the State Department, was a sensation for the Allied public. It could hardly have caused as great a sensation in the intelligence department of the Gestapo. After all, German intelligence must have known for some time about the Army School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia.

What will we do with Germany? The very question is in itself badly put. It sounds as though Germany, after losing the war, will be at our mercy. This may be the case for a short time, perhaps, but only for a short time. To believe otherwise would be to revive the illusion of 1918 all over again. The main question is not what we will do with Germany. It is, rather, what will Germany do with us? And the next question is: How best can we prevent Germany from carrying out her plans? Can it be done by introducing a regime of terror? Can it be done by forgiving the German people, and starting appeasement all over again? Can it be done by technical devices, such as occupation for ten or twenty years, by control of transportation or utilities, by closing frontiers and keeping Germany in quarantine? Can it be done by doing business with Germany or not doing business with Germany? Can it be done by exercising strict control over raw materials imported into Germany? By supervising German newspapers, theaters, and radio? Is it

possible to re-educate the German people? Or may we hope that the Germans have learned from events and that what they have gone through or will go through will change them? Is it conceivable that the very few really militant anti-Nazi Germans will gather around them enough followers to enable them to control the German mind and run Germany in such a way that the world need not again be exposed to the German threat ten or twenty years hence? Or will the Germans always disavow the leaders who want to lead them in the right direction and follow blindly those who lead them and the world into war and disaster?

One thing seems obvious: we must strengthen the ranks of the anti-Nazis inside Germany. Even if it is not possible to turn the country over to them we must give them an opportunity to show what they can do. Even if the country must be occupied—and it must—we should make it clear to the Germans that they ought to settle their own affairs, and this in a way that will guarantee the peace of the world.

Fascism is nothing but the primitive though somewhat disguised desire for power. In order to succeed, the Nazi underground, like the Nazi party twenty years ago, has to promise everything to everybody. For there is no leading idea unifying the army of the Nazi underground; there are only the hopes of its many soldiers of gaining something for themselves—and many of their goals automatically exclude each other. There is a deep abyss running through the Nazi underground. If we can widen it, if we can show the German people that this whole movement is nothing but an enormous fraud, all schemes for a Nazi future will collapse.

In order to achieve this end we must have an idea, where the Nazis have not. We must be untiring in our efforts to make this idea real and workable.

Rudolf Hess said at the Party Congress of 1937 in Nuremberg that the whole world knew the old order was ended; that a new order must be created. He went on to say that he believed the Nazi order was that new order.

As it turned out, this Nazi order was but a continuation of the old disorder, in more barbaric terms. But Hess was quite right when he said that the old order was ended. He was right to a much greater degree than he probably knew himself. How otherwise was

it possible that the little Nazi party could grow so fast? How was it possible that gangsters who never denied their gangster methods could take power? How was it possible that they almost succeeded in conquering the world?

In a world where things are in reasonable order, the Nazis could never have come to power. They did come to power because something was wrong with a world in which millions of people in every country were out of work, where they went hungry while in other countries millions of bushels of wheat and grain were poured into the ocean; where millions suffered from over-industrialization of their country while even more millions were denied the benefits derived from basic industries; where whole countries sank to a subhuman standard of life because they were not rich enough to import the necessary raw materials, and others suffocated in gold and had to bury it deep in the ground.

And the Nazis will come to power again if that something which is wrong with the world is not remedied. If we can make our world a better world, the Nazis will disappear into the abyss of history.

The English, French, and Americans were pleased in 1918 to think that they had prevented a genuine revolution in Germany. They were unhappy that they could not prevent a genuine revolution in Russia. Twenty-five years later millions of French, English, and American soldiers had to fight a second time against Germany. Many of these soldiers have died because there had not been a German revolution in 1918. Yet millions of Allied soldiers will live because Russia did go through a revolution.

We, the Allies, have not yet understood this lesson. We still seem to be afraid lest a revolution break out in the Fascist countries. We want Hitler and Mussolini out of the way, but we don't feel that the German, French, and Italian industrialists should suffer unduly. We are willing to crush the Nazis, but we are most unwilling to hurt those who have made them possible. We have understood that certain changes are necessary, but we have not yet understood that a complete change is necessary.

The only way the coming Nazi underground can be crushed before it is strong enough to rear its head is to introduce a new order. In Germany—and outside of Germany. The Nazis came to power, not because something was wrong with Germany, but because something was wrong with the world. Nothing has yet

changed as far as the world is concerned. Mr. Churchill is still of the opinion that the British Empire should be preserved precisely as it was when he was born. The overwhelming majority of influential Americans still believe that the United States should be run according to the principles and by methods which were effective and fair a generation or two ago.

This war will bring about a change as far as the relation of the strength of the different powers is concerned. But that is not enough. It is not enough that Germany will be weak for many years to come, and Soviet Russia strong. That France will have to be rebuilt and America will have to feed the world. Any result which is subject to changes in itself—and Germany will not always stay weak—guarantees nothing. It is not the relative strengths of the different powers that must change, but the relations of the human beings within all the countries of this world. Some call it revolution. Some call it a new order. Whatever we call it, it must come about.

If it does not, the Nazi underground will live and flourish. In due time it will make itself felt far beyond the borders of Germany. It will certainly make itself felt in this country—and no ocean will be broad enough to stop it.

For Nazism or Fascism is by no means an Italian or German specialty. It is as international as murder, as greed for power, as injustice, as madness. In our time these horrors were translated into political and cultural actuality in Italy and in Germany first. The next time . . .

If we don't stamp out the Nazi underground, it will make itself felt all over the world; in this country too. We may not have to wait ten years, perhaps not even five.

For many years in the past we closed our eyes to the Nazi threat. We must never allow ourselves to close them again. The danger to the world, to this country will not diminish. But it is possible to fight this danger if we know it, if we remain aware of its existence.

That is why this book was written.

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